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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an account of the challenges people in Tyefu Location, Peddie District, and 
specifically in Gwabeni village, face in their attempts to manage their common pool natural 
resources. Taking my analytical cue from the literature which deals with the institutional 
dimensions of resource management in common property systems, I look at the impact of both 
outside influences and local dynamics on resource managing institutions at village level. 
I show how particular historical circumstances, including state interventions, led to the 
enclosure of Tyefu Location, and to the rapid increase in the population that had to be 
accomodated here. This placed enormous pressure on the natural resources of the area, and 
contributed to the emasculation of the local institutions responsible for overseeing resource 
management. The residents of the location adopted whatever strategies they could to 
ameliorate the depletion of natural resources in their villages. One 'traditional' strategy they 
have sought to emulate is to move their imizi (homesteads) away from areas where local 
resources has been exhausted. Given the finite area of land available to them, this strategy 
was only ever likely to be successful in the short-term. 
I analyse social, economic and institutional factors at village level that appear to act as 
disincentives to collective resource management activities. These factors include the social 
structure of the imizi and the socio-economic heterogeneity that exists between imizi in 
Gwabeni village. The varying degrees of household economic marginality that follow from this, 
together with the differential ownership of livestock and other possessions that decrease 
people's reliance on locally available natural resources, mean that the transaction costs that 
people would incur by contributing to collective resource management activities, differ widely. 
A primary cause of people's failure to engage in resource management at village level stems 
from the dispersion of the members of their imizi. This factor robs the village of decision-
makers and undermines the capacity of those left behind to make and implement resource 
management decisions. It results in the various members of imizi in the village having different 
orientations that dissipate the energy needed for collective action. It also fuels existing 
struggles, and creates new ones, over the meanings and uses of the term 'community'. 
I conclude by arguing that, in Tyefu Location, the management of natural resources is 
extremely difficult to co-ordinate, because such management is highly contested, undermined 
by differentiation among resource users, and subject to the attentions of weak village 
institutions that do not share a clear set of resource management objectives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Concern has been growing over the increasingly degraded1 state of natural resources 
in rural areas across the African continent (Anderson and Grove(eds)21987; Berry 
1997; UNRISD3 1994). In South Africa, much of the academic and popular attention 
in this regard has focussed on the resource degradation that is said to characterise 
many rural areas of the former bantustans (Cowling 1991; Ramphele (ed) 1991). It is 
particularly in these areas, where most of the land is subjected to various modified 
forms of communal tenure arrangements and related resource management systems4 , 
that disproportionately high indices of resource degradation are said to exist (De Wet 
1987b; Cooper 1991; Cross 1991; Peters 1994; also see Shackleton 1993). 
Recently, both in anticipation of and, latterly, in response to the land reform initiatives 
ofthe African National Congress (ANC)-Ied government, some of the literature on the 
subject of resource ownership and management has grappled with the social and 
ecological implications for sustainable resource utilisation of the government's plans 
to redistribute agriculturally productive land (MacKenzie 1994; Scholes 1994; Cousins 
1995). One result of these endeavours has been to place the track record of resource 
management practices in former bantustan rural areas under the spotlight again, as 
planners and policy-makers attempt to deal with the social, political and ecological 
legacy of past policies towards land ownership and management. 
A key area of the (ideologically loaded) debate in the 'land reform' literature has been 
the respective economic and ecological merits of different forms of land tenure 
(Cousins 1996; Williams 1996; also see De Wet and McAliister(eds) 1987; Cross and 
1 Such degradation can be both ecologically and economically significant : in terms of 
ecological criteria, the argument has been made that some of these processes of degradation are 
'irreversible' on any reasonable human time-scale (i.e. only very costly mechanical rehabilitation or 
thousands of years of natural rehabilitation could restore the resource base to an 'optimum' (not 
pristine) utilisation level); economically significant degradation could be said to have occurred when the 
state of the resource base declines below the subsistence requirements of the local population. 
2 Anderson and Grove (1987:9) contend, however, that the depiction of an African 'eco-
catastrophe' has been used by Western environmentalists and developers as a lever to justify further 
post-colonial interventions, both physical and socio-political, in rural Africa. Also see Leach and Mearns 
(eds) (1996) and Rocheleau et.al (1995) in this regard. 
3 United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. 
4 The concept of natural resource management as used here, is based on the interaction of 
three elements : the physical resource base (land, water, fauna, flora and climate), the production 
system (the uses to which these resources are put) and the social regulation (by way of rules, norms 
and conventions) of access to, use and distribution of these resources (Egger and Majeres 1992:305). 
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Haines(eds) 1988). The social and ecological impacts of one particular instance of 
tenure reform, namely state intervention by way of Betterment Planning, and its 
implications for natural resource management, has been subjected to rigorous empirical 
analysis and consideration (Yawitch 1981; Hendricks 1989, 1990; De Wet 1988, 
1989;1995 ; Mager 1992). Other factors, inter alia , the historical and institutional 
factors which mediate the ways in which rural peoples use and manage their natural 
resources, are not always as well documented or understood : in fact, the field seems 
to have a relatively soft empirical underbelly, with commentators relying on a small 
number of case studies from which to make their generalisations (see Bernstein 
1997:16; Cross 1991 :92; Kruger in Ramphele (ed.) 1991). 
Given this context, i.e. firstly that of the debate around the present government's land 
reform programme and the formulation of national land policies, and secondly, of the 
relative dearth of empirical data (see section below on post-modernism) on rural natural 
resource management systems, the need for detailed analyses of the social , economic 
and institutional dynamics across a broad range of these systems has been identified 
(Cousins 1995). Indeed, localised studies conducted more recently on a provincial and 
district basis have begun to address precisely this need (see for example, Kepe 1997; 
Ainslie et.a/. 1997; Huggins 1993 and LAPC6 1995). 
1. Explanations of Resource Degradation 
Conventional explanations for the degradation of natural resources in bantustan rural 
areas have taken two different tacks : the first set of broadly neo-liberal explanations 
blames natural resource degradation on the 'intrinsic weaknesses' of the communal 
land tenure system at the micro-level. It is argued that the depletion of the resource 
base is most advanced in these bantustan rural areas subject to communal tenure (see 
for example, Transkei Agricultural Development Study 1991; Houghton 1962:11 ; 
Antrobus et.al 19947 ; and for a critique of this approach, Vivian 1992:59). In its more 
sophisticated rendition, this line of argument invokes, or at least draws inspiration from 
5 A central problem here is that many people who reside in rural areas cannot be called 'rural' 
in any meaningful sense: almost every rurally-based person has multiple and complex social and 
economic ties with people and institutions in urban centres. It might in fact be that only the space in 
which they are presently situated is rural, but that their whole orientation is urban focussed . 
6 A series of regional or 'zonal' studies commissioned by the Land and Agriculture Policy 
Centre and published as working papers. 
7 Also see the series of letters, articles and editorials in the Daily Dispatch 27/9/1996 to 
10/10/1996. 
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the assertion that 'common property is nobody's property.' Resource degradation is 
seen as the inevitable result of uncontrolled utilisation8 under such conditions, such 
that the communal tenure system and the rural people9 in it, who are apparently unable 
to collectively manage their resources, are seen to be at the centre of the problem (see 
Runge 1986:50;Lawry (1990:405) for a case-study from Botswana and Lane (1992:98) 
for an example from Tanzania; Louw 1988). 
The second set of explanations for the degradation of bantustan natural resources 
relies mostly on macro-level analyses of the regional political economy. Such analyses 
stress the deleterious impacts of colonial expansion, of the appropriation of land and 
of labour migration by adult male villagers, who are often key decision-makers in village 
matters. They posit a picture of the subsequent crippling and impoverishment of the 
rural economy, rural overpopulation and the emasculation of rural local government first 
through incorporation into the colonial political economy and later through the 
interventions of the apartheid juggernaut (Ramphele (ed.) 1991 ;Huggins 1993; Letsoalo 
1987:77). 
This latter set of approaches has tended to cast rural people as the essentially innocent 
victims of an oppressive world system in its particular local manifestation, the apartheid 
state, which has imposed radically modified systems of communal tenure on rural 
people and in the process, upset an indigenous custodianship of land or 'land ethic'W 
These macro-level type explanations argue that the rigidity of these imposed systems, 
taken with the pressure of high concentrations of rural population, primarily the 
consequence of forced resettlements, has resulted in the inevitable over-exploitation 
and the subsequent degradation of the natural resources used by rural people. In this 
way, such explanations tend to portray rural people as 'reactive, buffeted by forces 
beyond their control, and helplessly watching as their own activities contribute to the 
8 This conventional view of the 'causes' of resource degradation subscribes to Hardin's (1968) 
'Tragedy of the Commons' argument which has been challenged in recent times (see McKay and 
Acheson (eds) 1987). The solution commonly put forward is to institute private ownership of land, 
thereby increasing the incentive of individual owners to manage their natural resources more 
sustainably. 
9 A consultant's report (Loxton, Venn and Associates 1991 :67) on Tyefu Irrigation Scheme 
reads as follows: 'The basic causes of environmental degradation go back to the people on the land. 
Therefore the primary conservation effort should be to create awareness of the processes causing soil 
erosion and veld degradation and to foster an interest in conservation.' [my emphasis]. 
10 An exception here is Hendricks (1990) who, despite taking a political economy perspective 
on rural land management, gives a nuanced analysis of intra-community socio-economic differentiation, 
showing how this negatively affects co-operative activities. 
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destruction of their chances for a better life in the future' (Ghai and Vivian 1992: 11). 
By contrast, I make use of a common property theoretical framework (Cousins 1995; 
Peters 1994; Ostrom 1990;Oakerson 1986) in this thesis, to analyse the management 
of natural resources in one particular resource management system, namely Tyefu 
Location in the Peddie district of the Eastern Cape Province. I argue that taken 
separately, both sets of conventional explanations for resource degradation in the 
former 'bantustans' are inadequate, because they fail to situate the patterns of natural 
resource consumption adopted by rural people within the local domain of the choices 
and strategies available to these people." The focus in this study is thus on the actual 
resource users and managers in these resource management systems and on the 
sometimes ambiguous ways in which these people contest and mediate the effects of 
the wider political economy on the use and management of rural natural resources (see 
Palmer 1997:13; Berry 1997,1993; Blaikie and Brookfield 1987). 
By incorporating elements of both these sets of explanations, I argue for a more open-
ended analysis of the complex social and social-ecological interactions that are taking 
place in rural areas of the former bantustans. Instead of seeking to present either a 
micro-level or a macro-level causal analysis for the many patent failures of resource 
management practices in bantustan rural areas, I want rather to problematise such an 
enquiry by investigating the ways in which factors which supposedly have their origins 
in one of these two domains (i.e. the micro-level actions of resource users and the 
macro-level political economy) reinforce or undermine each other. The prism through 
which this is viewed is the experience and actions of the people in these areas who are 
at the same time, both the agents and the recipients of resource management 
interventions. 
In arguing for a more nuanced understanding of the social norms and interactions that 
attach to land and other natural resources at the micro-level , I also suggest that facets 
of the common property theoretical framework may be deficient in fail ing to take 
sufficient cognisance'of the complex processes involved in the interplay between a 
variety of local and supralocal factors. The usefulness of the notion of 'social capital ' 
" Sara Berry, in the foreword to Peters (1994), makes this point eloquently : 'Once we confront 
the possibility that social agency involves ongoing struggles to cope not only with conflicting external 
pressures but also with ambiguous or contradictory interests in (and understandings of) their outcomes, 
rt becomes difficult to sustain modes of analysis that attribute social outcomes to the hegemonic 
influence of particular agents, instrtutions or ideas: 
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(Putnam 1993;Ostrom 1995), which sees the success of common property institutions 
as essentially a function of the degree of harmony or disruption in social dynamics in 
a corporate group, is one that I wish to challenge. 
2. The Study Area: Gwabeni village in Tyefu Location, Peddie District 
Tyefu Location,'2 which provides the spatial parameters of this study, has an area of 
some 24 218 hectares (De Beer 1984:200) and is situated in the north-western section 
of Peddie district (see Map 1). The location falls within the former Ciskei bantustan and 
is bounded by the Fish River to the south and by the Peddie-Committee's Drift road to 
the north, east and west. 
Tyefu Location was never subjected to villagisation and tenure reform under Betterment 
Planning. Consequently, the 'indigenous' settlement pattern in the location is one of 
widely dispersed groups of dwellings, which are loosely arranged into eleven '3 villages, 
of which Gwabeni is one. In 1985, the resident population of Tyefu Location was 
(probably over)estimated at around 13 563, with that of Gwabeni estimated to be 
approximately 600 (Setplan 1985, but see Chapter Five for an explanation of this 
figure). 
Tyefu Location has been described as having very limited overall agricultural potential 
and as only moderately suited to extensive and semi-intensive livestock production 
rather than cultivation (Loxton et. al. 1979). The low potential for dryland crop 
production stems from the semi-arid ecological conditions which prevail in the area. 
These include low and unpredictable rainfall , high rates of evapotranspiration, shallow 
soils and a complex topographyH 
12 Tyefu Location should not be confused with th e Tyefu Irrigation Scheme (see Holbrook 
1992), which was established in a section of the Fish River Valley that falls within the boundaries of 
Tyefu Location. 
13 The exact number of villages in Tyefu Location is a source of contention, because the people 
in some of the smaller settlement units have formed separate Residents' Associations, which hold their 
own meetings and consequently consider themselves to constitute a separate village to their 'parent 
village: This applies, for example, in the case of Mankone and Horton 'villages: Throughout this thesis, 
I use the term 'village' to refer to the loosely arranged (i.e. non-Bettered) clusters of homesteads that 
make up the discrete settlements prevalent in Tyefu Location . 
14 See Chapter Two for a more detailed discussion of these issues. 
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Map 1 : Tyefu Location in Peddie District 
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Given the low natural resource potential of the location, consistently high levels of 
natural resource use in the area, which include extensive grazing by domestic 
herbivores and the cultivation of steep slopes, have had an adverse effect on the 
limited resource base of the area. The most visible features of these patterns of land-
use and resource [mis]management are accelerated soil erosion (with an associated 
net loss of carbon from the remaining soil) and the transformation of vegetative 
species, such as the spread of unpalatable grasses and karroid shrubs (Palmer and 
Avis 1994). 
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Gwabeni village consists of 68 (occupied) homesteads, with around 227 residents. 
Local employment opportunities are very limited and the local economy is buttressed 
by state transfers and migrant remittances. Gwabeni has a primary school, a Methodist 
church and a creche. The nearest clinic is at the Tribal Authority office in Horton (some 
six kilometres away). While a few tiny spaza shops are dotted around the village, local 
residents generally make use of the credit offered at the small general dealer attached 
to the Breakfastvlei Hotel (less than one kilometre from the village) for the purchasing 
of their homestead necessities, especially food, toiletries and paraffin. The bottle-store 
and bar that form part of the Hotel complex are frequented by the men of the village. 
3. Fieldwork, Postmodernism and Writing Ethnography 
As has been the case in a number of other disciplines, postmodernism 15 has subjected 
the epistemological roots of anthropology, specifically its (often implicitly) positivist and 
modernist tradition, to an intense and critical scrutiny. In the process, the entire 
ethnographic project has been placed under a microscope - to use a somewhat 
positivist metaphor - and probing questions have been asked about the ways in which 
ethnographers 'construct understanding from the constructed native's constructed point 
of view' (Crapanzano 1986). 
At the heart of the postmodern deconstruction of rational scientific method, with its 
aspirations to objectivity and realism, is the assertion that social phenomena are 
layered with multiple meanings and that any analysis of these phenomena can only be, 
at best, subjective and partial (Van Maanen 1995:16). As Clifford argues, 'cultures do 
not hold still for their portraits' and any attempts to make them do so always involve 
simplification and exclusion, selection of a temporal focus, the construction of a 
particular self-other relationship and the imposition or negotiation of a power 
relationship (Clifford 1986:10). While Hastrup (1992:125) has described ethnographic 
texts as 'contextual ised truths which are under threat from the empirical ', for post-
modernists, it is both these texts and 'the empirical' (or factually knowable) world which 
are under siege from the multi-vocality and multiple perspectives of a post-modern 
condition. 
15 The ability of native (or insider) anthropologists to critically challenge assumptions made and 
conclusions reached in the depiction of the 'other' in anthropological texts is another feature of this 
critique (see Mafeje 1997). 
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Postmodernist theorists have argued that fieldwork entails systematic 'violence' 
between ethnographer and informant, and that this 'violence' is expressed in the 
essentially asymmetrical relationship that exists during fieldwork between researcher 
and researched (Hastrup 1992: 122). The asymmetry of this interaction is carried over 
into the contextualisation and reframing of the ethnographic material by the 
ethnographer-as-author.16 Such reframing has emerged, according to Clifford (1986:2), 
as central to what anthropologists do both 'in the field' and thereafter: the interpretive 
and manipulative exercises that go into the fashioning of ethnographic texts have been 
shown to comprise a myriad of literary devices that are employed to establish both the 
ethnographic authority and the narrative contract (including the establishment of an 
'us' group as opposed to 'them', the observed and revealed) between ethnographer and 
reader. 
The self-reflexive criticism generated by postmodernist authors has elicited the 
acknowledgment that all ethnographers are 'positioned subjects [who] grasp certain 
phenomena better than others' and that their position is defined by age, gender and 
outsider's status in the research setting (Rosaldo 1984: 192). By challenging the long-
held notions of ethnographies as detached, objective descriptions of cultures or as self-
sufficient explanations of social reality (Van der Waal 1992: 169); the postmodernist-
inspired 'ethnography of ethnography' (Van Maanen 1995: 17) has left us with the task 
of making explicit the ways in which our data are collected and how this process is 
contextualised by our subjective experience (Van der Waal 1992: 170, 171). Moreover, 
our task is to render the lives and events which we study as fully as possible, with all 
the 'contradictions, contestations and uncertainties' which exist in everyday life (Moore 
and Vaughan 1994: Introduction,xix). As Van Maanen (1995:23) argues, 
'The work at the coal face of ethnography goes on ....... in much the same way as 
it did before textuality came into vogue. Evidence must be offered up to support 
arguments whose pedigree must be established in a way that will convince at 
least a few readers that the author has something credible to say. Changes in 
attitude are always possible, and what is persuasive to one generation may look 
ludicrous to another ....... In the case of ethnography, what we continue to look for 
16 1n an argument more subtle than it is rendered here, Hastrup (1992:118-121) suggests that 
the confrontation and dialogue between the two parties involves the joint creation of otherness and 
selfness, and that the responses of an informant are relational, circumstantial responses to the 
ethnographer's presence and questioning. According to Hastrup, the dialogical element of the 
encounter does not allay its inherent 'violence.' 
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is the close study of culture as lived by particular people, in particular places, 
doing particular things at particular times.' 
Like all anthropological texts, this thesis should be judged on the merits of the particular 
ethnographic evidence, and specifically, on the way in which it is presented and 
analysed in support of its key arguments. The merits of this evidence can, in turn, only 
be judged on the credibility of supporting claims to an 'I was there' ethnographic 
authority. What follows by way of a summary of my fieldwork experiences, are these 
supporting claims to authority 
4. Fieldwork 
I conducted fieldwork for this study intermittently over a period of four years (i.e 1994 
to 1997). My association with the village of Gwabeni in Tyefu Location began in 
February 1994 when I was introduced (as part of a research team investigating the 
dynamics of gender, households and environmental change) to the people of Gwabeni 
by Dr.Cecil Manona of the Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) at Rhodes 
University (see Palmer 1997). Dr. Manona is patrilineally related to a number of 
Gwabeni residents and we were able to use his kinship ties and good relations with 
villagers to gain their confidence and get the research project off to a good start in the 
somewhat politically volatile pre-election period. Since February 1994, whilst working 
on subsequent research projects at the ISER, I have been almost constantly involved 
in research in Gwabeni, the rest of Tyefu Location, and in Peddie district more 
generally. All of these projects have been concerned with natural resource 
management issues. 
Throughout the research period, I have meticulously maintained my own research 
interests in Gwabeni and kept the fieldwork component that was at the centre of my 
thesis research, separate from larger research projects . Subsequent to the first project 
initiated in Gwabeni (referred to above), I was able to structure the various research 
projects so that I could personally conduct whatever fieldwork was required for various 
projects in Gwabeni. 
In 1994, I spent two months living at the Breakfastvlei hotel adjacent to the village. A 
businessman who hails from Rura village in Tyefu Location (and who is also 
patrilineally related to a Gwabeni lineage) had recently purchased this practically 
derelict hotel and he was in the process of renovating it. On the same premises he now 
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runs a small but successful shop and a thriving bottle store that caters for the residents 
of Gwabeni and passers-by, his hotel being at the junction of the two gravel roads that 
are the main thoroughfares through the area. The verandah of the hotel proved to be 
a good place to meet the men of Gwabeni, many of whom congregate there and, by 
pooling their resources, are able to buy a few drinks that oil their exchanges about the 
news and events of interest in the village, the district and in other parts of the country. 
In an attempt to immerse myself more fully into the lives of the people of Gwabeni, I 
later negotiated to move into a house in the village itself, which I rented for a small fee 
from the absentee owner. Throughout 1995, I used this house for a number of week-
long periods of fieldwork. During 1996, my fieldwork visits all consisted of commuter 
trips , after which I returned to Grahamstown (some 53 kilometres away) on a daily 
basis. During 1997, periods of fieldwork were sporadic, except for a one week period 
in December when I revisited and lived in the village to tie up some loose ends in the 
writing up of my thesis. In total over the nearly four year period , I have spent 
approximately six months living in Gwabeni, conducting fieldwork towards this thesis. 
During the course of my fieldwork, I attended various ritual events, graduation parties, 
church bazaars and community meetings, I went hunting with young men on adjacent 
(vacant) farms and, on a number of occasions, I assisted in the removal or repair of 
fencing on the commonage . I also participated in group discussions about historical 
claims to land, the chieftaincy and the management of natural resources, such as water 
and grazing resources. I was elected as 'organiser' on the Gwabeni Development 
Forum (GDF), but I declined the position . I did, however, assist by equipping the GDF 
with a typewriter, stationery and other administrative effects, and I attended several 
meetings of the GDF and general community meetings, at which I observed 
proceedings and only participated when my opinion was sought. These varied 
interactions with the villagers of Gwabeni I would incorporate under the rubric of 
'participant observation.' 
Although I have studied isiXhosa, I am not yet fluent in the language, and I found it 
necessary to employ an interpreter-cum-research assistant, particularly for the more 
structured components of my fieldwork Except for the first few weeks of my study, the 
same (male) person filled this role throughout my period of fieldwork This had obvious 
advantages for the research endeavour, such as the fostering of a mutual familiarity 
and understanding between researcher and research assistant, but also had distinct 
r 
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disadvantages, as such the selective filtering of data through one person's perception 
of what constitutes saliency. Fortunately, several men and women in the village, 
whether through periods of migrant labour or domestic service, are fully conversant in 
English and this allowed for some interviews to take place without the 'interpreter-as-
filter.' 
Another consideration was the fact that my research assistant is a prominent ANC 
organiser, and a member of one of the two dominant clans, in the village. On the one 
hand, this made it easier for me to conduct my research in that my association with this 
man served to sanction my interaction with the majority of the villagers. On the other 
hand, this situation also had the drawback of making it more difficult for me to interact 
with villagers who are peripheral (by choice or otherwise) to the locus of community 
organisation and I had to actively seek such people out in order to learn about their 
views and interests. My assistant was also able, particularly in the earlier stages of my 
research, to select and structure my interaction with informants and thereby 'package' 
particular information about the village in ways that were not always useful to me. 
During the course of my fieldwork, I engaged in archival research to historically 
contextualise this studyH I conducted a series of structured and unstructured inter-
views with a number of key informants. I also administered a questionnaire survey to 
all of the sixty-eight households in Gwabeni which were occupied at the time of the 
survey in 1995.18 The survey covered all aspects of household structure and 
composition, patterns of income and expenditure and levels of natural resource 
utilisation. 
I also conducted participatory rural appraisal (PRA) workshops in Gwabeni on four 
occasions. The first workshop was held in 1994 to establish a nominal understanding 
of resource management issues in the village. The second workshop was held in 1995 
and comprised of elderly men and women and addressed people's perceptions of the 
role of traditional authorities in general village administration. In May 1996, two 
colleagues and I conducted a third workshop in Gwabeni , where we informed members 
17 At the National Archives in Pretoria, in the Cory Library at Rhodes University, at the Port 
Elizabeth Intermediate State Archives Depot and in the records housed in the Peddie Magistrate's 
Court. After the offices of the Magistrate's Court in Peddie were damaged by fire in March 1997, the 
records were moved to the new provincial archives in King Williams Town, where I continued to conduct 
my archival research . 
18 One of these questionnaires could not be used during the analysis of my data. 
12 
of the village that the funders of our research project would make funding available to 
them in order for them to initiate natural resource-related pilot development projects 
in their village, with our assistance and the help of local NGOs and officials from the 
Department of Agriculture in Peddie. The Gwabeni Project Implementation Committee 
(GPIC) was subsequently set up, as a sub-committee of the Residents' Association, to 
administer the project. 
In August 1997, a colleague and I conducted a fourth PRA workshop with a view to 
discussing, with the GPIC, the form that proposals and business plans for projects that 
would be submitted to the GPIC by groups and individuals in Gwabeni , should take. 
Although the villagers clearly hoped that my presence in the village would finally pay 
off and that I would 'bring them something,' I was very careful throughout the period 
over which I conducted my fieldwork, not to raise any expectations about my ability to 
do so. It was only at the th ird workshop that the availability of funding for specific 
natural resource-related projects in the village was broached. One of my colleagues 
has the formal responsibil ity of overseeing the rather slow process of implementing the 
pilot development project in Gwabeni (and a similar one in another village in Peddie 
District), which left me relatively free to pursue my research interests as before. 
Despite my best intentions and my 'open agenda', I concede that it is possible, and 
even likely, that the people in the village chose to regard me as a well-resourced and 
potentially influential outsider who may be able to assist them in some as yet 
unspecified way. I was sensitive to this possibility throughout my fieldwork and, in 
analysing my data, I have tried to be particularly alert to instances where their 
perceptions may have coloured their interactions with me and given rise to patterned 
or predictable responses to my many questions (see Sharp (1985:69) for a subtle 
discussion of similar concerns). 
5. The umzi (homestead) as unit of analysis 
'The question of the "unit of study", far from being a methodological 
nicety, is a consequential theoretical matter. For fields of enquiry are 
never naturally given; they always reflect substantive assumptions about 
the constitution of the "real" world.' (Comaroff 1982: 144). 
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In this study, I use the umzi (pI. imiz/) as my primary unit of analysis. This approach to 
the important issue of conceptual ising the most elementary unit of social organisation 
for rural areas (in this case in the Eastern Cape) , takes cognisance of the many 
analytical problems that have been associated with the concept of household (see 
Spiegel 19902S4-262;Netting et.al. 1984). Among these problems is that, in practice, 
it has been difficult to circumscribe in terms of structure and membership what 
constitutes a household: Spiegel (1986;1990) and others (Guyer and Peters 1987; 
Sharp 1994; Niehaus 1994) have pointed to the significant degree of fluidity which 
characterises rural and urban households in the South African context with regard to 
structure and composition, mobility, patterns of residence, of consumption and of the 
variable contribution made by members to the sustenance of the household. As Spiegel 
(1990261) notes, it is precisely this wide-ranging variation in the form and content of 
the household as analytical unit that is itself of conceptual significance, and which 
undermines the analytical rigour of the concept. 
In choosing to use the umzi as unit of analysis, I take as my starting point the 
observation that natural resources are generally collected and managed by the 
members (or contracted outsiders) of each umzi (or homestead) for use and 
consumption in that homestead. It appears to me that many village and location level 
resource management interventions, be they social , economic or ecological, are 
discussed, decided upon and implemented (or ignored) at the level of the umzi (see 
McAllister 1992:203-4) . While not wishing to diminish the impact of individual agency 
on these many activities, I nevertheless argue that it is the umzi - with its particular 
configuration of social, economic and physical resources, at a specific point in the 
developmental cycle (Spiegel 1980; Manana 1988a), and which comprises a fluid set 
of co-operating individuals who share, to some extent, certain short and longer term 
goals with regard to social reproduction and material well-being - that is the 'common 
denominator' when trying to understand natural resource management strategies in 
Tyefu Location. 
Most importantly, though, I found that the emic understanding of umzi in Tyefu Location 
has far-reaching implications for the management of natural resources. Membership 
of a specific umzi in Gwabeni , to which the members of a number of variously and 
fluidly constituted , rural and urban-based households, can make a locally recognised 
claim, meant that a person has rights, irrespective of where they reside at anyone time, 
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to the full use of natural resources on the 'commons' in the village. '9 
In Gwabeni, each umzi consists of one or more buildings, which together with the 
fenced or unfenced residential site on which these buildings are situated, possibly one 
or more arable fields and some livestock,20 constitute the 'property' of that umzi. There 
is sometimes a fenced garden to be found adjacent to the buildings on the residential 
site, but such gardens have, in many cases, fallen into disuse. 
Socially, the umzi has traditionally comprised of extended families defined by patrilineal 
descent and virilocal residence. Typically, the male head of this extended family lived 
with his wife and his married sons with their wives and children (Manona 1988a:87). 
Socio-economic changes over the course of this century have transformed the structure 
of the umzi so that in Gwabeni , imizi are currently made up of a varying number of 
members, kin and non-kin who are related to each other in a number of ways (see 
James 1985: 159-163). Increased population mobility has contributed to the notion of 
the umzi taking on multi-layered meanings in respect of belongingness and identity, 
both for those members who are present in, and those who are absent from, the 
village. 21 
A number of imizi in Gwabeni are deserted as their members have all moved 
permanently away from the village, often but not always, to an urban centre. Other 
people have also effectively become urban-based, but reta in their imizi in the village 
and visit once a year or less frequently in order to conduct rituals there. While 
residence in the village undoubtedly constitutes a key element in conferring influence 
to people in respect of decision-making over resource management, the stake of those 
who are absent but who maintain varying degrees of contact with the village is 
consequently more complex and ambiguous. The resulting shifts in people's claims to 
'belong ing' to the village, and thus of their ro les in local alliances and authority are 
19 Such people include women who were born into Gwabeni lineages and homesteads, but 
who have since got married, moved away from the village and established their own households 
elsewhere. These women are still recognised as fully-fledged members of their homestead of origin 
and, should they be separated from their husbands or widowed, they would be able to return to the 
vil lage and to enjoy unrestricted access to 'commons' resources . Access to resources and inftuence 
over resource management decision-making are, however, two different issues (see below) . 
20 The ownership of livestock, whether by the umzi, or by specific members of the umzi , varies 
from homestead to homestead. This is not, however, the case with arable land, which in Gwabeni is 
regarded as the 'property' of the umzi. 
21 I am grateful to Leslie Bank for th is insight. 
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played out in the contestation of access to and management of the natural resources 
of the village. These ideas are explored in subsequent chapters of th is thesis. 
6. Chapter outline 
Chapter One introduces the study and situates it theoretically within the framework of 
common property systems and communal land tenure arrangements. Some elements 
of this broad framework are discussed and evaluated. The socio-economic 
heterogeneity prevalent in rural villages and the institutional challenges of managing 
natural resources held in common, in circumstances such as those which prevail in 
Tyefu Location, emerge from a review of the literature as central to understanding how 
these resource management systems change over time. 
In Chapter Two, the agro-ecological conditions of Tyefu Location are described and 
discussed. The chapter looks at recent debates around the notion of resource 
degradation and considers whether it is possible to establish conclusively that the 
natural resource base in Tyefu Location has been subjected to significant and 
effectively irreversible levels of degradation. 
Chapter Three analyses the historical processes that have exerted an influence over 
the way resources have been used and managed by the people of Tyefu Location and 
Gwabeni in particular. Reference is made to significant legislation which has influenced 
people's access to the land and its resources and continues to have an impact on 
natural resource management practices at village level. The role of the former Ciskei 
bantustan administration, particularly in politicising many aspects of the rural economy, 
is also evaluated. 
Chapter Four examines the institutional arrangements that have shaped the 
management of natural resources at the level of the location and its constituent 
villages. I argue that the interplay between state intervention and local dynamics over 
a considerable period has changed the structure and powers of the local institutions 
that manage natural resources at this level. This has, in turn, undermined the efficacy 
and legitimacy of these institutions over time. The ways in which rural people attempt 
to circumvent or ameliorate unpopular measures imposed on them, are also 
considered. 
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Chapter Five unpacks the factors that currently impact on the use and management of 
natural resources in the village of Gwabeni. It analyses how the communal tenure 
system here is constrained by the natural environment, and has been modified by the 
'enclosure' of the village, as well as how the resource management strategies adopted 
by residents are affected accordingly. I suggest that circumstances in the rural political 
economy limit the options open to people in this respect, but that different imizi and 
individuals have enjoyed and continue to have differential success in exploiting these 
options. 
Chapter Six examines the extent of socio-economic heterogeneity in Gwabeni. 
Differences between imizi with respect to composition and structure, patterns of income 
and expenditure, relative wealth in terms of material possessions (including livestock 
holdings) and different levels of natural resource use, make it is possible to distinguish 
between different categories of resource users at the level of umzi. I show how these 
categories of resource users have differential incentives to contribute to the collective 
management of the natural resources available to them. 
Chapter Seven analyses the changes in the rural agrarian economy and the impact that 
these changes, in conjunction with the dynamic rural-urban interdependence patterns 
prevalent inthe villages of Tyefu Location, are having on natural resource management 
efforts at village level. It explores these issues within the context of one particular case-
study, i.e. voluntary resettlement onto the Breakfastvlei Outspan. 
In conclusion, Chapter Eight revisits the theoretical framework on common property and 
suggests how and why the observed property situation differs from the 'ideal' common 
property system. It draws together the main themes of the study and speculates on 
both the significance of these findings for the study of agrarian and post-agrarian 
systems in rural areas of the Eastern Cape and on the prospects for the successful 
implementation of sustainable natural resource management practices in these areas 
in the future. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Management of Natural Resources in Common Property Systems 
To analyse how rural people (in Tyefu Location) mediate the impact of the wider 
political economy on their use and management of the locally available natural 
resources, their individual and collective actions aimed at resource management must 
be situated within the interplay of social, economic and political conditions that prevail 
in this area. Given that the resources in question are held under a system of modified1 
communal land tenure, it would be appropriate to ascertain whether a common property 
theoretical perspective can inform an analysis of this nature. To this end, we begin by 
analysing the notions of tenure and property systems. 
1. Some General Principles of Land Tenure Systems 
'Tenure' embraces the terms and conditions under which land and other natural 
resources are held and used (Bruce 1986: Introduction,xxvii) .2,j"n rural areas throughout 
Africa, land tenure systems regulate access to productive resources, influence patterns 
of income and employment and impact on the local distribution of wealth, status and 
authority (Lane and Moorehead 1995:117). The legal basis of a tenure system provides 
one important framework for the expression and negotiation of kinship networks and 
ethnic identity and for the exercising of power within social groupings. Englund 
(1996:1) refers to land in rural Mozambique as the 'fabric of social relationships,3 and 
sees tenure, or the engagement of villagers around the land and its resources, as a key 
context in which the local sense of moral being is negotiated and refined. 
1 Modified in the sense that people in these tenure regimes are prevented (essentially by virtue 
of being fenced in) from expanding their settlements into 'new' areas, once the natural resources in their 
immediate locality are exhausted. 
2 Bruce (1988:23) contends that a wide range of variables may affect the development of land 
tenure systems. These may include local climate and ecology, the quality of the land resource, 
population density, level of agricultural technology, crops, markets, kinship organisation, inheritance 
patterns, settlement patterns, political organisation, religious significance of land and patterns of ethnic 
conquest, dominance and rivalry. 
3 This argument is most convincing in those cases where an agrarian rural lifestyle still 
predominates, and where relations around land and other productive natural resources are central to 
social reproduction. As will be argued later, in many rural areas of South Africa , the centrality of land in 
defining a 'local sense of moral being' has been eroded (but not displaced) by longstanding patterns of 
migrancy, urbanisation and overpopulation. 
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A central component of tenure is the notion of property : Bromley and Cernea (1989:2) 
argue that property is not an object such as land but a right or entitlement to a benefit 
stream that is only as secure as the social guarantees that protect such entitlement. 
The concept and practice of property is thus deeply rooted in social relationships (Lane 
and Moorehead 1995: 117). 
Analysts usually distinguish between four property regimes, namely state property, 
private property, common property and situations of 'open access' or non property 
(Bromley and Cernea 1989:11). Under state property regimes, rights of ownership and 
management of natural resources are vested in the state, but the state may transfer 
certain rights, for example usufruct, to individuals or groups. In private property 
regimes, the elementary rights to a stream of benefits accrue to the individual (or to a 
legally circumscribed group of people, such as a trust), but these rights are subject to 
certain legal conditions and social conventions. Under common property systems, 
ownership and management rights to a particular stream of benefits are vested in a 
corporate group of people4 In situations of 'open access' , no corporately recognised 
system of rights and obligations in respect of resource use exist. 
In practice, different permutations of these four 'types' are found and it is relatively 
common for various elements of these types of property to co-exist in one property 
regime. This is, in fact, the case in Tyefu Location, which is one geographically and 
administratively discrete resource management area under a modified communal 
tenure regime. The implications of this are discussed below. 
2. Common Property Systems 
Common property has been defined as 'private property for the corporate group' 
(Bromley and Cernea 1989:14). Ostrom refers to 'self-organised and self-governed 
4 The corporate group of a common property system is defined by Bromley and Gernea 
(1989:15) as a social unit with definite membership and boundaries, with some shared cultural norms 
and an endogenous authority system . Each of the members who make up the corporate group has 
structured rights and duties in the regime (IFAD 1995:19) . 
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common pools resource' systems, by which she means a situation in which specific, 
interdependent groups of resource users collectively use and manage one or more 
common resources to obtain continuing joint benefits (1990:25,29).6 
According to Oakerson (1986:13), all common property regimes7 have one central 
problem, namely the co-ordination of rights and obligations in the management of 
resource use by individuals, especially since all users ostensibly face the temptation 
to free-ride. This co-ordination includes members agreeing on how to allocate and 
manage the common pool resources, and on the monitoring of compliance by resource 
users of the resource management rules. The management of common pool resources 
attempts to attain an optimal and equitable rate of consumption and productive use of 
resources by the whole group (Swallow 1996: 1). 
The problem of co-ordinating common pool resource use is addressed by : 
(i) defining a corporate group of rights holders which is able to limit access to resources 
through the exclusion of 'outsiders' and, 
(ii) by establishing and enforcing rights and obligations, or operational rules, with regard 
to resource use (Cousins 1995:2). 
It is argued that common property regimes are compatible with individual usufruct of 
prescribed segments of the total resources held by the corporate group. Bromley 
(1989:870) argues that resources in many rural areas are characterised by complex 
S These refer to the resources held in common and available for use by all members of the 
corporate group. 
6Lawry (1990:406) argues a 'minimum definition' of common property pertains to situations 
where rules define who has access to the commons and, by extension, who is excluded from using 
these resources. Explicit regulation of the behaviour of those who qualify as commons users becomes 
necessary when local resource demand exceeds sustainable supply. 
7 U (1996:504) argues that much of the common property literature constitutes an ideological 
project to influence a diverse audience of scholars, policy-makers and others in national and 
international agencies, by challenging the currently dominant neo-liberal discourse that advocates a 
shift towards 'more efficient' private property management systems (also see Mosse 1997:468; Peters 
1994:3). In pursuing this objective, simplified representations of what are essentially 'fragile' (see 
Ostrom 1990:178) common property systems and rural 'communities', when deployed in a macro policy 
context, can be more effective than emphasising the 'heterogeneous, factional and stratified nature' of 
these communities (U 1996:504). I share U's concerns and suggest that it is important to recognise 
and differentiate between the ideological, theoretical and practical ways in which common property 
systems are discussed and put forward as potentially suitable systems for specific instances of resource 
management. 
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institutional arrangements that vary across resources and during different seasons, 
giving the impression that property rights are, in fact, absent. For example, arable 
allotments which are generally held by individuals, are nevertheless often regarded as 
part of the common property system, with the proviso that the user cannot alienate or 
transfer the rights to, or the use of, that resource segment. In the event that the user 
fails to put the resource segment to productive use, it reverts (in theory at least)8 to the 
jurisdiction of the corporate group for re-allocation to another user (Bromley and 
Cernea 1989: 16). 
The discussion thus far has outlined several key characteristics and institutional 
aspects of 'ideal' common property systems. In rural areas of the former bantustans in 
the Eastern Cape, land that is state-owned is held under a modified communal land 
tenure system and exhibits some of the features of the common property model. Land 
shortages (mainly due to overcrowding in these areas) have, however, resulted in 
social pressure which blocks the reversion of arable land to the common pool and its 
subsequent re-allocation to another individual for arable purposes at a later stage. 
Nevertheless, the same arable lands are often used out of growing season as common 
pool (Le. common access) grazing areas. Grazing lands proper are held in common 
and may be used by the livestock of all members of the local corporate group. In the 
case of Tyefu Location, this includes owners of livestock from the eleven constituent 
villages of the location, as the boundaries between the villages, although well-known 
to residents, are not demarcated by fences, and livestock are thus free to roam across 
the location. 
Other common pool resources in these villages, namely water, fuelwood and timber 
products, mud for building, soil resources, thatching grass, manure and wilderness 
resources, such as wild game, wild vegetables and fruits and medicinal plants, are 
(nominally) subject to common property management regimes. These regimes tend to 
be localised to specific villages and their residents, who have unfettered access to 
these resources. 
8 Clearly, whether the under-utilised resource segment does, in fact, become available for re-
allocation, has major implications for issues of productivity, equity and resource conservation in these 
regimes. 
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3. Institutions for resource management in common property systems 
By definition, common property systems are made up of a specifically defined group of 
resource users who, because of their membership of this group, have rights of access 
and use to particular common pool resources. Further, there are rules in place which 
govern individual access and which ensure that the limited resources at the disposal 
of the group are allocated and used in ways that are broadly endorsed by the whole 
group (see Wynne and Lyne 1995:649). Clearly, both the composition of the group and 
the structured nature of their interaction are of key significance to the efficacy9 of the 
common property system The interaction between the members of a common property 
system is structured by means of local and supra-local institutions. 
Unpacking Institutions 
Institutions are established social practices or relationships based on shared norms 
and behaviours that change over time, but which serve collectively valued purposes 
(Uphoff 1992:4). Because they are the expression of established sets of conventions, 
codes and rules, institutions are at the core of all social systems, mediating the ways 
in which people interact with one another (Bromley 1989:870). Institutions include 
things like legal codes, tenure systems, kinship and marital arrangements (Thomas-
Slayter 1994: 1480), as well as informal 'constraints' on behaviour such as sanctions, 
taboos, customs and traditions (North 1991 :97). It is important to note, however, that 
these 'codes of behaviour' are themselves constantly being renegotiated, adapted or 
ignored to suit particular social situations and that while an institution might endure 
through time, its raison d'etre and its characteristic features may undergo a number of 
fundamental changes.1o Also, as Cousins and Robins (1993:3,21) point out, non-
statutory and informal institutions which exist and are maintained outside the formal 
institutional framework can have enormous effects on the latter. 
9 Here, I use the term efficacy to mean a state in which the allocation and use of common 
property resources is ecologically sound and is socially and economically acceptable to its members, in 
the sense of meeting their material needs. 
10 Communal tenure is one such institution (see Besteman 1994;Peters 1994). 
r-
I 
22 
In what is widely regarded as a seminal text on common property institutions, Ostrom 
(1990:88-102) analysed a number of 'long-surviving, small-scale'11 common property 
systems and described what she termed the 'design principles' of the institutions that 
govern these resource management systems. The features of these systems are 
paraphrased below: 
(1) clearly defined rights and boundaries in terms of membership and of the 
physical resource base, 
(2) congruence between use and management rules on the one hand and local 
socio-economic and ecological conditions on the other, 
(3) collective choice arrangements where most individuals affected by the 
operational rules can participate in the negotiation and modification of these rules, 
(or what Bromley (1989:871) has referred to as 'rules for changing the rules of 
use'), 
(4) resource monitoring, where monitors accountable to the group (and who are 
possibly also members of the group), actively audit resource conditions and the 
actions of resource users, 
(5) the application of graduated sanctions, by officials accountable to the 
corporate group, against resource users who violate operational rules, with the 
initial sanctions used often fairly minor, 
(6) ease of access to low-cost local arenas where conflicts between users and 
between users and officials can be resolved, 
(7) the right of users to devise their own institutions that will not be undermined 
by external governmental authorities and, 
(8) the existence of institutional arrangements where the different levels of 
activities necessary to sustain the management of resources in common property 
systems are hierarchically structured into local levels of resource use and 
management and more generalised, regional or national levels, of these activities. 
This influential framework has a number of weaknesses. Firstly, many of these 
'principles' relate to group membership and collective activities more generally, and are 
not necessarily specific to common property systems per se. Secondly, the list begs 
the question as to whether a property system that does not exhibit all these 'ideal' 
11 Ostrom's definition of 'small-scale' is where the common pool resource (CPR) is located 
within one country and the number of individuals affected varies from 50 to 15 000 who are heavily 
dependent on the CPR for economic returns. 
23 
institutional features can be called a common property system or not, and what the 
implications of this might be. Thirdly, the somewhat organic (i.e. internally 
interdependent) - and what Li (1996:504) refers to as an 'outdated functionalist' -
framework does not appear to deal adequately with institutional change over time. As 
an 'ideal case' , the framework seems to suggests that if one or more of the 'design 
principles' are neglected, the institutional basis of a common property system is 
weakened and may collapse (see Masse 1997:469-70). Indeed, Ostrom (1990) refers 
at length to the inherent ' institutional fragility' of common pool resource systems. 12 
Institutional flexibility 
Recent work (see Swallow 1996; Ng'weno 1996) that deals with the contestation 
around management and use of land resources, offers a corrective to Ostrom's 
somewhat static orthodoxy13 by placing an emphasis on the value of fluidity and 
flexibility (essentially, openness to change) with respect to group and physical 
boundaries. This new emphasis offers a corrective to an idealisation of the way 
common property institutions should work as opposed to the 'messy' ways in which 
these systems have actually been found to work in practice. 
Swallow (1996: 11) asks' .. .... . if well-defined [membership and physical] boundaries are 
so important, why do some common property regimes have f lexible or fuzzy14 
boundaries?' He reasons that flexibility is an alternative way of maximising the access 
to common property resources which is useful specifically in situations when rights to 
'resource bundles' can be exchanged easily between rights holders who have different 
12 These systems are threatened by overcrowding and 'rent dissipation' (i.e . resource depletion) 
(Ostrom 1990:143); by heterogeneous users with conflicting interests, in situations where there are no 
over-arching institutional mechanisms for conflict resolution (ibid:146); by increased market opport-
unities and socio-economic differentiation (1990:156-7); by a lack of recognition of local resource 
regimes by national governments (ibid:205). 
13 Ostrom (1990:191) herself argues that current theoretical studies of common pool resource 
systems do not deal properly with institutional change and the role of external political regimes, nor do 
they include information and transaction costs in common pool resource management. 
14 A boundary is flexible if its spatial location is easily identifiable, though subject to change 
through negotiation and agreement. A boundary is fuzzy if it does not separate territories into discrete 
land units that are the property of mutually-exclusive groups (Swallow 1996:11). 
24 
needs. 15 Ultimately, it seems that, in practice, Swallow's flexible common property 
arrangements still rely on local or macro-level (overarching) institutions (such as the 
administrative and judicial organs of the state) that are organisationally competent 
enough - and have sufficient political legitimacy - to administer and regulate these 
flexible systems. Without this regulation it may be debatable whether there is, in fact, 
a 'common property system' to speak of. 16 
In a different vein, Ng'weno argues that, at any given time, different groups of resource 
users benefit from the fixity or dynamism of categories and possibilities ('codes') in 
respect of access to and use of natural resources (1996:22). She suggests that it is the 
existence of flexible membership boundaries, geographical borders, networks of kin and 
other relationships of belonging, that allow people with questionable claims to group 
membership to remain on the land, to utilise resources and to survive physically. 
Following Ng'weno's argument, however, it is not clear, to what extent the common 
property institutions that accomodate this degree of 'flexibi lity' are immune to pressures 
of overexploitation, conflict and disintegration. Indeed, it could be argued that the 
'community ethic' values (see below) that underpin and accomodate this flexibility, may 
result in a major influx of people onto a fixed land area. A typical result of this scenario 
is an increase in social, demographic and ecological pressures that threaten to disrupt 
the common property system and could make it move towards an open access (i.e. 
unregulated) situation. 
15 This argument is most compelling in respect of trade-offs between pastoralists and 
agricultural resource users who have overlapping claims to different resources in the same landscape, 
such as those in the Sahel. It could, however, also be applied to resource users in the communal areas 
of Peddie District, who are characterised by heterogenous interest groups and socio-economic 
differentiation at village and location level, and who thus have different needs and uses for local natural 
resources. 
16 As Mosse (1997:500) argues, 'Collective action theory persistently constructs as 
spontaneous and self-supporting, institutional solutions which are in reality conceived , imposed, and in 
most cases sustained, by substantial external authority and resources.' 
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4, Collective action and 'social capital,17 
Thomas-Slayter (1994: 1482) has argued that across Africa, it is often informal networks 
and formal associations based on patterns of co-operation, reciprocity and patron-client 
exchange, that underpin household survival and promote individual and collective 
welfare, These relationships and networks, which are based on shared identity, 
religion, kinship and local (neighbourhood) networks, playa key role in determining 
access to resources and to centres of power and decision-making, 
Membership of these networks provides individuals with an insurance policy of sorts, 
a store of 'social capital', which ensures a measure of social and material support for 
them and their dependents, in the event of some unforeseen disaster or even in the 
daily business of resource (including prestige) scarcity. Sharp and Spiegel (1985:140) 
refer to the 'social resources' of kinship and neighbourhood that foster relationships of 
reciprocity and clientage and provide a hedge against impoverishment. 18 
Notions of social capital are also a critical component, it is argued, of what makes 
common property systems work effectively. Ostrom (1990: 184, 190) draws attention to 
the importance of shared norms and patterns of trust and reciprocity, and people's 
reputations for keeping promises, honest dealings and reliability, as valuable 
components of the social relationships that form the bedrock of collective social action. 
As Ostrom (1990: 184) argues, 
"When individuals have lived in [small-scale common pool resource systems] for 
a substantial time and have developed shared norms and patterns of reciprocity, 
they possess social capital with which they can build institutional arrangements 
for resolving common pool resource dilemmas." [my emphasis]. 
17 The term 'social capital' (Putnam,1993:167) is used popularly (and often loosely) in the 
common property literature to refer to the features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and 
trust, that facilitate co-operaUon and coordination of group action for mutual benefits (see Mearns 1996 
and ODA 1996). 
18 Sharp and Spiegel (1985) go on to discuss the extent to which these ties were drastically 
undermined in the conditions of poverty and deprivation experienced by people in the former Qwa Qwa 
bantustan . 
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The existence of 'social capital' supposedly helps to explain why people choose to co-
operate in the management of common pool resources, essentially because it makes 
a major contribution to reducing the 'transaction costs' of resource management in 
common property systems. Mosse (1997:468), however, sees the current academic and 
policy trend of advocating 'community management' models (in which ideas about 
'social capital' play - explicitly or implicitly - a significant part) in preference to state 
control and privatisation options, primarily as a larger critique of the modernising 
development strategies of centralised states and the dominance of 'western' technical 
models over indigenous community perspectives. 
This 'pro-community management' view tends to portray 'communities' as resource 
managers who are autonomous and independent of the organs of the state, and as 
synchronic, ahistorical and monolithic constructs (Mosse 1997:469; Berry 1997: 1228). 
This approach tends to assume that 'local communities' possess the necessary 
capacity (Le. 'social capital') to collectively manage their resources, because of 
(romanticised notions of) long established and stable norms of mutual trust and co-
operation. The reality is, of course, that practically all 'local communites' have been, 
and continue to be, subjected to the vagaries of changes in climate, population, and 
economic and political integration. In other words, they are not homogenous groups of 
people, and, as such, do not continue to act and co-operate in accordance with age-old 
customs and practices. 
How useful then, are ideas about 'social capital' in understanding the actual processes 
at work in situations that require collective decision-making and action to manage 
natural resources? Firstly, the notion of 'social capital' appears to assume a degree 
of social egalitarianism and co-operation among the collective in a common property 
system that is not always borne out in practice. In the Eastern Cape, the levels of 
socia-economic differentiation that exist in rural villages and the differential access 
enjoyed by various categories'9 of rural people have to decision-making fora are two 
'9 Agarwal (1994:1456) has argued, for example, that it is patently misleading to assume that 
the household is a unit of congruent interests and preferences, among whose members the benefits of 
available resources are shared equitably, irrespective of gender. 
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important elements that dispel any myths of egalitarianism and of the existence of 
homogenous 'communities' in rural areas. 
Furthermore, at the inter-household level, Keohane and Ostrom (1995:33) remind us 
that many social groupings are characterised by heterogeneity and deep fissures and 
that they continue to experience rapid social change. On a similar note, Mearns 
(1996:2) dispels the myth of equality by contending that the shared expectations and 
commitments [of members in a common property system] do not necessarily imply 
equality among members of that particular system (see Thomas-Slayter (1994: 1482) 
and Snidal (1995:58), for discussions of this asymmetry of expectations and access). 
Clearly, social relations and networks of reciprocity and trust, as well as shared 
incentives are critical elements of effective and robust common property systems. 
Despite the detailed attention to institutional arrangements, Ostrom (1990), and indeed 
much of the voluminous literature on common property systems, and land-resource 
issues more generally,20 does not systematically 'unpack' the processes by which 
'social capital' , as the 'glue' that binds people together in collective action systems, 
develops and is nurtured, or is destroyed. 
This failure stems mostly from the fact that the elements included under the rubric of 
'social capital' do not exist in the objective and readily identifiable form that the term 
'capital' suggests. 'Social capital', used in this way, tends to act as a holdall for the 
myriad of social and moral elements of human action that cannot be accounted for by 
rational choice or similar (for example 'game') theories of human behaviour. This is 
because the 'moral economy' of trust and reciprocity, that is at the core of 'social 
capital', is embedded, in a way which is constantly being negotiated and contested, in 
the everyday social, economic and political circumstances of social groupings. For 
these reasons, I do not find the notion of 'social capital', as used in the common 
property literature, an analytically useful concept in the study of common property 
systems. As I show in Chapter Seven, notions about, and claims to membership and 
identity within particular kinds of 'community' and the 'social capital' such a grouping 
20 Cross (1988:367) in her discussion of informal freehold , refers to a 'community ethic' which 
has much in common with the notion of 'social capital ' put forward here. More recent work by Mearns 
(1996) and White and Runge (1995) has paid closer attention to the aspects of social organisation in 
common property systems. 
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ostensibly shares, can actually undermine efforts aimed at collective resource 
management. 21 
5, The advantages of common property systems 
With reference to the potential benefits of common property systems, Runge (1986:33) 
argues that 'village economy' common property systems are easier to manage and 
generally have lower transaction and enforcement costs than other property systems. 
The latter systems of necessity make greater formal, social investments in mechanisms 
for the assignment, definition and adjudication of exclusive rights in property. They do 
this because of the absence of the 'moral community' which is apparently prevalent in 
the 'village economy.' In the 'village economy' system, a relatively small number of 
people have been tied together, possibly for generations, by kinship and other social 
networks, and there is likely to be a recognition of local leadership and institutions. 
Lawry also points out that the costs of delineating clear private property rights to many 
kinds of resources would be prohibitive to the people involved in common property 
management arrangements. In addition, the resource needs of poor people and small-
scale users may be best met by common property systems. A good example of 
appropriate use of common property is in arid and semi-arid rangelands, where range 
productivity is essentially a function of rainfall, which varies both spatially and 
temporally. Communal use of these rangeland resources allows for livestock to move 
over large areas in search of available grazing (Lawry 1990:405-6). 
What is not readily specified in these arguments is the point(s) at which a common 
property system that exhibits these features, loses its comparative advantage in terms 
of transaction costs over other property systems. Nor is it clear which factors undermine 
the existence of the 'moral community' at village level so that it is no longer able to 
21 White (1996:2) argues that 'common pool resource systems, and other forms of collective 
action , perform a valuable role in societies, not only by the partcular issues they address, or economic 
gains they generate, but by their subtle and generalised contribution to the construction of other and 
future forms of social capital' [my emphasis) . Ostrom's definition of 'social capital ' as the arrangement 
of human resources to improve flows of future income .. . .['social capital1 is created by individuals 
spending time and energy working with other individuals to find better ways of making possible the 
achievement of certain ends that, in its absence, would not be possible' (1995:125-6) . 
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regulate the use and management of resources in common property systems. 
Another ostensible advantage is that common property systems are able to manage 
and allocate resources more efficiently (i.e. with less long-term ecological impact) 
because they benefit from local indigenous knowledge. This knowledge allows for the 
development and adaptation of management mechanisms that are sensitive to, and 
which suit, local environmental conditions. These mechanisms may include the 
development of systems of communal rangeland management that are sensitive to the 
abovementioned high local temporal and spatial variation in rangeland (vegetative) 
production. Again, this argument assumes firstly, that a ready source of indigenous 
ecological knowledge exists which has been and continues to be generated, refined, 
adapted and transmitted over an extended period and secondly that, despite 
management intervention by outsiders, including the state, and rapid socio-economic 
and possibly ecological change in a locality, this indigenous knowledge remains 
relevant and useful. Suffice to say that this may in fact not be the case in specific rural 
areas. 
A further advantage cited in the literature is that common use rights may contribute to 
social stability by guaranteeing common access to certain key resources, particularly 
in situations of poverty and where the availability of natural resources may be 
unpredictable. Common property systems can thus be appropriate institutional 
adaptations to resource management at the local level because they provide the 
individual, through membership of a group of resource users, with a hedge against 
poverty and distress (Runge 1986:49; Lane and Moorehead 1995: 120-1). This is also 
referred to as the 'risk management' function of common property regimes which 
provides people in high risk, marginal environments with the necessary 'assurance' 
against impoverishment. In these situations, natural resources may become 'the 
employer of last resort' or 'safety net' which allow the poorest members of the 
community to intensify and even commercialise their use of natural resources (Swallow 
1996:6-8; IFAD 1995:7-8). 
Empirical research from the Indian sub-continent has shown that the rural poor do 
indeed derive far greater proportions of their fuel supplies, animal grazing, employment 
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and total income from resources under common property regimes than do the wealthier 
stratum of rural residents (Jodha 1991 :6). This is also true for rural areas in South 
Africa (May et.al. 1995:66). Swallow (1996:8) argues that the relatively wealthy 
members of a common property system may also favour the maintenance of a 'safety 
net' comprised of resources held as common property because they too are subject to 
the vagaries of fortune and may at some future juncture need to rely on these 
resources. Another reason why they might support the notion of a 'safety net' is that 
the availability of 'commons' resources relieves them of the social and moral obligations 
of having to assist impoverished residents (ibid :8). Furthermore, this relief can be 
achieved at no real expense to themselves, as many of the resources that constitute 
the 'safety net' of the poor are not needed by the wealthier members of the corporate 
group and vice versa. The state can also be included among those who benefit from 
the maintenance of common property systems, because these systems relieve the state 
of the administrative and financial burden of taxation, and of having to make welfare 
disbursements to the poor. 
6. Reasons for the 'breakdown' of common property systems 
Common property systems, I ike all social institutions, are subject to the pressures of 
socio-economic, political and ecological change. Some of these systems are able to 
adapt to changes in the wider political and economic context in which they exist, but 
others are less successful. One reason why some of these systems fail is that the 
mechanisms for the regulation of resource use are not capable of adapting to changed 
social conditions and increased pressure on ecological resources. This could result, 
inter alia, from rapid population increase in areas with inflexible leadership structures. 
Both these factors would make it difficult for a large number of resource users to reach 
agreement on appropriate levels of resource utilisation or on other changes that should 
be effected to optimise resource management. 
Lawry (1990:410) has identified the lack of incentives to invest in collective action as 
one reason for the collapse of common property systems. He argues that collective 
action is more likely to be successful where a commons resource is (a) critical to local 
livelihoods and (b) is scarce. In essence, this means that in those areas where the 
r 
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needs and interests of the members of a common property system no longer 
correspond sufficiently to serve as incentives for collective resource management, the 
system is likely to fail. 
In the rural areas of the Eastern Cape, marked socio-economic differentiation appears 
to be well-established. In this situation, the management of commons resources that 
make a critical contribution to the sUbsistence needs of poorer residents, such as 
firewood , wild vegetables and prickly pear fruit, is virtually ignored by the wealthier 
residents. The wealthier stratum of imizi are in a position to substitute the use of some 
natural resources with alternative options, for example, by using paraffin or gas as fuel 
instead of firewood. As a result , the 'rural elite' has considerably less incentive to 
contribute to the sustainable management of these resources because the opportunity 
costs of their labour in collecting, using and particularly, in managing the resources 
subject to common property management are often higher than the value of the 
resources to them (Jodha 1991: 1 0). 
Conversely, wealthier imizi may attempt to appropriate certain resources, such as 
grazing resources, for their private use, thereby ignoring the rights of other members 
and in the process undermine the common property system itself (Cousins 1995). 
These imizi are also more likely to try to disengage from stifling local social networks 
that hold few benefits for them, although there may be strong social pressure exerted 
on them, including the threat of witchcraft accusations, to prevent this. This 
disengagement by the local elites from village affairs means that decisions taken by the 
rest of the village residents are not necessarily endorsed by the wealthier (and often 
influential) individuals and imizi and may therefore lack authority. Again, the common 
property management system can suffer as a result. 
Another factor that renders common property management vulnerable is increased 
demographic pressure (Ostrom 1990:220). Increased population densities tend to 
create competition and tensions that cannot easily be resolved with the institutional 
mechanisms in place. Another factor, namely the penetration of market linkages may 
result in the commercialisation of resources and pressures for privatisation, particularly 
where some resource use occurs outside indigenous controls (Little and Brokensha 
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1987:191). This may happen, for example, where firewood resources are utilised to 
fulfil subsistence needs but are easily harvested for sale outside of the corporate group 
or local area. Market linkages also result in increased population mobil ity, through 
practices such as labour migrancy, which remove people from rural areas, blur the 
membership boundaries of common property systems, and negatively affect efforts 
aimed at collective resource management. The spread of markets can also promote 
socio-economic differentiation: as people's levels of engagement in the economy, their 
sources and levels of income diversify and their interest in collectively managed local 
resources diverge. 
Another problem with regard to common property systems is that of mediating and 
maintaining the requisite recognition by outside political institutions of the legitimate 
role of local resource management institutions (Ostrom 1990: 144-6). Thomas-Slayter 
has observed that in many African countries centralisation of power has been the 
fundamental objective of the state (1994: 1484). This somewhat haphazard advance 
of the modern state system in Africa has witnessed the partial integration of common 
property systems into the legislative frameworks of present day nation-states. The 
unwillingness of many incumbent national governments, (with their pretensions to 
control over land-based natural resources) to recognise and uphold the often localised 
authority and decision-making systems of common property regimes, has seriously 
undermined the continued existence of these systems. 22 
The issue of institutional recognition and support by government is complicated by a 
lack of government administrative capacity and by the competing claims and interests 
of the various tiers and organs of government (Toulmin 1991 :113,115; Lawry 
1990:419). Where this recognition and support is withheld for whatever reason, and 
state-controlled organisations attempt to usurp the decision-making powers of local 
common property regimes, the ambiguities and uncertainties of what is often an 
incomplete transfer of these powers undermine the trust and confidence between 
resource users themselves and between them and their local institutions responsible 
22 Indeed, Toulmin (1991 :115) contends that governrnents use what they regard as 'anarchy' in 
land rnanagement to justify continued central control, on the grounds that local populations are patently 
incapable of managing their own resources. This is so even though most African governments have 
themselves not been up to the task. 
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for regulating resource use (see Tiffen 1991 :99}.23 
As a result of this lack of clear (ie, unambiguous) external legitimation, common 
property systems suffer from a crisis of authority and are likely to decline and 
eventually lapse into non-management or 'open access' (Bromley and Cernea 
1989: 19), It cannot, however, be assumed that the dismantling of state control over 
decision-making processes with regard to rural resources will automatically lead to the 
resurgence of local management institutions: a more likely scenario is that of an 
institutional vacuum on the ground because the endogenous institutions have been 
changed and possibly eroded (IFAD 1995:90; Toulmin 1991 :111), 
7. Modified Communal land tenure in the Eastern Cape Province 
Defining communal land tenure 
Bruce (1986:3) suggests that the term 'communal tenure' has been used loosely in the 
literature to cover at least three quite different situations. Firstly, it may be used to 
describe common ownership, which implies collective use and management of 
resources, something which occurs only exceptionally in Africa, Secondly, the term 
may refer to 'the right of members of a group to each use independently the full 
resources of certain land (the commons) of the group,' but this right does not extend 
to arable land, which is held individually. Thirdly, the term 'communal tenure' has been 
used to refer to 'significant group control over land which is apportioned for the 
exclusive use of individuals or families of the group', This group is usually defined by 
common descent, common residence or both and the group's interest may be 
represented as a property right or couched in political or administrative terms (ibid:4). 
In the South African context and specifically in communal tenure areas of the former 
Ciskei, it is the nature and extent of the 'communality' of both resource use and 
management that has generated debate (see De Wet 1987b:459), Cross argues that 
'communal' tenure has taken on different forms around the country depending on how 
23 Runge (1986) speaks of the problem of 'assurance' where users lack confidence in the 
capacity of institutions to regulate resource use, 
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it is administered (1991 :72) . Cross has also suggested that to describe indigenous 
tenure as 'communal ' is to obscure the way it works in practice. This is partly the case 
because it is only the resources on the commons which are held communally in the 
sense that every member of the 'community' has rights of access and use to them24 
Cousins (1995:2) points out that while these resources can potentially be managed as 
common property, there is a tendency in South Africa and more generally to elide the 
concepts of common property and communal tenure in ways that obscure the significant 
differences between the two concepts. Although resources on the commons generally 
lend themselves to management by common property systems, they could also be (and 
in some cases are) held and managed under state, private or non-property regimes. 
In contrast to the communal rights that people have to these natural resources, 
residential sites and arable allotments are held and controlled by individuals who have 
exclusive usufruct rights to these resources for as long as they reside in the village 
(Mills and Wilson 1952:8). Ownership of the land and its resources rests with the 
State, but it delegates (in theory, at least) the responsibility for the management of 
these resources to its statutory local representative(s), for example a magistrate, chief 
or headman. 
In principle every (married male) person has the right to residential and arable land by 
virtue of his being a member of a village community. In practice however, De Wet 
(1987b:460) notes that the exercising of the right to arable land may be restricted by 
a local scarcity of such land. The rights to arable land may be (unofficially) inherited 
but not sold (Mills and Wilson 1952:8). Rights to grazing land for livestock (and rights 
to other commons resources) are generally secure, regardless of whether a person 
holds arable land or not and irrespective of the number of livestock a person owns (De 
Wet 1987b:461) 
Cross (1988:17) points out that the term 'communal' also refers to the right of the 
members of the corporate group to approve the transfer of usufructary rights over 
24 As noted previously, these include a significant number and range of natural resources other 
than grazing resources. 
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residential land to an outsider. This means conferring user rights and obligations to this 
person and his dependents. This practice echoes Bruce's notion of 'communal' as 
'significant group control over land' (Bruce 1986:4). By conferring membership on 
individuals through transfers of land, the corporate group has the capacity to organise 
itself and to enforce (to some extent) socially acceptable behaviour because the right 
to belong is conditional to the exercising of acceptable moral and social behaviour25 
The extent to which the corporate group actually participate en masse in the 
transferring of this right is probably highly variable, especially given the formal powers 
which were formerly enjoyed by the headmen and the 'tribal' authority structures. 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Modified Communal tenure 
In a critical analysis of the apparent benefits of communal tenure in the Eastern Cape, 
De Wet (1987b:467 -8) found that the communal tenure system does, in fact, provide 
people with access to commons resources. Another benefit of the system is that 
inheritance patterns and the inalienable nature of the land resources contribute to 
social and cultural continuity, because membership of these communities has in many 
cases been relatively stable over time (lbid:467). The implication here is that it remains 
possible, in the face of state-endorsed and other (for example economic) resettlements, 
for the members of a village to control the influx of 'outsiders' into their area or to admit 
these people on their terms. Clearly, this has not always been the case for many rural 
areas in the Eastern Cape, and Tyefu Location is no exception. 
De Wet (1987b) also suggests that many of the assumptions that exist concerning this 
tenure system do not necessarily apply in practice. Firstly, the shortage of arable land 
in practically all former 'bantustan' rural areas means that not every married man is 
guaranteed access to land, a fact which undermines the supposed egalitarianism which 
the communal tenure system promotes, and which increases the potential divergence 
of local interests. This may also result in a breakdown of the incentives for collective 
action that are necessary for the maintenance of the property regime and of the related 
management of natural resources. 
25 In practice, it is not very easy for the corporate group to withdraw membership rights once 
these rights have been conferred . 
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Secondly, the tenure security offered by a land tenure system which confers land use 
rights based on membership of the social grouping, has been vulnerable to government 
intervention in the form of Betterment Planning or through the implementation of large-
scale irrigation schemes that have re-engineered local tenure regimes. This argument 
relates back to the point about the uncertainty experienced locally as a result of the 
(possibly unwanted) transfer of authority from local institutions (for example, chiefs and 
lineage heads in villages) to those representing primarily the interests of the 
government administration. 
Cross shows that 'traditional ' tenure regimes in South Africa discriminate against 
women (1991 :76) . This issue is also emphasised in DLA (1997:32): 'There are parts 
of the country where the rules and practices of communal tenure discriminate against 
women, both in respect of access to land and in terms of their ability to participate 
effectively in decision-making structures.' Discrimination against women in this regard 
is certainly not restricted to areas subject to communal tenure, but clearly these issues 
have an important impact on the sustainable use of natural resources in rural areas 
where women predominate.26 
Institutional flexibility under systems of modified communal tenure 
Cross (1988:33) has characterised 'communal' tenure in the former Ciskei as a rigid, 
administrative codification of what colonial administrators thought indigenous tenure 
was, with legal codes that facilitated control by the State. The weight of these laws, 
Cross argues, 'has functioned to freeze spontaneous change and to promote the state-
sponsored 'traditionalism' that informs and sustains the homelands system at the 
expense of adaptation at the local level (Cross, 1991 :77). I suggest that the de facto 
modified communal tenure system in the former Ciskei is characterised more by the 
manipulation, circumvention or blatant disregard by the resource users and managers 
of laws and regulations in specific resource management systems, than by rigid ity. 
26 An emphasis on gender differences should not, however, mask the significant intra-group 
heterogeneity of needs and (class) interests that exist between rural women as a group and between 
rural men as a group. 
r 
37 
Indeed, Cross (ibid:64) herself refers to this tendency: 
' .. ... .. [We must take note] of the administrative gap between what the 
state and its bureaucracies prescribe and what people on the ground are 
actually doing ... ... Black South Africans have often successfully evaded 
planning efforts to force them to conform to state restrictions. As a result, 
some of the main tenures under which Africans live today do not officially 
exist. These land systems survive because of the administrative gap 
between the state's capacity to intervene and the daily activities of the 
people on the ground.' [my emphasis]. 
Cokwana (1988:305) has also argued that the communal tenure system in the former 
Ciskei of the mid-1980s did not provide for either community or individual control over 
the use or disposal of land. He contends that although the headman and village 
council were involved in processes of land allocation and management, authority over 
land [and related natural resources] rested with the agricultural officer, the magistrate 
and the relevant government minister (ibid:305).27 This perception of the rigidity of the 
land administration system in the former Ciskei is however, particularly tenuous when 
the past twenty years - the period of Ciskeian 'independence' and the few years 
immediately preceding it - are examined. Evidence suggests that the 'system' of land 
administration became increasingly fragmented, as forced removals increased and 
local people began taking the initiative and solving their problem of land shortages by 
invading vacant (often 'released') land for residential or livestock grazing purposes (see 
Bank 1993). 
Two contentious issues require clarification here: firstly, the process by which local or 
supposedly 'customary' institutions for resource management were undermined and 
subsequently formally supplanted, only to be reconstituted through, inter alia, the 
implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 , was not a linear one. Instead it 
was convoluted, drawn out, uneven and contradictory (see Hendricks, 1990). In 
27 Kerr's argument (1990:95ff) that the 'Administration holds ulijmate jurisdiction over the rights 
to residential and arable land [in communal areas]. and therefore over the use of the land' is, of course, 
correct in the legal sense, but that is not what is at issue here. Rather it is the day-to-day practices of 
natural resource allocation and management that interest us and at this level, the only representatives 
of the administration involved were the headman and the (unpaid) sub-headman, both of whom did not 
exist outside the web of local socio-political and economic networks. 
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addition, in the rural location areas of former Ciskei, this process has played out over 
a period of some hundred and fifty years with marked local variations and sometimes 
considerable time lags between the passing of legislation and its implementation on the 
ground. This implementation was by no means uniform in all areas of the former Ciskei. 
Secondly, the legislative articulation (i.e. the 'codification') of the lines of administrative 
authority28 aimed at the management of land and other natural resources in rural 
localities, did not necessarily match the observed patterns of day-to-day land and 
resource allocation and management on the ground. The pervasive existence and 
survival of 'informal' or 'unofficial' tenure and resource management arrangements, 
which circumvent the institutions of legislated authority, have been noted in the 
literature (Cross 1991; N'gweno 1996; Bruce 1986) and have also been recorded for 
rural areas in the Eastern Cape: De Wet (1992:23) notes that even for freehold land 
in Keiskammahoek, 
'Administrative officials have in the past tried, with varying degrees of success, 
to bring the records [conceming landownership] up to date. Relationships around 
land thus take place in the context of community norms, with the legal context 
usually being invoked only when appeal to these community norms has 
failed ...... . This de facto location of land matters in a social and moral, rather than 
in a formal legal context, also leads to considerable diversity on the ground ...... ' 
Actual examples from rural areas of the Eastern Cape of observed patterns of village 
level land management, clearly show how the authority and effectiveness of statutory 
institutions formally responsible for land management has often rested on informal 
village networks and alliances : De Wet (1987b:460) notes that with regard to 
applications for land in Keiskammahoek (prior to the 1980s), ' .. .. .. . the magistrate 
rubber-stamps the application [for arable andlor residential land] of candidates 
presented to him by the headman, provided that the person has paid his taxes.' This 
observation suggests that headmen, and by extension the local village networks in 
which the headmen moved, continued to playa pivotal role in land allocation and thus 
2B For instance, subhead man - headman - agricultural officer - magistrate - government 
department - government minister. 
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in respect of resource use, even though these tasks were the ultimate legal 
responsibility of the magistrate. 
Lending weight to this argument is the contention by De Wet that 'inasmuch as 
landlessness is increasing, the headman has discretionary power in relation to the 
allocation of vacant land and it is not unusual for a person applying for an allotment to 
present a gift of sorts to the headman' (1987b: 460; also see Wilson et.a!. 1952:37). 
Once a field had been granted, the headman was also 'thanked' (ukubulela) with a 
gift29 
A review of examples of correspondence between landless, urban-based men and the 
local Native Commissionero.in Peddie dating from the 1950s, indicate the extent to 
which the latter was forced to rely on the local headmen for confirmation of each case, 
giving the headmen considerable influence over the success or failure of each 
application. As a result, even though greater 'formal' control over land resources had 
been transferred to the statutory structures (particularly to the Native Commissioner), 
some of the local people were still prepared to present the headman with gifts, 
indicating his continued importance with regard to access to material (and natural) 
resources at the level of village and village-section31 
But the headmen were not alone in having discretionary powers over local natural 
resources: Wilson et.a!. (1952:29-30) noted that matters of administrative concern to 
specific village sections, were dealt with by the (unpaid) subhead man and the inkundla 
(moot or court) in his village section. These subheadmen were responsible for ensuring 
that the instructions given by the magistrate to the headman of the village or location 
concerning, for example, matters such as soil conservation or the eradication of 
noxious weeds, were carried out in his own area. He also conveyed to the headman 
29 See Mills and Wilson (1952:11-12) for an account (from the late 1940s and early 1950s) of 
the increasingly prominent role played by the Native Commissioner in the allocation of arable land. 
30 Documents from the Magistrate's Court in Peddie stored (but as yet uncatalogued) at the 
recently-established Eastern Cape Provincial Archives in King Williams Town (File No.N2/8/3-B). 
31 The point here is that there were a number of avenues a man could pursue in trying to 
secure arable land. I argue later that the existence of these various avenues contributed to increased 
'institutional dissonance' which had a negative impact on resource management. 
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any requests from people in his section for residential sites and arable land and 
informed the headman when land became available for redistribution through the death 
or removal of any members of his section. In all areas of village admin istration, and 
particularly with regard to land and natural resource management, the subheadmen 
represented a tier of government, which was a level below that of the headman, with 
the concomitant ability to influence decisions over which imizi would enjoy access to 
particular local resource 'bund les.' As such, his office represented another forum 
where the complexities and ambiguities of overlapping and multiple claims to local 
resources could be negotiated and contested. 
Why should rural people be keen to retain flexibility, even in modified communal tenure 
arrangements? With reference to arable land resources in the Transkei, McAllister 
(1992:215) has pointed out that the 'indigenous' tenure system provides rural people 
with the flexibi li ty to exercise their individual rights to cultivate or not to cultivate their 
land, depending on their present social and economic ci rcumstances. The system, he 
argues, makes allowance for the cyclical nature of umzi agricultural productivity. This 
means that 'farmers' who are currently inactive as a result of the social and financial 
constraints they are experiencing at that particular point in the developmental cycle, (or 
who are absent migrant workers) are not denied the opportunity to farm in future, once 
they are able to overcome their particular constraints to agricultural production. 
Cousins (1993:35-6) also shows how the communal tenure system in Zimbabwe makes 
for flexibility in respect of access to, and use of, natural resources. 
These examples suggest that the communal tenure 'systems' in the former Ciskei, 
Transkei and elsewhere in southern Africa were not and are not as rigid as has been 
suggested by some commentators. As De Wet points out, local diversity rather than 
rigidi ty is a feature of this system. I would argue that this is essentially because of the 
social value of land: since social and moral values must constantly adapt to dynamic, 
local social circumstances (such as a large influx of people into the area), most rural 
people are likely to resist outside attempts to codify and standardize land tenure 
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matters.32 Instead, they strive to retain local autonomy and dynamism, in short 
flexibility, in matters relating to land and natural resources. As Cousins (1993:37) pOints 
out, however, 'the price of this flexibility [is] a legacy of deep-seated ambiguity' over 
who has rights of access to resources and who is responsible for managing these 
resources. 
While some policy makers and commentators may continue to regard communal tenure 
areas as intractable and unproductive sponges for soaking up the 'discarded people'33 
i.e. the aged, destitute and unemployable masses of people, it is clear that these rural 
areas hold out the promise of at least some livelihood options and 'fall-back' positions 
to those people who are able to make and sustain claims to village membership in 
these areas. This is bome out by the virtual absence of calls by rural people for state-
driven tenure reform measures in the communal areas, as opposed to their strident 
calls for access to more land outside these areas.34 It is also bome out by the vast 
financial and explicitly social investments being made by urban-based people in rural 
housing and in rituals conducted in rural areas, and by calls made by the people in 
these areas for the state to provide infrastructure and services in their villages. 
The social, political and economic costs of changing land management practices in 
communal tenure areas or more drastically, wholesale changes of the nominally 
common property system to a freehold system (i.e. privatisation and title registration of 
land and natural resources), could far outweigh the present utility - to both local people 
and to the state - of the communal type arrangements currently prevalent in these 
areas (McAllister 1992:217). For the Communal Lands in Zimbabwe, Cousins (1993:32) 
argues that 'changing this system ..... .. [would be like] playing with political dynamite.' 
32 See, however, the differential response of different categories of rural (and urban-based) 
people to Betterment Planning (Mager 1992). 
33 Desmond (n.d). Sharp and Spiegel (1985:133) grimly referred to the bantustans of 1985 as 
'places to which the structurally unemployed are being permanently consigned.' 
34 This does not mean that the flexibility of the system suits all categories of local and displaced 
(urban-based) rural residents: indeed, different groups have different needs, giving rise to contests over 
such matters as whether old age pensioners can reasonably be expected to make a major contribution 
to the costs of building creches in rural villages. In the villages of Tyefu Location, landless people have 
been agitating for a redistribution of arable land, but most of them want this to be done by local 
institutions, not through outside intervention. 
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8. Rural Change and Collective Action 
A vast array of studies provide evidence that social and economic differentiation35 is 
firmly entrenched in rural areas across South Africa and that 'rural communities are 
fundamentally heterogeneous in nature' (May et.al. 1995: 124; De Wet and Leibbrandt 
1991 ; Spiegel 1990; Will iams et.al. 1989). In respect of col lective action (aimed, for our 
purposes, at the management of natural resources), it could be argued that social and 
economic differences or inequalities are empirical realities and that is the very fact that 
people have unequal social and other resources that fue ls patron-cl ient relationships, 
reciprocity and people's participation in numerous social networks that could be 
potentially beneficial to them and to the corporate group of resource users of which 
they are members (Berry 1989; 1993). 
However, as Lawry (1990:407) argues, the changing nature of social re lations, brought 
about by what he styles the 'modernisation process', often reduces the incentives for 
individuals to participate in local collective activities, particularly by limiting the scope 
for local action in managing common property systems. This is not because of any 
homogenising effects of economic integration: on the contrary, with even partial 
integration of rural people into the national (and global) economy, broad-based rel iance 
on communal resources tends to decline and to differentiate as people's economic 
interests (in essence, their sources of livelihood) diverge, and the commitment to 
collective decision-making over the management of local resources is often undermined 
(Lawry 1990:413-15). Evidence suggests that where the relative importance of 
communal resources to local livelihoods varies markedly, collective action in managing 
the overall resource base effectively and sustainably is likely to be impeded. 
In South Africa, few rural dwellers are forced to rely exclusively for their survival on the 
communal natural resources in their village: all areas of the country are, to a greater 
35 De Wet (1995:57) lists a number of factors that may contribute to this socio-economic 
differentiation: the local economic role of migrant remittances, pensions, access to arable land and 
livestock, the domestic cycle, the length of settlement in an area, access to political and bureaucratic 
power and patronage.The list of variables suggests that some opportunities do exist for enterprising 
people to be socially and economically mobile and that the reality of differentiation should not be 
interpreted as static or unchanging . As discussed later, not all rural imizi are in a position to grasp even 
these limited opportunities . 
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or lesser extent, integrated into the national economy, so that there is an in and outflow 
of economic resources (including employment opportunities and cash). By diversifying 
their income generating activities, rural people adopt multiple livelihood strategies in 
an attempt to buffer themselves against risk in uncertain agrarian, socio-economic and 
political environments (May 1996:4). 
One long-standing livelihood strategy adopted by under-resourced rural dwellers is to 
stake claims to remittances from urban-based migrants. Besides that portion used in 
the purchase of domestic consumables and in payment for the education of children, 
such remittances are then diffused, to a lesser or greater extent, through the rural 
sector (see Spiegel 1980). They are used mostly as payments for minor services 
provided by individuals or teams of paid workers, such as additions and renovations 
to people's residences, the herding of livestock, the digging of pit-latrines, the collection 
of firewood and the repair of livestock kraals (byres). This tends to result in the 
commercialisation of the use of natural resources, a process which blurs the distinction 
between private and collective ownership of local natural resources.36 
Claims to remittances from urban-based kin have been less successful in the past two 
decades or more, mostly as a result of the gradual collapse of legislative and 
administrative restrictions on African urbanisation, which has allowed migrants greater 
freedom to invest their resources and energies in the urban sector. As a consequence, 
the amounts in cash and kind that are remitted to rural areas have, for the most part, 
dropped over this period (Sharp and Spiegel 1985; Gould 1988). Clearly, differential 
levels of remittances into rural imizi is one factor affecting decisions regarding other 
livelihood strategies adopted by these imizj : where remittances are low or non-existent, 
other strategies aimed at generating incomes are called for. 
These strategies include optimising the possibilities of formal employment closer to 
'home'. As De Wet (1995:71) argues, this became a real option with the creation of the 
former Ciskei bantustan bureaucracy, and the industrial decentralisation policies of the 
36 As will be argued later, this commercialisation also sets up a moral dilemma for local 
resource management institutions, because it is often the unemployed and destitute who are forced to 
take on these 'piece jobs' which may have an adverse effect on sustainable resource utilisation. 
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1970s and 1980s. Both of these developments brought more job opportunities and thus 
more money within reach of rural people, transforming those areas and imizi that were 
best able to avail themselves of these opportunities. 
Social welfare transfers from the state, which have grown considerably in prominence 
(not least because of a substantial increase in real monetary terms) in recent years, 
represent another avenue for securing a livelihood. The most significant of these 
transfers are old age and disability pensions, although child maintenance benefits also 
make a significant contribution to umzi survival in some instances. May (1996) notes 
that pensions constitute a critical component of the livelihood strategies of many rural 
people, to the extent that pensioners become nodes of social agglomeration because 
of their secure incomes. 
Other livelihood strategies may include 'petty' production and sale of foodstuffs or the 
assistance of kin and neighbourhood networks and may even involve 'outright charity' 
transfers (May et.a!. 1995:62). They may include other forms of community reciprocity 
and collective action, such as work parties, mainly in respect of agriculturally productive 
activities. For the most part, however, organised work parties in the former Ciskei have 
tended to rely on resources from outside the particular area, such as the payments 
provided by state-sponsored resource management projects, rather than local voluntary 
action by members of the collective (see Chapter Four) . 
A key strategy for many people is to exploit their multiple kinship links and social 
networks, in both rural and urban areas, so as to minimise the risk of becoming 
destitute or exposing their children to impoverishment. Young children are often left in 
rural villages of origin in the care of a pensioned relative, often their grandmother, while 
the parents reside in the cities where they are employed or seek employment. Indeed, 
the demographic composition of rural villages in parts of the Eastern Cape, particularly 
those where rural -urban links and specifically the circular migration of people are a 
longstanding and entrenched pattern, represents a challenge to the effectiveness of 
local decision-making and therefore of resource management regimes in rural areas. 
To summarise then, it is apparent that the complex heterogeneity of interests, both 
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social and economic, that characterise modified communal tenure areas of the Eastern 
Cape, are the result of ongoing social and economic change in these areas. Taken 
together, these factors present a considerable challenge to any attempts made by 
groups of people in these areas to collectively manage their common pool natural 
resources, as will be discussed in later chapters. 
9. Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the nature of the 'ideal' common property system and its 
local variant, the modified communal tenure regime. It has been pointed out that the 
literature surveyed places an emphasis on the importance of 'robust' institutions with 
particular qualities. Actual modified communal tenure situations were shown to differ 
from this model. I argue that while the situation in Tyefu Location exhibits some of the 
features of a common property system, the area cannot be viewed as an isolated 
'village economy' system, such as that postulated by Runge (1986): Tyefu Location 
may be peripheral in a number of ways, but it is at least partially integrated both socially 
and economically as well as politically, into the larger regional and national political 
economies. This degree of integration serves to dispel notions of 'desert island' type 
co-operative behaviour based on trust and face-to-face interactions and introduces 
greater complexity into a study of the conditions under which rural people may co-
operate to manage their natural resources. 
While I postulate that incentives for collective resource management initiatives would 
be limited by the specific environmental conditions that exist in Tyefu Location and 
would be constrained by the marked social and economic differentiation that exists in 
its constituent villages, it is nevertheless the case that a measure of collective action 
is known to take place in these villages and there is strong evidence of a 'will to 
collective action' in local discourses.37 Moreover, local organisations are grappling with 
common property resource management issues in the face of demographic pressures, 
37 Whether this 'will to collective action' is premised on local circumstances or is externally 
induced is debatable: non-governmental organisations often require that 'communities' demonstrate 
'consensus' and a unity of purpose in respect of a proposed development intervention; village leaders 
continuously exhort local residents to work together to achieve their ostensibly collective objectives; 
government projects require that village residents demonstrate the ability or will to act collectively 
before initiating projects in rural areas. 
46 
institutional weakness and economic exigencies. These issues are real and a common 
property theoretical emphasis, while not without its problems, does appear to offer 
some relevant insights into these complex issues. The chapters that follow will shed 
more light on the particular characteristics and failures of common property resource 
management practices in Tyefu Location and Gwabeni in particular. 
Pencil, ink marks 'lnd 
highlighting ruii"\ books 
for other readers, 
CHAPTER TWO 
Agro-ecological Conditions in Tyefu Location 
Although the successful long-term management of natural resources has critical social 
and institutional dimensions, it is the specific ecological characteristics (such as 
availability and resilience) of localised natural resource systems that circumscribe, to 
a greater or lesser extent, the potential levels of resource utilisation within such 
systems. For this reason, the (changing) resource endowment of a particular area has 
a significant and dynamic influence on the types of resource management 
arrangements that are likely to be ecologically and socially sustainable in the medium 
to long term. Strategies for the management of natural resources in modified 
communal tenure areas are likely to be most effective when they match a sound 
understanding of the ecological processes of change at work in these systems, with the 
establishment and maintenance of flexible common property institutions, that are able 
to enforce conformity to resource use rules and norms. 
1. Tyefu Location 
According to a 1984/85 [former] Ciskei Department of Agriculture and Forestry annual 
report, 
'The Tyefu Tribal Area is one of the most eroded and impoverished areas of the 
homeland. The area is densely populated and it is so drought prone that the 
people are unable to subsist from the land: a truly depressed area.' 
Tyefu Location has an area of some 24 218 hectares, and is situated in the north-
western section of Peddie district (De Beer 1984:200). The area is topographically 
complex, with much of the land consisting of steep slopes that separate low-lying land 
in the Great Fish River Valley from the more undulating lands on the interfluvial ridge 
between the Great Fish and Keiskamma Rivers. The settlement pattern in the location 
is one of dispersed groups of dwellings which are loosely arranged in eleven 
settlements. In 1985, the population of the area was estimated at around 13 563 
(Setplan 1985), giving a population density of some 56 people/km'-
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2. The Agro-ecology of Tyefu Location 
Climate 
Tyefu Location falls with in an area which is regarded as semi-arid, and which is prone 
to severe periodic droughts (De Lange el.a!.- 1994). The area experiences a dominant 
summer rainfall regime, with the highest precipitation occurring during the months of 
November and March. A central feature of the rainfall pattern in Tyefu Location is that 
I it is erratic in quantity and distribution, with a coefficient of variation in the mean annual 
i rainfall of just under 32% (Computer Centre for Water Research' ). The typical effects 
I I of altitude and topography on rainfall apply in that the higher lying areas of the Location I (around Gwabeni and Mankone) generally receive more ra in (between 500 and 
\ 550mm), while the Fish River valley receives least rain (less than 400mm per annum) 
\ (De Lange el.aI.1994:5) 
There has been no significant long-term change in the amount of annual rainfall over 
a one hundred year period stretching from 1890 to 1990, for which records have been 
kept in the town of Peddie. Youthed suggests, however, that there may be a recurrent 
dry and wet rainfal l cycle of approximately 23 years (Youthed 1994:2). In terms of 
rainfall for the area, the decade from 1983-1993 has been the driest on record this 
century. The overall water deficit in the area means that people are forced to make use 
of rainwater tanks or drums which capture a supply of rainwater conveniently near to 
where it is needed. During the drought of the 1980s and early 1990s, many imizi were 
forced to buy water or to share the meagre supplies of (what becomes polluted) surface 
water in local dams with their livestock. 
Mean monthly (maximum) temperatures range from 21 .8°C in June to 30.1 °C in 
February, when extreme temperatures reach 40°C and more (De Lange el.al. 1994: 12-
13). Again , these high temperatures are experienced particularly in the Fish River 
valley and are the cause of heat stress in crops. Winter temperatures are generally 
mild and temperatures rarely fall below O°C. The area experiences between 15 and 30 
, Personal commun ication from A.R Palmer, based on Computer Centre for Water Research 
statistics of 111 years of rainfall data from Peddie town, some five kil ometres from Tyefu Location) and 
20 years of rainfall data from Committees Drift (adjacent to Tyefu Location). 
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days of light ground frosts in winter, but the higher-lying ground is generally frost-free. 
The Fish River valley area is subjected to large diurnal temperature fluctuations, but 
sudden fluctations in temperature occur throughout the area as a result of two weather 
effects : (i) sudden cooling is caused by the on-shore flow of very cold maritime air of 
Antarctic origin, which is brought in by the passage of cold fronts and (ii) the rapid 
warming caused by the off-shore flow of Berg winds which are common to the Eastern 
Cape. These significant temperature variations which are often accompanied by winds 
of high velocity, cause further stress to crops and natural vegetation (De Lange 
1994: 13). 
The average amount of evapotranspiration for a typical crop is greater than the average 
rainfall for every month of the year in parts of Tyefu Location (particularly in the Great 
Fish River valley), and crops can only be grown under irrigation (Loxton et. al 1979). 
I These climate features give an indication of just how risky dryland cropping is in these 
\ areas, except in years of higher than average rainfall. As a result of this high margin 
\ of risk, agricultural production in the location, except on the Tyefu Irrigation Scheme in 
the Great Fish River valley, is centred around livestock production. 
Geology and Topography 
Tyefu Location has a geological substrate consisting of a variety of sedimentary rocks 
dating back to the Karoo sequence, which have very limited potential for dryland crop 
exploitation. In the area south of Gwabeni village, the oldest deposits belong to the 
Ecca Group and consist mainly of blue or black shales (De Lange et.al. 1994:16). To 
the north of these Ecca deposits, rocks belonging to the Beaufort Group occur. These 
rocks consist of light coloured siltstones, mUdstones and sandstones. In places, 
igneous rocks in the form of dolerite dykes and sheets occur (Ibid: 16). Murray (1995:8) 
refers to one such dyke which runs through Tyefu Location in a WNW to ESE direction 
as the 'Tyefu dyke' and suggests that it has potential hydro-ecological significance (see 
below). 
The landscape of Tyefu Location consists of inter-basin ridges, with steep river valleys. 
The inter-basin ridges are made up of more resistant sandstone of the Middleton 
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formation. In the river valleys, nutrient rich mudstones are exposed, but these are 
extremely susceptible to erosion (Palmer and Avis 1994: 12). 
The area has a complex topography, with elevation ranging from 170m above sea level 
(asl) in the Fish River valley to about 560m asl in the north west corner of Tyefu 
Location, which is situated on the dividing ridge between the Fish and Keiskamma 
rivers. Slopes in the latter area are predominantly between 15% and 30%, but steeper 
slopes are not uncommon (Ibid: 13). Most of the villages in the Location are situated 
on this higher-lying plateau which runs down to the Fish River basin . Unlike the gently 
sloping plateau area, the landscape between the plateau and the Fish River basin has 
been deeply incised by the downcutting of rivers and streams (Palmer et.aI.1996) . 
Some of the villages (for instance, Gwabeni, Qamnyana and Rura) that overlook the 
Fish River valley are situated on the crests on several narrow ridges, another feature 
which inhibits extensive arable land-use. 
Soils 
Soils derived from the shales of the Ecca Group are highly erodible. In particularly the 
lower-lying parts of Tyefu Location, the soil cover has been removed, leaving a blue-
black 'moonscape' devoid of any form of vegetation (De Lange et.al.1994: 16). Most of 
the soils in the area are extremely deficient in phosphorus, which is a major factor 
limiting plant growth (lbid:17). 
The two major groups of soils in Tyefu Location are the shallow soils of the plateau and 
valley slopes and the moderately deep soils of the valley bottoms of the streams flowing 
into the Fish River. The shallow soils of the first group cover by far the largest part of 
the Location. They consist of shallow, grey and grey-brown litholic2 soils, with a depth 
of approximately 200mm and have a sandy loam texture. This surface layer of soil 
usually overlies a gravelly layer of rock fragments and some tongues of soil (De Lange 
et.al.1994:17). Because of their shallow rooting depth, the water holding capacity of 
these soils is limited to about 40mm in depth. The slopes of the valleys are usually very 
2 Litholic soils consist of freshly and imperfectly weathered rock or rock fragments with no 
clearly expressed soil morphology (Soil Classification Working Group (1991). as quoted in Palmer 
1997:82). 
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steep, hence the formation of soil here is minimal and the surfaces of these slopes are 
covered with stones. 
The second group of soils are found in the valley bottoms where relatively deep layers 
of weathered material have been deposited. These soils are subjected to run-off and 
seepage and are often imperfectly drained, exhibiting a grey and mottled appearance 
as a result. The distribution of these soils, which have a higher agricultural potential, 
is limited to a few scattered areas which are small in extent (lbid:18). 
In summary, De Lange et.al. (1994:19) argue that the distribution of potentially arable 
soils in Tyefu Location is limited mainly to the Fish River valley itself. The largest part 
of the area is covered by a very shallow mantle of soil, which on steep slopes and in 
eroded areas, has by and large been reduced to a few remaining patches and clumps. 
Hydrology 
The groundwater potential of the Ecca and Beaufort Group sediments in Tyefu Location 
is relatively poor even though some local aquifers can supply sufficient quantities of 
water to meet domestic requirements (Murray 1995:8). The quality of groundwater in 
terms of (greater) salinity decreases towards the south away from the Beaufort Group 
sediments. In Rura village the electrical conductivity was measured at 430mS/m, which 
means that the underground water tastes extremely salty and even over the short-term, 
consumption of this water may lead to disturbance of the salt balance in the human 
body (lbid:8). As a result, several boreholes have fallen into disrepair and local people 
have not been overly concerned to rectify this situation. 
The only natural water bodies in Tyefu Location are the intermittently flowing streams 
that occur in the deep valleys. These streams, the Nqwelo, Mankazana, Rura, 
Nqwebebeni and Sinqumeni streams, all have very localised catchments and drain into 
the Fish River (Loxton et.aI.1987:70). The scarcity of perennial streams poses a 
problem for human and animal water consumption across the location, but particularly -
in the villages on the plateau. 
"~ I I tV 
The construction of dams in the valley bottoms has alleviated the overall water deficit ' _~ 
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by providing a reliable supply of water in the dry season, but the distance of these 
dams from the imizi and the difficulty experienced in negotiating the steep terrain are 
major obstacles to effective utilisation of these sources (Palmer 1997:23). Most of 
these dams suffer from siltation which will reduce their holding capacity. Small ponds 
or dams that form in the depressions on the plateau areas during the rainy season are 
used for domestic purposes but are often unfenced and are thus shared with livestock. 
Murray (1995:25) notes that all the villages of Tyefu Location have inadequate 
domestic water supply systems. Under these circumstances, the rainwater tanks and 
drums that store rainwater collected from the roofs of houses provide many imizi with 
a much-needed supply of potable water which is conveniently close at hand. 
Vegetation 
Much of the vegetation in the study area consists of two main veld types: Acocks 
(1988)3 classified one type as 'Valley Bushveld' of which there are two local variants 
known as Fish River Scrub and Southern Variation . The second vegetation type is the 
grassland known as 'False Thornveld of the Eastern Province' which occurs on the 
plateau areas. Acocks maintained that in its natural state (Le. in the period before it 
was intensively use by domestic herbivores) Fish River Scrub would have consisted of 
extremely dense, semi-succulent thorny scrub-forest of between 2 and 2,5 metres high 
with very sparse grass cover. This vegetation type represented an adaptation of Valley 
Bushveld vegetation to the low rainfall and high temperatures which occur in the Fish 
river valley4 It is interspersed with grassland on the high-lying areas and Acacia 
thickets along the riverine fringes. 
Acocks argued that the dense Fish River Scrub had been thinned out and opened up 
through over-utilisation by domestic and wild ungulates, leading to encroachment by 
jointed and spineless cactus (Opuntia sp.) and Euphorbia bothae and resulting in Karoo 
3 As quoted in Palmer and Avis (1994) . 
4 Fish River Scrub occurs along the north-eastern bank of the Fish River from the coast to 
Committee's Drift (Loxton et.al1 987:66) . 
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vegetation of the lower Central type invading the landscapes Loxton et.al. (1987:68) 
argue that the vegetation of the area has also been transformed by the demands made 
on the resource base for firewood which is a significant source of domestic fuel in the 
area, and by way of clearing for arable and settlement purposes. 
Fabricius and Burger (1994:5) contend that a characteristic of the endemic vegetation 
is that it is highly sensitive to grazing pressure by livestock and that it is very slow to 
recover if a threshold amount of woody vegetation is removed through over-utilisation. 
Soil Erosion 
Loxton et. al. (1979) found that 25 to 50 per cent of the topsoil in the area comprising 
Tyefu Location had been lost entirely. They also argued that erosion gull ies were 
common and that urgent rehabilitation was needed. The area is considered to have a 
high natural susceptibililty to erosion because of the steep topography and the shallow 
soils which form a thin layer over the highly erodible shales and sandstones. Given the 
nature of these soils, any reduction of plant cover, through intensive grazing pressure 
or through turning the soil for arable production, is likely to greatly increase the 
likelihood of soil erosion, because the lack of vegetation increases the run-off of 
rainwater, both in terms of the volume of water and of the velocity of flow. 
This situation is exacerbated in those areas where, as a result of selective grazing, 
unpalatable karroid shrubs have replaced the endemic grasses and shrub species and 
have left the soil surface largely uncovered. The most conspicuous evidence of 
accelerated soil erosion in the area is the occurrence of erosion gull ies (or 'dongas'), 
which are found particularly on the slopes of valleys where arable land-use has 
occurred in the past. Sheet erosion has also occurred widely throughout Tyefu 
Location and are responsible for a substantial loss of topsoil (Kakembo 1997). 
5 As quoted in Palmer and Avis (1994:14) . 
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3. Understanding natural resource degradation6 
Debating notions of degradation and resilience 
With specific reference to communal rangelands, the 'new thinking' in rangeland 
management, articulated by Scoones (1995), Cousins (1996) and Shackleton (1993), 
has challenged the conventional argument that the communal areas in southern Africa 
are unequivocally overgrazed and degraded. These writers argue that the categories 
of what consitutes 'overgrazed' and 'degraded' rangelands, are subjective and based 
on a particular normative set of views and evaluations (usually with the commercial 
production of that area in mind) of what rangeland condition should be. They argue that 
a wide range of site-specific rangeland management objectives (what Scoones (1995:2) 
terms 'differentiated livelihood objectives') exist which do not necessarily share the 
values or stress the same rangeland characteristics as the normative rangeland 
condition model. The condition of particular rangelands might not, in fact, be regarded 
as degraded, especially when the normative model is not a commercial one, but based 
on multi-purpose livestock production strategies (Scholes 1994: 12). 
These writers make a distinction between equilibrial and non-equilibria I rangeland 
systems. In equilibrial systems, there is a direct relation between animal numbers and 
vegetation states, successional processes (between vegetational states) can be 
identified and notions of carrying capacity are relevant (Behnke and Scoones 1993: 12, 
quoted in Cousins 1996: 173). Here, appropriate common property systems for 
managing livestock in communal tenure areas are those with clearly defined 
boundaries for user group membership and management rules that accomodate the 
internal heterogeneity of resources needed for herd mobility at the local level (Cousins 
1996). 
In non-equilibrial systems, an important element is the existence of heterogeneous 
patches of resources over greater spatial and temporal (for example, season and 
drought cycle) variations. Non-exclusive forms of common property resource 
management, that accomodate opportunism, and allow for maximum flexibility in use 
6 See the Introduction for the definition of the term 'degradation' used here. 
55 
patterns, thus making for wider access to co-ordinated access to these patches, would 
probably be the most suitable form of tenure in these situations. The argument is 
essentially that arid and semi-arid rangelands are inherently unstable sy-stems, driven 
by episodic events, such as fires or drought, and that these non-equilibrial systems may 
actually be very resilient and often recover rapidly after drought or periods of rest 
(Behnke and Scoones 1993, quoted in Cousins 1996: 172). 
With respect to resource management it is argued that rainfall, rather than the effects 
of possible over-exploitation of the resource base, is the key factor influencing 
rangeland condition in non-equilibrial rangelands (Scoones 1995: 1). Consequently, the 
stocking rates that are often regarded by agricultural authorities as excessive under 
common property systems, are subject to substantial cyclical fluctuations (animal 
numbers increase rapidly during and just after periods of high rainfa ll, but decline 
dramatically during droughts) and may in general approach optimal levels of utilisation 
(Shackleton 1993:74). An assessment of 'carrying capacity' in terms of the current 
appearance of resource depletion in the short to medium term may thus be 
unnecessarily bleak. They may also lead to inappropriate and unpopular resource 
management interventions (such as livestock reduction programmes) that could 
undermine the legitimacy of local resource management institutions (Shackleton 
1993:67; Cousins 1996: 172, 173). 
Another important consideration is time scale: it is argued that if disturbed systems 
revert back to their 'original' state after one generation (15-30 years), then they can be 
considered stable (Shackleton 1993:70). These temporal cycles are generally longer 
than the usual administrative planning horizons or research project time-frames, a fact 
that could lead to inaccurate assessments of the state of the resource base at any 
given time . One important caveat here is that the effect of continuous, heavy grazing 
which reduces vegetal cover may result in accelerated erosion, which would degrade 
the resource base and thus warrant management intervention. 
This same argument could be extended to question whether significant and irreversible 
degradation has taken place in specific rural areas across the spectrum of natural 
resources utilised by rural people, given the fact that practically no empirical studies 
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(with long-term vegetation trial sites) of the ecological transformation of these areas 
have been done over a period sufficiently long to account for the possible episodic 
rejuvenation of the resource base (Shackleton 1993:74).7 
Has degradation of the natural resource base occurred in Tyefu Location? 
A longitudinal study of resource degradation in Tyefu Location was conducted very 
recently with the use of air photographs dating as far back as 1938 (Kakembo 1997).8 
Although not suitable for assessing the state of grazing resources, this study shows 
conclusively that indices of both sheet and gully erosion have increased over this 
.\. period, with the decade 1965-1975 exhibiting the most 'drastic increase' in erosion. 
Kakembo argues that the cessation of cultivation, without the adoption of measures , 
aimed at the rehabilitation of arable lands, was a major cause of gully erosion in the ' 
\ area (Kakembo ibid:1 05-1 07). 
Using satellite image data and two different erosion status indices, Tanser (1994:22) 
also detected a large increase in erosion status between 1982 and 1992, with the 
percentage of severely eroded land increasing from 21 per cent in 1982 to 40 per cent 
in 1994. 
There is also evidence which strongly suggests that widespread deforestation of 
indigenous tree species together with species replacement and bush (Acacia sp.) 
\ encroachment has occurred (Palmer and Avis 1994). In a comparative study of the 
\ change in vegetative cover and composition (effectively over a twelve year period) for 
an area which includes Tyefu Location, Palmer and Avis (1994:40) found that the cover 
of perennial shrubs and grass in the communal rangeland areas is low to very low, with 
extreme transformation in the species composition in favour of species that are 
unpalatable and more tolerant of arid conditions. 9 Palmer et.al (1996) also argues that 
7 The comparative study by Palmer and Avis described below is a useful alternative to an 
longitudinal study. 
8 The dates of aerial photographs used in Kakembo's sequential analysis were : 1938, 1954, 
1965, 1975 and 1988. 
9 The study compared rangeland condition across three different land management regimes: 
State-owned land under nature conservation management, freehold land that was previously 
commercially farmed but had been under-utilised for twelve years, and land that is subjected to 
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the former 'patchy' distribution of nutrients across the landscape has changed to one 
in which the nutrients are widely dispersed, primarily by erosion. 
In the case of areas in Tyefu Location which have a combination of low elevation and 
low rainfall,lO the study of vegetation in the communal rangeland indicated a move 
~ _ \ towards an arid condition, where perennial grasses and herbaceous species have been 
replaced by karroid dwarf shrubs (Jatropha capen sis, Chrysocome ciliata) and annual 
grasses. In areas with high elevation and high[er) rainfalill , samples of vegetation were 
dominated by unpalatable woody shrubs (such as pteronia or Coddia rudis) and 
I succulents, for example Aloe sp. Perennial grasses and shrubs, such as the highly 
palatable Portulaca ria afra (commonly known as 'spekboom' ), had been replaced by 
unpalatable shrubs and succulents (Palmer and Avis 1994:29). 
On the plateau areas, it is the spread of unpalatable grass species, such as Eragrostis 
plana, which is one cause for concern in terms of vegetative transformation. Arable 
lands which were ploughed at one time in the past, but which have since been 
abandoned and thus reverted to rangeland, have been invaded by these undesirable 
grasses that grow very successfully after the soil has been disturbed. In the virtual 
absence of more desirable species of grasses which have been subjected to heavy, 
continuous grazing pressure, these unpalatable grasses are able to spread across 
significant portions of the rangeland. 
Palmer and Avis (lbid:29) conclude that the communal rangeland areas of Tyefu 
Location exhibit an 'extreme transformation in species composition' and are generally 
in poor condition. They attribute the most significant causes of this state of affairs to 
the heavy stocking rates, the practice of continuous grazing, the high proportion of 
goats and sheep in livestock herds and the fact that there is too little land available for 
the number of land-users in the area (lbid:44). They estimate that in its 1994 condition , 
the communal rangeland of Tyefu Location had a carrying capacity of about 35ha per 
modified communal tenure land-use arrangements (Le. Tyefu Location). 
10 Areas under 300m asl that experience less than 350mm rain per year. 
11 Areas higher than 450m asl with more than 450mm of rain per year. 
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large animal unit (LAU), This low (estimated) carrying capacity is comparable to an 
area in the Karoo which receives half the annual rainfall of Tyefu Location, 
On a similar note and in respect of species richness as an index of biodiversity, 
Fabricius and Burger (1994:7) argue that Tyefu Location contains less than half as 
many plant and arthropod (mainly insects and spiders) species as the nature 
conservation reserve areas adjacent to Tyefu Location , They also note that a large 
number of medicinal plants identified by traditional healers during the course of the 
study within the reserve area no longer occurred in Tyefu Location , 
4. Conclusion 
For the purposes of this study, it is accepted that sufficient empirical evidence does in 
fact exist (despite the call to take cognisance of disequilibria! systems) which 
demonstrates that the ecology of the resource base in Tyefu Location has been 
detrimentally and irreversibly transformed over an extended period (Palmer and Avis, 
1994; Fabricius and Burger 1994; Kakembo 1997), Palmer et.aL refer to the 'altered 
vegetation state'12 of the Tyefu landscape, with the implication that the livestock 
production potential has been adversely affected. They suggest that an optimistic 
estimate for the 'restoration' of the rangeland vegetation would be fifty to one hundred 
years (1996:12), The result of this transformation has been to adversely affect the 
production potential of rangeland resources, as well as fuelwood, soil and other 
resources, 
This transformation is deemed to be 'irreversible' for all practical purposes, because 
12 Walker and Noy-Meir (1982:557) argue that there are 'bounds beyond which savanna 
ecosystems cannot recover', but also suggest that many of these systems have more than one stable 
point or 'state', one of which the system will tend towards, depending on the nature and duration of a 
disturbance or treatment Despite the absence of long-term empirical data on rangeland condition for 
Tyefu Location, Palmer (personal communication), on the basis of 20 years of experience in the area, 
argues that continuous, heavy grazing by domestic herbivores, possibly starting from as long ago as 
one hundred years, pushed the rangeland in Tyefu Location into a specific and fairly resilient 'state.' It 
appears to have persisted in this state for several decades, maintaining a relatively constant number of 
livestock over this period : Data for the period 1946 to 1997 show that livestock numbers have generally 
remained constant overall , dipping slightly as a result of recurrent droughts through the 1980s and 
again in the early 1990s (data provided by Nick Fischer, State Veterinarian for Peddie, Alice and 
Seymour Districts) , 
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firstly, it would require that all livestock be removed from the rangeland for several 
decades at least and that other resource use also be severely curtailed during this 
period (Palmer et.al. 1996:12). Without the provision of additional land, this would in 
effect mean removing all the local inhabitants of the area so that the vegetation is given 
an opportunity to recover, since resting smaller sections of rangeland (by prohibiting 
all forms of resource use there) would simply increase the pressure on the natural 
resources in those areas which were still in use. Local institutions are not likely to be 
in a position to enforce such exclusions given the strongly held perceptions of an acute 
shortage of arable and grazing land in these areas. 
Secondly, even long-term 'natural' (as opposed to mechanical) rehabilitation would 
entail considerable financial expenditure (labour costs in the eradication of alien 
vegetation, the reseeding of large areas of rangeland, and programmes to rehabilitate 
and prevent gully erosion) that would probably be unjustifiable in terms of the benefits 
that could be gained from what would remain ecologically marginal rangeland, and in 
a situation where rangeland and other natural resource production would still be reliant 
on variable amounts of rainfall (see Palmer et. al.1996). 
Clearly, this particular set of agro-ecological constraints poses enormous challenges 
for the management of the local resource base in Tyefu Location. The semi-arid 
conditions are only really suitable for extensive livestock production, although some of 
the irrigable potential of the low-lying areas has been exploited. Even if the area had 
a population of less than 1000 people to support - which is roughly the comparative 
number of people on a similar area of commercial farms adjacent to Tyefu Location in 
the Great Fish River valley13 - socio-economic conditions for the majority of the 
inhabitants would not be rosy. Given, however that the population of the Location is 
closer to 14000, resulting in a density of around 56 persons/km2 , the enormity of the 
resource management challenge is brought into sharper focus. 
If, as I argued in Chapter One, Tyefu Location does exhibit some of the characteristics 
13 These farms have comparable agro-ecological conditions but population densities in the 
region of 3-6 persons/km' (Ainslie el.a1.1995) 
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of the 'ideal' common property model, then it appears to be an inefficient (even 
dysfunctional) common property system, in that the regulation of natural resource use 
has not ensured the maintenance of sustainable levels of consumption. Clearly, the 
high population densities (both human and livestock)14 are one significant contributing 
factor to this state of affairs, but it is a factor which begs the important question of what 
circumstances have allowed for such high and patently unsustainable concentrations 
of people and livestock on marginal land ? Moreover, what other factors have 
contributed to the degraded state of this modified communal tenure area and how are 
we to understand the role of social institutions and of socio-economic incentives with 
respect to natural resource management in this context? 
14 As Lacey argued in 1979 : "Overstocking, overgrazing, or overpopulation and congestion _ 
which was the greatest cause of deterioration in the reserves? The controversy is of prime concern to 
agricultural extension officers even today" (1979:88). 
CHAPTER THREE 
Setting the Scene: A History of Natural Resource Management in Tyefu 
Location, Peddie District 
Introduction 
Present-day patterns of natural resource management in Tyefu Location are rooted in 
the historical events that shaped access to land on the frontier of the Cape Colony from 
the early nineteenth century. A brief account of these historical struggles for control 
of land and natural resources in this area would thus be apposite. 
The recorded history of the Eastern Cape prior to the twentieth century is dominated 
by the nine Frontier Wars that were waged between 1779 and 1878. These wars have 
been described as the brutal contestation of different ways of owning and managing the 
land and its resources (Crais 1992; Bundy 1988:31) . Settler demand for the land 
(mostly for extensive livestock grazing purposes) claimed by Xhosa-speaking groups 
for the same purpose, and for control over indigenous labour characterised this 
struggle (see Lacey 1979; Webster 1991 a) . The effects of the settlement of Mfengu 
people in Peddie District from 1835 are of particular interest to us here. 
1. 'Frontier' conflict over land and resources 
In the mid-eighteenth century, Xhosa-speaking pastoralist groups were in permanent 
occupation of the grazing land between the Fish River and Algoa Bay (Peires 1981). 
The Gqunukhwebe in particular were to be found in the area extending from the 
Keiskamma River to beyond the Gamtoos River, west of Algoa Bay. Xhosa-speaking 
groups in these areas were involved in relationships of economic exchange and social 
(including intermarriage) and cultural (noticeable by the number of linguistic influences) 
interaction with Khoisan groups who also inhabited the area (lbid:97). 
From as early as the 1750s, these people were also in contact with white hunters and 
travellers and later with the Dutch farmers ('trekboers') who were expanding the frontier 
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of the Colony eastwards. From 1703, these farmers could apply for grazing permits 
enabling them to rent 'loan farms' which were large tracts of grazing land (a minimum 
of six thousand acres) at a token price for their exclusive use. Thus was introduced a 
system of individualised (if not strictly private) property rights which was to bring these 
'trekboers' into conflict with the shifting pastoralism of the Khoi Khoi groups and Xhosa-
speakers in the area (see Peires 1981 :122). By the late 1760s, the 'trekboers' had laid 
claim to all the Khoi Khoi grazing land between the Gamtoos and the Fish rivers and 
had come into contact with the Gqunukhwebe, Gwali, Mbalu, Ntinde and Mdange 
Xhosa-speaking groups (Switzer 1993:46). 
Although initially peaceful and characterised by barter in ivory, meat and hides, the 
relations between these Xhosa-speaking groups and the trekboers had degenerated 
into open conflict by the 1770s (Peires 1981 :57). The first significant tract of land to 
become the focus of conflict between the two parties was the Zuurveld (see Map 2), a 
well-watered region of prime sourveld grazing land that was situated along the coast 
and into the interior, between the Sundays and the Fish rivers (ibid:54). Three 'Frontier 
Wars' were fought in, and over access to the resources of, this area in the period from 
1779 to 1800. 
By 1811, Britain had re-occupied the Cape and the British colonial officials had 
accepted the Fish River as the boundary between the Cape Colony and Xhosaland. 
They were, however, unable to restrict the re-entry of Xhosa-speaking groups, 
particularly the Ndlambe and the Gqunukwebe, into the Zuurveld. The war of 1811-12 
resulted in about twenty thousand (mostly Ndlambe) Xhosa1 men, women and children 
being driven off the land, their cattle confiscated and their imizi destroyed so that the 
entire Zuurveld was opened up for 'white' setilement (Switzer 1.993:51-2). 
Such was the competition for natural resources (mostly livestock grazing and water 
resources) in the area, that thirty small forts were subsequently built along the Fish 
River and the boundary was patrolled by soldiers. The eastern bank of the Fish River 
1 The most important division of the Xhosa 'proper' was between the sons of Phalo, Gcaleka 
and Rharabe. The Gcaleka Xhosa are associated with the Transkei area, while the Rharabe Xhosa are 
mostly associated with the former Ciskei area (Peires 1981 :47) . 
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between Trompetters and Committees Drifts comprised a significant Xhosa-speaking 
settlement and cattle post during this time (Holbrook 1992:45). In spite of the 
intermittent wars, economic ties between the settlers and the Xhosa continued to grow 
and in 1817, bi-annual trade fairs were being held in Grahamstown and Xhosa-
speakers were given permission to enter the colony to participate in these fairs (Bundy 
198830). 
During the War of 1818-19, the area between the Fish and Keiskamma rivers (currently 
Peddie District) was virtually cleared of Xhosa groups, including the Gqunukhwebe and 
the Ndlambe, their huts and food supplies were destroyed and their cattle seized 
(Webster 1991 b: 13). A neutral zone was established between the two rivers that 
extended to the Kat and Tyhume rivers below the Winterberg. This zone became 
known as the 'Ceded (or Neutral) Territory' and was intended to be an uninhabited 
buffer area between settlers and Xhosa-speakers (peires 1981 :79). 
By the early 1820s, however, Dutch-speaking settlers began to cross the Fish River to 
farm in the disputed territory (Switzer Ibid:54). By 1824, the trade fairs2 between 
colonists and Xhosa-speakers had been moved to Fort Willshire on the Keiskamma 
River and, although strictly regulated, were being held three times a week (Bundy 
1988:30; Peires 1981 :98-101). The arrival of British Settlers in 1820 and thereafter put 
more pressure on the available land resources : land was granted to them on a 
perpetual quitrent basis, which greatly increased the speculative potential of land 
(Peires ibid: 122)4 
The drought of 1829 devastated both the Colony and Xhosaland up to the Kei, and only 
the area which constituted the Ceded Territory was spared (Peires Ibid:89). 
Consequently, both settlers and Xhosa-speakers drove their herds of cattle into it, 
2 Colonists traded mainly beads and to a lesser extent, blankets and utensils for the ivory, hides 
and other resources (such as aloes) that we re provided for barter by Xhosa-speakers (see Lewis 1984a 
:64-5) . 
3 Fort Willshire Is situated about seven kilometres north of Tyefu Location. 
4 Peires (1981 :122) notes that the 'possibility of reselling land obtained for next to nothing 
created an unquenchable thirst for new grants.' 
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making govemment attempts to keep the Ceded Territory uninhabited untenable. The 
colonial govemment abandoned the trade fairs in 1830, after an attempt to relocate the 
Fort Willshire fair to the Clusie (present-day Ngqushwa) River near Gqunukhwebe 
territory failed. Traders were subsequently allowed to penetrate the interior beyond the 
Keiskamma River as far as Mpondoland (Ibid: 1 02). 
Map 2 : Contested Areas circa 1779-1835. 
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2. The Establishment of Mfengu Locations in Peddie 
After the War of 1834-35, a large number of 'refugee' Mfengu people with 
approximately 22 000 head of cattle were brought out of Gcalekaland by the colonial 
forces.6 With the missionary John Ayliff, they crossed the Kei river and settled in 
Peddie, west of the Keiskamma river. Fort Peddie was constructed to protect the new 
arrivals (Bundy 1988:33). Mhlambiso, the 'loyal' chief of the amaH/ubi group of 
Mfengu, was appointed overall chief of the original settlement at Peddie, on the orders 
of O'Urban, the Cape governor at the time, and on the recommendation of the 
government agent, J.M. Bowker (Ibid: 29). 
O'Urban wanted all the land between the Fish and Keiskamma rivers, between Fort 
Willshire and Peddie, to be allocated to the Mfengu in fortified villages from where they 
would provide the colony with military support against the Xhosa (Crais 1992: 117). At 
the same time, they would form a strategic buffer between the 'white' settlers and the 
Xhosa 'proper'. It was by means of this policy that Mfengu men were induced, through 
taxation7 and through exploiting the desire of these people for consumer goods, to 
enter service in the Colony (see Moyer 1976:349). 
In any event, the nature of the settlement was somewhat different to O'Urban's plan and 
5 The conventionally accepted figure is around 16 800, but Webster (1991 b) regards this 
figure as excessive. 
6 Recent work by Webster (1991 a) has questioned whether the Mfengu (or 'Fingo') were in fact 
refugees from the upheavals in Natal that resulted from the military campaigns of Shaka in founding the 
Zulu kingdom between 1817 and 1829. Webster argues that most of the 1835 'Fingo' who were settled 
in present-day Peddie were 'captured Gcaleka (and Rharhabe) Xhosa women and children, military 
auxiliaries, refugees and mission collaborators' (1991 b:37). Webster (lbid:34) also contends that the 
destruction of Xhosa livelihoods during the Frontier War of 1834-35, was one of the keys to the increase 
in the number of 'Fingo' at this time. Peires (1981 :121) concurs with this, arguing that 'Many Xhosa, 
impelled by the loss of their cattle during the war, passed themselves off as Mfengu and the joined the 
stream ~nto the colony].' 
7The Mfengu were the first Nguni people in the Cape to be subjected to taxation . A hut tax of 
ten shillings per hut/family was imposed in areas of African settlement from 1848 (Switzer 1993:93). 
Various other taxes, including wheel taxes for those who owned wagons and horse and dog taxes, all to 
be paid in pounds, were also imposed on the people in these settlements (see Lewis 1984a:241) . 
Switzer (lbid:93) argues that 'the Mfengu ...... .were not so much attracted as compelled to partiCipate in 
the market economy to pay their taxes: and that successive Cape governments spent 'virtually nothing' 
on the locations during the colonial period because they had a reliable source of revenue received 
entirely from the African population (also see Lewis 1984a:670-74). 
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the original Peddie location was a small settlement on the Clusie River, consisting of 
some six hundred and ninety eight people clustered around the protection of the fort 
and the Boers stationed there (Webster 1991 b:28). The Mfengu apparently refused to 
be settled in areas that had only recently been cultivated by vanquished Xhosa groups, 
considering this to be too much of a provocation to the dispossessed Ndlambe and 
Gqunukhwebe people (see Peires 1981: 131 ). 
A short time after their arrival, however, groups of Mfengu were settled in six locations 
and on two mission stations. The area comprising Tyefu Location was settled by the 
amaH/ubi abaseKunene and was called Nzulu Location around this time. 8 Although 
D'Urban had wanted 'all locations carefully delimited and the boundaries pointed out 
to the residents to prevent disputes between clans, boundary disputes began almost 
immediately and flared up regularly thereafter' (Moyer 1976:358)B 
In the immediate vicinity of this settlement of Mfengu people in Peddie were placed 
settler farmers, and Bowker, who served as the Resident Agent (of the Mfengu) and 
Justice of the Peace at Peddie, had instructions to intersperse Mfengu land grants with 
these 'white' farms so that the Mfengu could be 'civilised' through contact with whites 
(Webster 1991 b:32; Moyer ibid:358). The settlement of the colonial farmers in the area 
was delayed by the outbreak of war that followed the establishment of the Mfengu 
locations. 
3. Conditions in the Peddie locations (1848-1858) 
On 8 March 1848, Peddie, including the area comprising the Mfengu locations, was 
created a magisterial district by proclamation and was named the District of Fort 
Peddie, with Mr. W.M. Edye as the first Civil Commissioner and Resident Magistrate. 
By the 1840s, the population of the district had risen to over 10 000 and was 
8 Jackson (1975) gives the genealogy of the Hlubi chiefs as follows: Radebe - Ngwane-
Maqubela - Mjoli - Zide - Msuthu - Zulu - Silo - Goven - Havington (in Butterworth) . The Right Hand 
house (or amaH/ubi Basekunene) from Zulu consisted of: Tyefu - Nkebeza - Alfred Msuthu - Douglas 
Msuthu - (Chieftainess) Nomalungelo Msuthu (in Peddie). 
9 The Mfengu at Fort Peddie were attacked by Siyolo's people in 1837. Mhlambiso was stabbed 
during the attack (Peires 1981 :131). 
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considered to be overpopulated (Moyer 1976:363). There was much discontent among 
the Mfengu who had hoped to receive more land than they did in payment for their 
collaboration against the Xhosa. Their fortunes were to change though, and as a 
reward for their loyalty to the Colony in the Frontier War of 1848, the Mfengu were 
given land concessions in Fort Beaufort (around Healdtown) and Victoria East. At the 
end of the 1850-53 war, more concessions of previously Xhosa-held land were made 
to the Mfengu in the Crown Reserve, to the west of King Williams Town, at 
Keiskammahoek, and in the Queenstown district at Lesseyton, Kamastone and Oxkraal 
(Lewis 1984a:239,241) . 
In 1849, the first white settlers received title to farms in Peddie District and in 1853, 
after the Eighth Frontier War, settlers began arriving in the area in considerable 
numbers (Bullock 1960:28) . Preference, in respect of title to farms, was given to the 
1820 Settlers and their sons and to Dutch-speaking burghers who had taken part in the 
Frontier wars. The farms were granted on condition of personal occupation and under 
a quitrent system. The central portion of the lower Peddie District was granted to 1820 
Settlers and the upper portions, along the Keiskamma River, to the burghers (lbid:28). 
The settlers wasted no time in establishing lucrative sheep farms, specialising mostly 
in labour-intensive wool production. The presence of a considerable number of whites 
settled on farms in the district was resented by the Mfengu, who by 1854 numbered 
8688 people in six locations and on two mission stations in Peddie District (Lewis 
1984a:245). 
A census of the Mfengu in Peddie was conducted in July 1854 by N. Edye, the Resident 
Magistrate in Peddie. It gives an idea of the conditions of the six Mfengu locations 10 
and the settlements at the two mission stations, D'Urban and Newtondale (Lewis 
1984a:245). Of interest here, is the situation in Nzulu (Tyefu) Location at the time, as 
shown in Table 3.1. overleaf. 
10 These six were: Jokweni, Matomela, Nzulu (which would later be known as Tyefu), 
Kwankwezi , Kaulela, M'Thonhli and Ft. Peddie Location (Lewis 1984a:245). 
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Table 3.1 . Census of Nzulu Location, July 185411 
Men 285 
Married Women 273 
Male children over 16 years 105 
Female children over 16 years 62 
Male children under 16 years 363 
Female children under 16 years 371 
Widows 50 
Total population 1509 
Huts 431 
Imizi 89 
Cattle 2989 
Goats 514 
Sheep 46 
Horses 162 
Wagons 8 
Ploughs 2 
Guns 174 
The figures in Table 3.1 are indicative of the general conditions prevalent inTyefu 
Location at that time. What is of interest here is the high proportion (49 per cent) of 
children below sixteen years of age. Lewis (lbid:246) speculates that this figure 
indicates a population that was growing or at least had the potential to grow rapidly. 
The low numbers of (unmarried) females over sixteen years (62) compared to males 
in the same category (105), suggests that many of the girls were married soon after 
they turned sixteen and were placed in the 'married women' category during the 
census. The census indicates that there were no polygynous households in Tyefu at 
the time (Lewis 1984a:249). 
11 Adapted from census taken by N.Edye quoted in Lewis (1984a:245-6) . 
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The census also shows that the population lived in groups of households, with each 
such group constituting a homestead (umZl) . Each of the 89 imizi would have consisted 
on average, of 17 people and would have been under the direction of a senior member 
of one of the constituent households (ibid:246). 
Investment in cattle was fairly significant: each homestead possessed an average of 
nearly 34 cattle, which represents nearly 11 head of cattle and 2 goats per man. It is, 
however, unlikely that every man in the Location would have owned cattle, and a more 
probable scenario is that the ownership of cattle was concentrated in the hands of a 
number of the homestead heads (see Lewis 1984a:248). The overall relatively high 
ratio of cattle to men among the Peddie Mfengu is not surprising as they had been 
recipients of Xhosa cattle during the period 1848-53 (ibid:247). 
The data show that investment in ploughs had hardly begun in the Location. The low 
numbers of ploughs suggest that field cultivation was still being done largely by means 
of hoes. The eight wagons in Tyefu imply that transport-riding as a source of income 
had taken root in the Location by this time. Lewis (1984a:250) suggests that 
investment in wagons was encouraged during the 1851-53 War in which the Mfengu 
were significant providers of transport to the British forces. Investment in guns by the 
people of Tyefu is also evident with an average of one gun to 1,6 men, or nearly 2 guns 
per homestead. 
The census appears to support Lewis' (1984a:250) argument that prior to the cattle-
killing of 1856-7, the Peddie Mfengu were not investing their resources in cultivation, 
but rather that earnings from employment on colonial farms, from the sale of grain and 
from other sources, were invested in wagons, guns and the purchase of cattle. Only 
on the mission stations, with encouragement from the missionaries, had arable 
production overtaken pastoralism in respect of economic activity. 
4. Consequences of the economic and political integration of the locations 
When Calderwood surveyed the Mfengu in three areas - Victoria East, Tyhumie and 
Fort Beaufort (i.e. not Peddie District) - in January 1855, he found that, despite the 
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migration of people to concession lands in other areas of British Kaffaria, many of the 
locations were overcrowded and 'too narrow to allow both grazing and agriculture' 
(Moyer 1976:396). He also noted that several white farms overlapped on to Mfengu 
locations and that problems had arisen as a result of the impounding of Mfengu-owned 
cattle by settler-farmers. These tensions between white and black neighbours also 
existed in Peddie district and were set to continue for over a hundred years. 
For eighteen months from January 1855, lungsickness decimated the cattle herds of 
the Xhosa and Mfengu. The Mfengu, even though they did not participate in the Xhosa 
Cattle Killing of 1856-7,12 were to find themselves without cattle, and were confronted 
with thousands of starving refugees from the Cattle Killing who wanted to buy grain. 
The widespread impoverishment in the wake of the Cattle Killing led to a major 
population displacement: thousands of Xhosa-speakers flooded into the Mfengu 
locations, where they 'became' Mfengu by changing their legal status (Stapleton 
1996:240). As a result, the Mfengu population expanded dramatically.13 The 
settlements between the Fish and Keiskamma rivers were severely overcrowded 
through this influx of Xhosa refugees. In March 1865, the Mfengu population of Peddie 
District was 16400 (Stapleton ibid:246), an increase of some 89 per cent in the 11 
years since Edye's survey. 
Large numbers of Xhosa-speakers also streamed across the Fish River and into the 
Colony in search of work, many of them settling on farms in the Albany and Bathurst 
districts where they worked as farm labourers. Decades later, they would move off 
these farms into the locations and villages of Peddie District. 
The Gcaleka chief, Sarhili, had been driven beyond the Mbashe River by the Colonial 
forces, and in 1865, some 40 000 of the Mfengu living in settlements throughout British 
Kaffaria were persuaded to resettle in the central region of Sarhili's territory around 
12 The most thorough account of the Cattle-Killing saga is Peires (1989) . 
13 See Stapleton (1996:240-3) for a somewhat controversial account of how this 'conversion' 
was endorsed by the colonial authorities. 
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Butterworth, in an area which came to be known as Fingoland (Stapleton 1996). The 
population of Peddie decreased by 11 ,2 per cent as a result of this exodus (Lewis 
1984b:21). The land of those who had left was taken over by younger imiziwho were 
in need of arable land, and who were apparently motivated by the fear that the Colonial 
state would seize any underutilised land in the Locations. The result, Lewis (1984b:21) 
has argued, 'was a [sic] organised drive to acquire ploughs and expand production in 
order to retain effective occupation of vacated lands,' thereby denying the Colonial 
government any excuse to intervene and redistribute land to settler colonists. 
Lewis has argued further that the increase in arable production at this time (1865 
onwards) was not the result of the intensification of production, but rather of the 
expansion of agricultural activity over a greater area. This arable expansion was made 
possible by the exodus of people to Fingoland (1984b:22). In places like Tyefu 
Location, the expansion of arable production into agriculturally marginal areas would 
have contributed significantly to increased levels of soil erosion in later years.14 Lewis 
contends that the increases in production were shortlived and were actually reversed 
by drought and by the pressure of further population increases that followed the 1879 
rebellion (1984b:22). 
Lewis argues that economic stratification between imizi was intrinsic to the structure of 
the economy in the locations, as it had been to the pre-conquest Xhosa economy and 
social formation (1984b:4). This stratification became more apparent as the imizi 
themselves began to break up because of the differential engagement of their 
constituent imizi with the Colonial economy, leaving each umzi to fend for itself 
economically. In consequence, a situation of 'radically skewed' access to productive 
resources such as land, cattle and family labour was entrenched, underscoring the 
overall trend of increasing impoverishment for the majority of rural imizi in these areas 
(lbid:24). 
Commonplace symptoms of this impoverishment after 1870 were that of overcrowding, 
14 Cf. the observation by Kakembo (1997) that, since the late 1930s, a great deal of the 
erosion features in Tyefu villages are the result of abandoned arable lands that were not rehabilitated. 
1-
72 
land disputes, a young landless group, indebtedness and a large wage-seeking group 
(Bundy 1973:29). Disputes over access to land grew more intense as landowners with 
livestock outside the locations clamoured for access to the grazing on communal 
grazing land in the locations 15, while poorer imizi without stock wanted to use grazing 
land for residential and gardening purposes (Switzer 1993:99). 
Magistrates were allowed, in terms of Act 20 of 1878 and Act 37 of 1884, to confiscate 
stock and charge grazing fees where imizi failed to pay their hut taxes. By 
Proclamation 140 of 1885, tax collectors were empowered to seize land and other 
property and even to evict people from their homes for failure to pay taxes (Switzer 
1993: 1 OO). Natural disasters, such as drought and livestock diseases contributed to the 
creation of an increasingly sub-subsistence rural economy, as did the attempts by the 
Colonial government to increase the flow of labour from these rural areas through 
administrative and legislative means (Bundy 1973:31) . 
With finite land resources, and with the mobility of the population regulated, 
overcrowding and landlessness became the norm in the locations. Soil erosion took 
hold as marginally productive land (including hillsides, ridges, dry and stony patches), 
was ploughed and reploughed (Bundy 1988: 117). Grazing resources were diminished. 
Although great disparities in wealth were recorded (Bundy 1988:88), the majority of 
those Mfengu who were sti ll 'on the land' by the end of the 19th century, had become 
heavily indebted, sub-subsistence farmers who had to leave the area periodically in 
search of employment (Moyer 1976:419). The scarcity and uneven distribution of land 
resources in the rural locations bred competition and conflict as the degree of economic 
stratification increased (Bundy 1988: 129). . 
In 1890, it was estimated that of a total population of 18 500 people in Peddie district, 
4000 men and women were absent 'at work on the gold-fields, railway works, reaping 
or in service' (Bundy 1988: 118). By 1905, these reserves had become reservoirs of 
labour which slowed the development of an urban African proletariat and served to 
15 This highlights the problem of defining and maintaining the membership boundaries of those 
with access rights to resources subject to a system of common property management. 
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underpin a system of migrant labour. The consistently high indices of adult male and 
female labour migration hamstrung rural agricultural production systems and, by 
causing membership of village communities to become increasingly dislocated and 
fragmented, undermined the authority of the institutions responsible for managing 
natural resources. 
While government land policy in the reserves vacillated between the opposing white 
interests, 16 conditions in many of the reserves were bleak. Moll's (1988: 7 -8) description 
of the conditions experienced by peasants in the Transkei in the 1900s, mirrors the 
processes that had been underway for some time in the Ciskei areas, including the 
locations in Peddie District, 
' ....... Under conditions of limited land area (partly due to restriction of 
African land ownership to the reserves) and rising population, land 
pressure escalated. Confined to limited resources in Transkei and the 
imperatives of survival, African imizi were forced to over-exploit the land, 
which had the long-run effect of undermining the fertility of the soil and 
lowering cereal and pastoral output.. ... .. One such survival response by 
rural producers was to cultivate marginal land on steep slopes, very near 
rivers, on stony patches and in other areas subject to erosion ..... .. A crisis 
was thus postponed for some years largely by increasing the absolute 
land-area under cultivation, and holding more stock.' 
5. The State intervenes into land-management 17 
The reserve system was legally reinforced in rural South Africa through the passing of 
the Natives' Land Act 27 of 1913. The terms of this Act set land aside for the exclusive 
occupation and ownership by Africans. The schedule to the Act was based on the 
existing rural reserves and locations which included Tyefu and the other Mfengu 
16 The disparate needs and demands of mining capital and the emergent white farming sector 
are discussed in Lacey (1979); Haines and Cross (1988: 78) and Davenport (1987:393). 
17 Hendricks (1989:306, 325) has observed that there is often a wide discrepancy between the 
stated objectives of government plans and their eventual implementation. Such observations serve as 
warnings against a view of the state as a monolithic institution that formulates and uniformly implements 
policy in ways that are free of contradiction. 
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locations in Peddie district. Additional land was set aside for African occupation (but 
not always handed over) in terms of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 (Surplus 
Peoples Project, 1983:xii). The South African Native Trust would henceforth administer 
the scheduled areas 18 set aside by the Land Act of 1913, as well as additional areas 
designated for African occupation by the 1936 Act itself (Switzer 1993:223). In 
practice, it was the headmen in the scheduled reserves (including the locations in 
Peddie) who continued to control access to land and other resources in the villages, 
and they remained answerable to the magistrate.19 
The Native Economic Commission of 1930-32 pulled no punches in describing the 
environmental crisis in African reserve areas as characterised by "denudation, donga-
erosion, deleterious plant succession, destruction of woods, [which is] drying up of 
springs, [and] robbing the soil of its reproductive properties, in short the creation of 
desert conditions" (U.G.22/32)20 
The official view attributed rural resource depletion to indiscriminate overstocking and 
the irrationality of African agriculture (Bundy 1988: 125). The official response in the 
late 1930s to the disintegration of the rural economy and the (perceived) almost total 
depletion of the natural resources of the reserve areas, was to implement rehabilitation 
schemes in rural location areas (Hendricks 1989:316). These schemes included the 
division of land for arable, grazing and residential purposes and the relocation of 
people and livestock (Bundy 1988:227). The programme embarked upon also included 
'limited agrarian reform', such as the culling of stock, fencing, contour ploughing, and 
measures aimed at water conservation and the control of soil erosion (lbid:227; Moll 
1988:23). 
Referring to conditions in the Transkei, Moll (1988:25-31) notes that the efforts to 
. . 18 Peddie District was identified as Area 26, and an area of 63 725 morgen (54 612,3ha.), 
whIch Included Tyefu Location, was scheduled (U.G. 19/1916) . 
19 The role of local institutions like the headmen in managing natural resources is examined in 
Chapter Four. 
20 Beinart (1984) has made some interesting observations about the origins of what seemed to 
border on paranoia with respect to the perceived levels of soil erosion and desertification. 
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rehabilitate these areas did not address the root of the problem, namely that of too any 
people and too many animals on too little land (see Lacey 1979:88). This argument 
also featured in the rhetoric of rural people in the former Ciskei where the same 
problem of overcrowding had existed in rural locations such as those in Peddie District 
since the middle of the previous century (Switzer 1993:231). 
By the mid 1940s, land-hunger was all-pervasive in the former Ciskei. The majority of 
the population were unable to subsist on the land and depended on urban wage 
rem ittances (Mager 1992:766). In 1945, more than half the cattle and sheep and a 
third of the goats in the former Ciskei died as a result of relentless drought. Agricultural 
productivity declined steadily while the incidence of soil erosion increased through 
desperate ploughing measures, designed to conserve drought-weakened draught 
animals. 21 
Government drought relief took the form of the employment of destitute men and 
women in public works programmes, such as road-building, contour maintenance and 
dam construction. These measures could not reverse the declining fortunes of the 
poorest nor did they make a lasting impression in terms of arresting the ecological 
decline of the reserve areas (Mager Ibid:767) . Indeed, one legacy of these cash 
transfers by the state to villagers for the completion of natural resource management 
related tasks, was that of undermining the endeavours of local institutions which of 
necessity, rely on the voluntary (i.e.unpaid) participation by villagers for fulfilling such 
tasks (see Chapter Four). 
In the post-war period, and especially after the National Party came to power, one 
aspect of government policy towards the reserve areas focussed on the need to 
maximise the numbers of people settled in the reserves. In order to address the 
problem of overcrowding, the Tomlinson Commission (1955) recommended that the 
reserve population be divided into farmers and rural-based wage-earners, with the 
latter, who were to have no rights to arable land or stock ownership, subsisting by 
21 To relieve the weakened oxen, downhill ploughing on steeper slopes was initiated, with 
women and children having to drag the plough back up the slope (Mager 1995b:200). 
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means of wages from the urban sector. Consideration of the ecological implications of 
such a policy took the form of Betterment Planning. While the discourse of these 
resource rehabilitation programmes was couched in purely technocratic and economic 
terms, it allowed for the state to exert control over the rural population through chiefs, 
headmen, dipping foremen and police. Ironically, as resistance to Betterment grew, the 
legitimacy of many of these functionaries was negatively affected. This was particularly 
the case for local headmen and chiefs who had agreed to the implementation of the 
schemes in their areas. 
This intervention by the state into the management of natural resources included the 
imposition of fines for the breaking of contours, the impounding of stock found grazing 
in betterment areas and for failure to dip cattle or to keep pigs enclosed. At the same 
time, the state devolved responsibility for policing rehabilitation onto headmen in the 
locations, in anticipation of the implementation of Bantu Authorities (Mager 1992:771). 
In many instances and in numerous ways, these measures were resisted and subverted 
by rural people (see Mager 1992), and particularly the contentious measures relating 
to imposition of restrictions on access to land and to the culling of livestock were the 
source of much resistance. Livestock that were to be culled by the authorities were 
often moved to kin or clansmen in neighbouring locations to escape this fate. 
Because of administrative delays and local resistance, the implementation of 
Betterment Planning was accompanied and even preceded in some places, by the 
establishment of Bantu Authorities. One goal of the Bantu Authorities Act was to re-
invent the 'traditional' African system through the establishment of tribal, regional and 
territorial authorities with limited powers. Both Betterment and Bantu Authorities tended 
to have the effect of strengthening the dominant conservative groupings in these 
locations, while simultaneously confining as many people as possible to the reserve 
areas and making them firmly dependent on the central government. In this way, the 
state hoped to divert emerging African nationalist forces (Moll 1988:38). These policies 
were to have the opposite effect in many areas (Mbeki 1964; Mager 1992, 1995b). 
Moll notes that in general, the rural people in the former Ciskei locations demonstrated 
r 
77 
much less resistance to these interventions than those in the Transkei. This he 
attributes to the greater differentiation at village level, a greater dependence on migrant 
remittances, higher education levels and more effective proletarianisation, which 
resulted in a limited and heterogeneous interest in issues of land and resource 
management (Moll 1988:42)22 
In Peddie District, as in other parts of the former Ciskei, there was both silent 
acquiescence and vehement resistance to the implementation of Betterment Planning 
(see Mager 1992:763). In the Mazizini area in the southern coastal section of the 
District, two chiefs (Jama Njokweni and Jeremiah Msuthu23) who agreed to Betterment 
without the consent of their followers were murdered (Mzozoyana 1995a:3; De Beer 
1984:145). In Tyefu Location, long-standing opposition to the Native Affairs Department 
(NAD) had centred around the person of Alfred Msuthu, the chief of the amaH/ubi 
abaseKunene, who had been banned for leading the resistance of the men of Tyefu 
Location against the imposition of the Bunga system as far back as 1933. As a result 
of his 'obstructionist and recalcitrant attitude', Msuthu had been suspended from his 
position as headman of the location (see Mager 1995a:57). Although he was reinstated 
as headman in 1952, Msuthu still refused to defer to the authority of the NAD officials 
and he was dismissed and deported from the area, but only after he had been a fugitive 
frorn the authorities for three years. 
Mager (1992:772-4) notes that in the early 1950s, the mobilisation of rural people, 
including large numbers of women, in Peddie District against Betterment came 
increasingly under the influence of the Port Elizabeth-based members of the ANC 
Youth League (see Hirson 1977:126). This shift corresponded to the collapse of the 
rural economy which saw imizi become totally dependent on the wages of younger, 
urban-based men. In Peddie, imizi who had lost 60 per cent of their livestock in the 
22 While the early leaders of this opposition to Betterment and Tribal Authorities were the rural, 
patriarchal elite (the chiefs , headmen and wealthy livestock owners), who had the most to lose through 
the culling of stock, the fencing off of land and the changing of ploughing habits (Switzer 1993:304), the 
landless and unmarried women were often more ambivalent towards Betterment implementation, 
hoping that they would be the beneficiaries of arable land. Mager's (1992;1995) perceptive accounts of 
the resistance to state intervention show how different social and economic categories of rural people 
responded in different ways to this state intervention into access and control of rural natural resources. 
23 No relation of the Msuthus in Tyefu Location. 
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drought lived half in the reserves and half in town in an attempt to make ends meet 
(Mager 1992:773). 
The villages of Tyefu Location were finally surveyed or 'planned' in anticipation of 
Betterment in 1963. No Betterment schemes were, however, implemented in Tyefu 
Location, probably in part because the state machinery had lost its enthusiasm by then 
to go into an area with the reputation for resistance such as Tyefu Location.24 
Permission to Occupy certificates that never were completed, or issued to landholders, 
are still held at the Magistrate's office in Peddie. 
6. Population increase: a key consequence of the Ciskei experiment 
Population increases and the pressures associated with it, were by no means solely a 
result of the creation of the Ciskeian bantustan: the 1946 census25 conducted in Tyefu 
Location makes interesting reading in this regard, particularly when compared to Edye's 
survey 92 years previously, as in Table 3.2. below. 
Table 3.2. A Comparison of Tyefu Location Census data 
CATEGORY 1854 SURVEY 1946 CENSUS 
People 1509 4889 
Cattle 2989 2938 
Sheep 46 5388 
Goats 514 18464 
What is immediately clear from Table 3.2 is that, while cattle numbers stayed 
remarkably constant, even declining slightly, the number of goats (nearly 36 times as 
24 Discussions around the implementation of the Tyefu Irrigation Scheme and the political costs 
of the possible failure of this scheme steered the authorities away from implementing betterment to the 
villages of Tyefu Location (see correspondence (from 1966) between the Secretary for Bantu 
Administration and Development, the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, KWT and the Bantu 
Commissioner, Peddie,( File No. N2/8/3-B, Tyefu Location), Peddie Archival Records (PAR) King 
Williams Town) . 
25 As quoted in 'Eradication of Prickly Pear - Ciskeian Native Areas' (1947) . PAR, King Williams 
Town (File No. N2/8/3-B, Tyefu Location) . 
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many) and sheep (over 117 times as many) increased quite spectacularly over the 92 
year period, albeit off a low base. Given the agro-ecology of Tyefu Location, it is 
understandable that particularly goats would be favoured over cattle and that they 
would be better able to withstand drought, but the figures above give more than a 
passing insight into the possible causes of the deterioration of grazing in the location. 
This begs the question of how a situation could have arisen in which the numbers of 
goats and sheep, both of which are capable of doing considerable damage to grazing 
resources, and thereby contributing to soil erosion, could increase to such an extent 
? At least part of the reason must lie with the fact that dryland arable production has 
always been a poor option for most areas of Tyefu Location, so that people were likely 
to invest in hardier species of livestock. The overall levels of investment in livestock (as 
depicted in Table 3.2) would help to explain the vehement resistance to attempts to cull 
livestock in the Location from the 1940s. 
If we accept that the area of the Location remained unchanged,26 an increase of 224 
per cent in the human population would have put local resources, especially water and 
arable land and thus living conditions for the resident population under considerable 
pressure. Clearly, by 1946 the situation in Tyefu Location in terms of the pressure on 
natural resources was already looking bleak. 
In terms of the Ciskeian Proclamation 187 of 1972, the Ciskei was declared a self-
governing state (Freeman 1981). In pursuance of its project of ethnically constituted 
'states', the South African State proceeded to relocate large numbers of Africans into 
areas demarcated for the development of self-governing ethnic enclaves. At the same 
time, plans to 'consolidate' and rationalise the boundaries of these enclaves were 
formulated and carried out. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the implementation 
of these plans involved both the removal and resettlement of 'black spots' and the 
buying out of white-owned farms for inclusion into the reserves (Surplus Peoples 
Project 1983 VoI.2) . This activity was to have far-reaching consequences, not least in 
contributing to the collapse of institutions responsible for natural resource management 
26 The farms, Gnusha Poort (506 ha) Woodlands and Runletts (combined area 1767 ha), 
which were bought by the South African Development Trust in 1924, have remained discrete 
settlements outside of Tyefu Location (see Lacey 1979: Appendix 95) . 
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and the to unsustainable utilisation of natural resources. The 'consolidation' of 
homeland boundaries resulted in a breakdown of the agricultural support systems and 
personnel, including agricultural extension staff, stock inspectors and grazing rangers, 
that had been key to the management of natural resources in both freehold and 
communal tenure areas until then (see Higginbottom et.al 1995:53-54). 
Population increase in the Peddie locations (see Table 3.3 below) has historically been 
augmented by the various measures introduced by the state to eliminate the 
phenomenon of 'squatting' on white-owned farms 27 More recently, there have been 
other major movements into Peddie District, this time by ex-farmworkers off white-
owned farms in the surrounding districts. Manona (1988a:284-292) notes that there 
were successive waves in the 1960s and 1970s of 'destitute' farmworkers that were 
pushed off 28 these farms in the wake of widespread farming mechanisation and the 
labour cuts that accompanied it (Manona Ibid:77-80). Predictably, many of these 
people attempted to settle in areas of re latively high agricultural potential and by 1984, 
villages like Mgababa in Peddie South had grown by several thousand people (Manona 
1988a:286). Most of the influx of farm-people into Tyefu Location came from the farms 
to the north of the Location, those of Peddie North and Victoria East areas. The majority 
of these new arrivals were able to gain access to residential land and in some cases, 
such as in Tyefu Location, they were also granted grazing rights. For the most part, 
however, these newcomers were unable to secure access to arable land. Table 3.3 
lists the official census figures for females and males in Peddie District over a fifty-five 
year period29 
27 Manana (1988a:66) notes that the Location Acts of 1892,1899 and 1909 made it 
increasingly difficult for the African tenants on these farms to pay the increased rentals to stay on the 
farms. Records show that by 1931, implementation of the 1909 Act had reduced the 'squatting' 
population in the Eastern Cape from about 40000 to 7 000 people (Manana 1988a:66). These people 
relocated to neighbouring areas demarcated for 'Native' residence, such as the locations of Peddie 
District. 
28 Manana (1988a:288) argues that some farmworkers were attracted to villages in the former 
Ciskei because of the 'cultural in frastructure' including better schooling facilities, churches, access to 
kin and a sense of being among one's own 'community.' 
29 1 am grateful to Di Tipler for the making this data from her forthcoming M.A. thesis, Tipler, 
D.J . 'Rural and Urban Population Trends in the Eastern Cape Province, 1936-1991' available to me. 
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Table 3.3. Rural (black) Population of Peddie District 1936-1991. 
YEAR OF CENSUS TOTAL POPULATION PERCENTAGE CHANGE 
1936 23522 -----
1946 23415 -0.45 
1951 23340 - 0.32 
1960 31 711 + 36 
1970 41985 + 32.4 
1985 62707 + 49.4 
1991 65057 + 3.8 
As Table 3.3. indicates, the population of Peddie District began to increase rapidly from 
1951, registering considerable increases from this time until 1985. Between 1970 and 
1985, the population of the district increased from 41 985 to 62 707, which constituted 
an increase of over 49 per cenl. 30 This increase was largely attributable to the 
displacement of people from neighbouring farms, as well as forced resettlements in the 
already overcrowded locations (Charton 1980:174,229). Five major resettlement camps 
were established in Peddie District. These were Glenmore, where 4 500 people were 
settled on a farm bordering the villages of Tyefu Location, as well as Kammaskraal, 
Zweledinga, Bell and Bingqala (Surplus Peoples Project 1983). From 1985, the table 
shows that the population increase flattened off, indicating that the major resettlement 
projects had been completed. 
Manona (1980) has shown how the relocation of whole communities into Peddie District 
onto land which established villagers regarded as their grazing land, has led to conflict 
over access to natural resources. In Tyefu Location, incidences of conflict between the 
residents of Glenmore and those of Ndwayana, particularly in respect of access to local 
grazing resources, have been recorded (De Lange el.aI.1994). 
30 Comparable statistics in DBSA (1985) indicate these totals as 30 311 (1970) and 55 136 
(1985); with the increase over the fifteen year period of nearly 82 per cent. These figures are probably 
an exaggeration since the methods used during the collection of the DBSA data set were potentially 
inaccurate (see Chapter 5). 
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In 1981, the former Ciskei gained its 'independence' from South Africa. The 
commercial agricultural sector of this 'country' was deemed to be unviable, and the 
subsistence sector had all but collapsed. Rural employment was practically non-
existent and migrant wage-labour offered the only viable strategy for household income 
generation. The rural areas were stagnating economically and politically (Charton 
1980:228). Vast areas of the countryside were over-grazed and heavily eroded. Despite 
the industrial decentralisation policy adopted by the South African government in the 
1 960s, which consisted of encouraging the establishment of border industries that were 
supposed to alleviate rural poverty, little headway was made in relieving the overall 
impoverishment of many rural dwellers (Switzer 1993:328). 
The politicisation of the countryside had a negative impact on local resource 
management practices, because practically all the government funding which was 
aimed at providing drought relief and the conservation of natural resources was 
channelled throught the Tribal Authorities or the Department of Agriculture, and 
directed at members of the CNIP 31 (see Rogers 1980:77). As a result, those people 
who were opposed to the bantustan system (and thus not members of the CNIP) were 
marginalised from workteams that were paid to undertake these conservation projects. 
After some nine years as 'President-for-life,' Sebe was ousted in a military coup in 
March 1990 and was rep laced as 'head of state' by Brigadier Oupa Gqozo. Gqozo 
suspended the headmen (although he continued to recognise chiefs) who had become 
unpopular with rural people, but he did not transfer their powers to the ANC-aligned 
SANC032 Residents' Associations at village level (Manona 1995:2; Lewis 1992). With 
the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and other liberation groups in 
February 1990, opposition from non-statutory groups like SANCO, towards the delayed 
re-integration of the bantustans into South Africa and the continued existence of the 
bantustan administration reached fever-pitch. This made for intense political activity at 
village level and resistance grew towards Gqozo and his newly-formed party, the 
African Democratic Movement (ADM). In the face of this opposition, and in an attempt 
31 Sebe 's Ciskei National Independence Party. 
32 This is the acronym for the South African National Civic Organisation. 
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to re-establish statutory local government structures, Gqozo withdrew what amounted 
to tacit support for the Residents' Associations and re-introduced the headmen system, 
linking access to rural resources to membership of the ADM. This move was vigorously 
opposed at village level and met with a violent response in places (Manona 1995:26; 
Lewis 1992:18). 
The upshot of the political upheavals in the period 1990 to 1994 was that many 
inhabitants of rural villages have been alienated more than ever from the loci of 
authority at all levels of the bantustan administration. This induced a great deal of 
uncertainty over issues relating to resource management in the countryside as the 
former Ciskei bureaucracy all but collapsed. Laissez faire resource management 
practices were adopted : land invasions, particularly by newcomers onto the 
commonage grazing land of established villages, was widespread as local systems of 
control fell away or were ignored. Existing regulations concerning resource use, such 
as the prohibition on the use of axes to collect firewood and the regulation that pigs 
must be kept enclosed, were identified with the oppression of the bantustan and its 
headmen system and were brushed aside. 
In Peddie District, the now-dominant village Residents' Associations were non-statutory 
bodies and as such had no legal status. They also did not have any formal links to tiers 
of the bantustan government in respect of funding for community projects and drought 
relief initiatives. In an effort to break any vestiges of local power the oppositional 
headmen (and by extension, Gqozo's African Democratic Movement) might still enjoy, 
the Residents' Associations assumed responsibility for allocating (residential) land in 
rural villages, with varying degrees of success. 
In 1994, the former Ciskei was re-integrated into South Africa, forming part of the new 
Eastern Cape Province, which included the Transkei and a section of the former Cape 
Province. The amalgamation of these three administrations has been fraught with 
difficulties and the new provincial government has been slow to address the broad 
range of issues relating to the management of natural resources, with a key constraint 
being that of the lack of capacity at the level of rural local government. 
84 
8. Conclusion 
This chapter has documented the historical contestation over access to land and other 
natural resources in the area between the Fish and the Keiskamma Rivers and has 
reviewed several critical facets of this contestation. Firstly, there were successive 
waves of people coming into and settling on land in the rural locations of Peddie 
District, so that the land resources of these areas were put under considerable 
pressure. Despite outflows of people to other areas (notably to 'Fingoland' in 1865), 
rural locations like Tyefu Location were, by the late 1850s, already demarcated, 
permanently fixed in area and fenced in by the presence of white farmers bordering on 
these areas. This meant that an increasing population had to be accomodated on a 
finite area of land. The socio-cultural and economic significance of livestock did not 
diminish however, and even with finite grazing resources and ever-increasing numbers 
of people settling in the locations, the inhabitants fought to retain their stake in livestock 
ownership. 
Secondly, given the relatively marginal arable potential of Tyefu Location, the economic 
viability of arable production was soon under threat. Every consecutive influx of people 
heightened the contestation over arable land and increasingly brought ecologically 
marginal land into production, increasing the probability of soil erosion. Eventually, all 
possible arable areas had been allocated and the subsequent landlessness of 
newcomers and younger people became one indicator of the widespread socio-
economic stratification in the villages of Tyefu Location. Landed and landless villagers 
had and still have different levels of interest and stakes in the sustainable management 
of local natural resources. 33 
Thirdly, their permanent settlement by the colonial authorities in overcrowded villages 
required a transformation on the part of the inhabitants of Tyefu Location to an 
economy centred around migrant wage labour in towns and cities. Overall, colonial and 
33 Cross (1991 :77-78) has argued that in 'trying to ensure access to land for all the families in 
the community, communal tenure has tolerated rapidly diminishing sizes of sites and fields and severe 
degradation of the environment... .. .. [ln these systems], universal access to land is basic, and ecological 
considerations distinctly second [my emphasis]. 
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state interventions over the entire period of contact, conquest and integration, have 
played a significant role in mediating the relationship of rural people to the natural 
resources at their disposal. Intervention by the state has generally been disruptive of 
local patterns of resource use, undermining the legitimacy of local institutions and 
increasing the tenure insecurity of rural people to the detriment of sustainable use and 
management of their natural resources. 
The long-standing and entirely pragmatic commercial ising of activities aimed at 
resource conservation and rehabilitation (through the payment of labour), has resulted 
in people not being prepared to perform these activities on a voluntary basis34 
Voluntary collective action by local residents in this regard has been and remains 
highly unlikely, given the weak.incentives in place. The politicisation of the countryside 
during the era of authoritarian bantustan politics has further eroded a sense of 
custodianship that rural people might have felt towards the resources that are, certainly 
in the case of the poorer imizi, still crucial to their subsistence. 
The concentration of people in the locations of Peddie District documented in this 
chapter begs the question of why people continued to stream into these areas once 
they had become - and were known to be - overcrowded, so that the prospects of 
receiving an allocation of arable land were remote. In terms of the economics of arable 
production, it made very little sense for these people to resettle in the locations and one 
might have expected them to resist attempts to resettle them into these areas. It would 
appear, however, that they had little choice in the matter, given the terms of the 
coercive legislation in place and the fact that there were no viable alternatives where 
they could resettle35 Moreover, as Nash and Charton (1980:70) noted, the 
remuneration of chiefs in the Ciskei was based on the number of people over whom 
they claimed jurisdiction. This meant that the chiefs had a private interest in allowing 
34 The Annual Report of the Ciskei 's Department of Agriculture and Forestry, 1983/84, makes 
the point that 1he donga and gully reclamation structures would be constructed on a labour intensive 
basis thereby providing the much needed employment opportunities for each Tribal Authority' [my 
emphasis]. 
35 Around 1980, Lennox Sebe was quoted as saying that the Ciskei felt bound to take the 
responsibility for people displaced by the Republican [sic] government 'for humanitarian reasons' and 
that '[they] cannot drive Ciskeians away when they have nowhere to stay' (Nash and Charton 1980:69). 
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newcomers to settle in their areas. In Nash and Charton's prophetic words, 
'that. .... .. short term interest... ... .will in the long term further impoverish and destroy their 
territory, their people and themselves' (ibid:70). 
In one sense, the overcrowded and depleted reserve areas like Tyefu Location were 
- by default - places of refuge, in which people felt relatively safe from the attentions of 
a government which did not appear to be overly concerned with the circumstances in 
the reserves. This allowed for greater flexibility in terms of group membership : it was 
especially the kinship idiom, where every local man had a 'birthright' to land in his natal 
village and where the identities of individuals and families were acknowledged and 
reinforced by social interaction, that afforded people a sense of security in the 
locations, overcrowded as they were. People were generally amenable to extending 
this sense of secure membership of their village community to newcomers as long as 
the latter showed that they were prepared to abide by local norms. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Institutional Dissonance and Competition over Scarce Resources 
Introduction 
Institutional changes in both the formal and informal institutions that mediate the access 
to natural resources and oversee the management of these resources are of key 
analytical concern to this thesis. Local and supra-local institutions provide the context 
and the critical fora in which the users and managers of natural resources in Tyefu 
Location reshape and redefine rules and boundaries of resource use. In the process, 
the particular meanings and structures of local institutions are themselves continuously 
subjected to scrutiny, debate and contestation by local people (Berry 1997: 1228; 
Cousins 1993). 
Rather than viewing institutional change in African rural areas as the inevitable collapse 
of monolithic 'traditional' or indigenous institutions in the face of economic and political 
integration, Berry (1997: 1229) advocates that a processual rather than a structural 
viewpoint be adopted. This entails recognising that institutional change consists of 
multiple processes of change negotiated by individuals and groups of people (not 
necessarily on equal terms) that mayor may not be synchronised or mutually 
consistent. This contextual and processual perspective extends to an analysis of the 
actions of the state, illustrating how the state has itself struggled to definitively modify 
and transform 'traditional' forms of tenure and patterns of resource use. 
Contemporary natural resource management practices in Tyefu Location represent a 
particular amalgam of 'traditional' and introduced forms of natural resource use which 
have adapted locally (and not always successfully) to changes in the state of the 
natural resource base. These practices are also responses to changes in the political 
and economic conditions in the rural-urban environment, as well as to the changing 
social dynamics at work in the location and beyond. 
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1. Pre-conquest patterns of natural resource management 
Prior to contact with white settlers, the chief was the embodiment of Xhosa society: he 
had the tasks of controlling access to land, protecting his followers from their enemies 
and acting as the custodian of their environment. In doing so, he played a central role 
in the resolution of internal disputes over cultivation, grazing and hunting land (Sansom 
1974:137). Chiefs sought to regulate access by their followers to the available 
resources, and to this end, they guaranteed individual and communal rights to the use 
of the land (Peires 1981 :33-4). A chief and his deputies allocated land for pasture and 
for cultivation, they supervised hunting privileges and often ritually opened and closed 
the agricultural cycle. It has been argued that Cape Nguni chiefs held the land in trust1 
for their followers and that under this system of communal tenure, every married male 
had a right to the use of the land (Switzer ibid:36). 
As long as these segmentary chieftaincies, with their subsistence economies based on 
I ivestock (particularly cattle) ownership, limited crop cultivation and hunting and 
gathering, remained relatively small and had sufficient land for expansion, they were 
unlikely to do much lasting damage to the natural resource base. One category of these 
'traditional' practices in particular made ecological sense : that of transhumance 
between summer grazing areas on the plateaux and winter grazing in the river valleys 
(Peires 1981 :9; Holbrook 1992:45). Cattle posts which were established at a distance 
from settlements for both security and ecological reasons, also served to limit the 
depletion of grazing resources. 
The scattering of imizi in a decentralised manner also eased the pressure on local 
resources (Sansom 1974: 139). In the event that the resources of one area were 
exhausted, the practice was to move to other (uncontested) areas, allowing the 
depleted resources of the first area to recover. Since the political system of the Xhosa 
was geared towards indefinite expansion (Peires 1981 :53), it was inevitable that once 
1 Notions concerning chiefly 1rusteeship' over communal land and presumptions of an 
'egalitarian pre-colonial society grounded in relations of reciprocity' are simplistic and generally 
inaccurate (Levin and Weiner 1996:104) . With respectto the role of the chief, Letsoalo (1987:20-1) 
argues that, among the Bapedi at least, chiefly control over land only extended to its allocation : once 
allocated , the actual use of the land was no longer any concern of the chief (see Peires 1981 :33) . 
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no more land was available for westward expansion - as the colonial settler-farmers 
expanded into the hinterland in the opposite direction - pressure would be brought to 
bear on natural resources through the increased and concentrated population in the 
areas dominated by Xhosa-speaking groups. 
2. Colonial intervention into local level institutions of resource management 
After 1835, Governor D'Urban brought all Xhosa-speaking groups within the new 
colonial borders under the authority of the Colonial government (Crais 1992:118). A 
white magistrate was appointed over each acknowledged Xhosa chief, curtail ing the 
chiefs powers. From 1855, Governor Grey took the erosion of the powers of the chiefs 
a step further by announcing that chiefs and their councillors would receive monthly 
salaries as part of their roles as 'administrators of justice' (Crais Ibid:201). 
Grey implemented policies which made headmen and subheadmen responsible for 
local administration in specific settlements and locations. They reported to a Resident 
Magistrate (Crais 1992:201). The headmen, many of whom had been the amaphakati 
(councillors) of a particular chief, were now paid directly by the government and were 
no longer reliant on the patronage of the chief. The policy of co-opting recognised 
leaders by appointing them as paid officials was also implemented among the Mfengu 
in Peddie District 2 In many cases , the Colonial officials appointed men of proven 
loyalty to them to the position of chief to preside over the Mfengu locations.3 Chiefs 
appointed in this way experienced difficulties in getting the people in the locations in 
Peddie District to accept their authority. In an attempt to bolster their authority, the 
Colonial officials gave these chiefs cattle, goats, grain, clothing, knives and most 
importantly, land which they could distribute to their followers (Lewis 1984b:34). 
As long as the chiefs followed government directions, assisted in protecting the colony, 
2 Lewis (1984a:243) suggests that the powerful headmen of the Mfengu clans functioned as de 
facto chiefs although, relative to the Xhosa , these Mfengu chiefs were weak. 
3 See Moyer (1976, Chapter 3) for the most comprehensive text on the history of chieftaincy 
and governance among the Mfengu. Moyer (lbid:172) notes that for the majority of the displaced 
Mfengu in Peddie District, their chiefs remained leaders in name only and that there was little to be 
gained .by identifying with them. 
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In apprehending cattle thieves and pass-law violators and encouraged Mfengu 
enlistment in military levies, they retained their offices and were permitted some 
independent authority. If they tried to assert their independence too forcefully, they 
could be removed from office, although this was not always a viable option (Moyer 
1976: 176; and ct. how the widespread support for Chief Msuthu in Tyefu Location made 
it difficult for the authorities to remove him from office) . 
It was the headmen (who presided over sub-headmen in villages and the larger village 
sections) though, who were responsible for the day-to-day administration at village 
level (Moyer 1976:168). In fact, in Peddie District, it was precisely the more influential 
headmen who were later installed as chiefs. Switzer (1993:95) argues that after 1855 
these headmen became the eyes and ears of the local magistrate : they helped to 
collect hut tax, to locate stolen cattle and to apprehend fugitives from the law. 
Headmen also became the key intermediaries between colonial officials, labour 
recruiters and rural people in the locations. In effect, they controlled access to wage-
earning labour opportunities and to the labour pool itself. They also mediated the 
settlement of debts in the changing rural economy, where debt relations and payment 
for the rendering of various services that had previously been paid for in kind, were 
becoming increasingly monetarised. These services included the hiring out of cattle 
and ploughs, the selling of milk, fencing of gardens and cattle-kraals, the collection of 
wood and other building materials (Switzer ibid:95; Mills and Wilson 1952: 11-15). 
With the rise of the headman as an appointed govemment official , the pre-contact ideal 
of descent and consensus as mechanisms for determining political office was disturbed 
(Crais 1992:203; Lewis 1984a:638). Headmen, on occasion, received payments for 
land allotments and sometimes set up their own courts (Switzer 1993:95). In short, the 
rise in the fortunes of the headmen saw them build and maintain patronage networks 
that had a major influence on daily social practices in the locations. They were de jure 
answerable firstly to the administration and secondly to the residents of their villages, 
but in effect the demands from these two quarters were intertwined and had to be 
skillfully mediated by each headman (Lewis 1984a:641). 
By the 1880s, headmen had consolidated their position to the extent that they were 
-
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able to confiscate, not uncontroversially, land from households who had not cultivated 
garden plots, or who had not paid their taxes, or in cases where contract labour had 
been absent from the location for more than six months (see cases cited in Chapter 
Five) . These practices were not condoned by the authorities who insisted that the 
headmen had no legal status other than that conferred on them by government decree 
and that they could only allocate land or to deprive individuals of land on the orders of 
the resident magistrate4 
An example of the authority assumed and resistance offered by some headmen was the 
reported opposition (in 1883) of 'Headman Tyefu' of Tyefu Location to the surveying of 
land in Horton for the purposes of establishing a Wesleyan Methodist Mission station 
there: 
' ....... He (the Headman) objected to a site being surveyed for the purpose stated 
above and he still objects and expresses himself surprised that the matter is 
again brought forward ... ... .' 5 
The reply from the Civil Commissioner in Peddie, dated 2 August 1883, was 
unequivocal : 
'With reference to the Headman Tyefu's remark that he has always objected and 
still objects to a site being surveyed I will thank you to inform him that the 
Government has decided long since to make a grant of ten morgen and have it 
surveyed for the Wesleyan Mission, and that he has nothing whatsoever to say 
in the matter' 
Whi le it appears that the land in question was surveyed and granted, the matter was 
4 Rogers (1933:107) has argued that under the 'general regulations framed at the time of 
annexation the sole right of allotting land was vested in the Govemor. Subsequent regulations have 
placed this duty in the hands of the Magistrates. In practice, however, the headmen of the various 
locations actualy allotted lands in their respective areas subjectto the confirmation of the Magistrate, 
which is readily given except in disputed cases requiring investigation.' Wilson et.al. (1952:27) have 
suggested that control over land (given by the colonial state) gave early headmen in communal villages 
some of the attributes of chiefs. Hence, they were spoken of as chiefs and even in the 1950s, 'there was 
a strong tendency to regard the office as hereditary.' 
5 As described in a letter dated 31 July 1883 from Inspector Hartley of 'A Location' (present-
day Tyefu Location) to the Civil Commissioner in Peddie (Cory library, Methodist Archives PR 3605/2) . 
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not laid to rest quite so easily: some five years later, in a letter dated 4 January 1888 
and written by E.Gedye, the Superintendent at the Methodist Mission at D'Urban in 
Peddie to the Peddie Civil Commissioner and Resident Magistrate, the subject of the 
Wesleyan Mission land at Horton was broached again: 
' ....... [1] refer to Head-man 'Tyefu', who has .... .. . deprived our 
Native Minister and two of our School Teachers of the 'Garden 
lands' which had been allotted to them for years past; and up to 
the present, though this action has been duly complained of, we 
have no redress, our Native Agents being this Season deprived 
of their lands ....... Rura Location [sic] being said to be 'Treaty 
Territory', this head-man appears to have absolute authority over 
garden lands .. .. .. .' 6 
Clearly, while the Civil Commissioner, who was stationed in Peddie town, could make 
the decision to grant land in the locations, he had to rely on the headmen to carry out 
such decisions in the locations and vii/ages. In the case described above, the headman 
demonstrated his ability to circumvent and undermine this authority in matters 
perta ining to land when he felt that the decisions reached were not in his own best 
interests. Indeed, Switzer (ibid:96) argues that in general, the Colonial officials were 
'simply not strong enough to impose their will on headmen inside the locations during 
this period' (see Lewis 1984a:681) . Headmen were the organisers of public opinion 
and no laws could be implemented effectively in the locations without their support. 
In 1890, the duties of the headmen included reporting on the movements of all people 
entering or leaving the location, providing crime reports and collecting evidence against 
suspected offenders, helping to collect taxes, enforcing forest regulations aimed at 
protecting trees and monitoring illicit beer-brewing. 
De Wet argues that 'headmen tended to favour people from their own and neighbouring 
village-sections in the allocation of land.' This gives a hint of the patronage networks 
the headmen were involved in, not unlike that of the chief, to ensure the support of local 
6 Methodist Archives, PR 3605/5, Cory Library. 
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residents. As arable land became scarce, villagers found that their interests were best 
served by having the headman live in their locality and they tended to support a local 
candidate in contests for the headmanship (see De Wet 1987a:60) . 
In the village of Chatha in the Keiskammahoek District, village sections and other 
'factions' were galvanised by the often ambiguous intervention of the authorities over 
a period of seventy years (1880-1950) into contests for the headman ship. While the 
colonial authorities were more interested in efficient administration and the 
maintenance of law and order 7 than in adhering to local claims based on genealogical 
succession to the headmanship, they were happy to accede to such claims when a 
proposed hereditary candidate was likely to support their objectives. Negotiation, 
strategic trade-offs and local politicking were thus key ingredients involved in the 
selection and appointment of headmen, the latter activities made all the more 
contestable and ambiguous by the fact that they rested on fluid and subjective 
judgements concerning the respective merits and standing of candidates for the 
headmanship (cf. Berry 1997: 1235). 
3. Local ambiguity in the reform of 'traditional' tenure regimes 
In the 1850s, colonial policy towards even the 'loyal' Mfengu shifted: Governor Grey 
wished to implement procedures aimed at controlling especially the mobil ity of the 
Mfengu, while simultaneously increasing their agricultural productivity. He also wanted 
to wean people away from their chiefs. It was decided to settle Mfengu people in 
compact villages and to begin issuing individual title deeds for land (Moyer 1976:396). 
The colonial government officials also felt that settling people in compact villages would 
provide for the best defences for these people against Xhosa attack. 
The Mfengu, however, preferred to reside in scattered imizi in which each family had 
its privacy. They also preferred to live on hillsides, which enabled them to survey their 
7 De Wet (1987a:69) quotes the Assistant Magistrate of Keiskammahoek (in 1912) as follows, 
' .. .. [the acting headman's] fearlessness in carrying out his duties has not been palatable to some of the 
residents and this fact, in my opinion, has been the reason for the oppos~ion to his appointment... . I 
have no hestitation in recommending his permanent appointment as headman' [my emphasis] . 
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garden lands, to watch over their livestock and to keep a look-out for an enemy 
approach. Hillsides also ensured good drainage for their kraals and grain storage pits 
(Moyer 1976:359-360). 
Moyer (Ibid) notes that '[in 1835]. .. the problem of organising Mfengu into compact 
villages was a source of controversy that would last for the next 30 years'. In fact, 
intervention by the government into the tenure and spatial arrangements of the Mfengu 
settlements was to continue for approximately 150 years thereafter (Crais 1992:200) 
and, with the adoption of a comprehensive land reform programme in 1995, it continues 
to impact on people at the present time. 
The granting of individual (freehold) title to land in 'native areas' in Peddie District was 
initiated in 1858 when the Mission locations of D'Urban and Newtondale were surveyed 
(Union of South Africa, U.G42/22:1). The headmen were not averse to title being 
granted for residential and arable land in their locations, but they wanted such title to 
land to be vested in them and not in their followers. Against the wishes of the 
government that employed them, some chiefs and headmen in Peddie District managed 
to convince their followers not to accept title to land and these locations remained 
effectively communal. The chiefs are said to have persuaded their followers that by 
accepting title to land in Peddie they would jeopardise their collective chances of being 
granted land across the Kei (in Gcalekaland) where they would be free of the colonial 
yoke (Moyer 1976236) 
Rural people in many modified communal tenure areas resisted the offer to take up 
freehold title to land. A number of reasons were cited for this: there was a preference 
for 'tribal' tenure, due in a great measure to the deep-seated aversion of the chiefs to 
individual tenure; rural people disliked being tied down to definite and permanent sites 
for dwelling and gardens; there was a reluctance to pay the costs of survey and title 
and; the unsuitability of allotment caused by surveyors not consulting the interests of 
the future occupants, so that these surveys were generally haphazard, with res idential, 
grazing and garden areas laid out without due regard to the quality of the land or the 
wishes of the landowner (U.G. 42/22 :1; Hendricks 1990:27). 
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An interesting development in the locations where individual title was taken up was the 
fact that no local attempts were made to prevent non-title holders from disregarding 
tenure arrangements and from residing on and cultivating the commonage (U.G. 
42/22:4) .8 The fact that people could still move into these areas indicates how rural 
people were able to undermine the state's attempts at privatisation and villagisation at 
this time. It also illustrates one of the central themes of this thesis: that the existence 
of flexible social arrangements (manifested in the often ambivalent approach adopted 
by local institutions responsible for resource allocation towards restricting access to 
these resources) had two crucial results: First, it allowed the locations to become 
severely overcrowded, putting unrealistic pressure on an often fragile and marginal 
resource base. Second, in the subsequent heightened contestation over scarce 
resources, this ambivalence led to uncertainty over who had rights to land and other 
resources and who was responsible for the management of these resources. 
The latter point also highlights another issue that appears to have been a weakness 
in the villages of Peddie District in the period 1870-1900, and remains a problem with 
local institutions at present: the capacity or inclination of the headmen and chiefs to 
actively regulate all forms of natural resource use (beyond the allocation of land for 
residential and arable purposes) appears to have been tenuous at best. The reasons 
for this lie in the ambiguous and localised nature of the headmen's authority and the 
way this was exercised at village level. As the linchpin in the contested interactions 
over natural resources that existed between the colonial state and the people in the 
rural reserves, and owing his position to his maintaining good relations with both these 
parties (and their various interest groups), the headman needed to be skillful in 
mediating the various demands made of him (see Wilson et.al 1952:24). This 
mediation included not being overzealous in regulating the resource use of local 
people, even if such use was not sustainable in the long-term. 
Another reason why headmen were not more involved in ongoing resource 
management across the spectrum of resources (although this probably varied from 
8 Hendricks (1990:27) argues that 'where title was granted, the situation was chaotic; surveyed 
boundaries were disregarded , land was sub-divided, transfer procedures were ignored ...... .ln short, 
these schemes ....... [wereJ rendered unfeasible by both Government policy (or lack thereof) and the 
resistance of the African people.' 
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place to place and from one headman to the next) was because the state, (see later in 
this chapter), took it upon itself to (intermittently) dictate the terms of such resource use 
(to the point of employing local people to rehabilitate degraded areas). 
For locations like Tyefu, I argue that the apparently laissez faire approach to the steady 
influx of new arrivals into the location and the pressure this placed on over-stretched 
resources, had two quite different sources: in the first decades following the settlement 
of the location, newcomers would have been welcomed by the headman as new 
supporters who increased his following and thus his status (and later, contributed 
directly to an increase in his income from the state). By the early twentieth century, 
when the resource scarcity in the locations may have been causing the headmen to 
rethink their openness to newcomers, the balance of power at local level had tipped 
firmly in favour of the state, which was more interested in accomodating as many 
people as possible in the rural locations and aiming resource management 
interventions at attempts to ameliorate environmental degradation. The headmen do 
not appear to have been in a position to reject incoming people or to institute 
acceptable mechanisms for managing the natural resources under increasing pressure 
in their villages. 
4. The politicisation of natural resource management institutions 
As discussed above, the authority of the headmen in the locations, while no doubt 
variable, was somewhat tenuous and their de facto impact on resource management 
minimal. In the 1920s, legislation was introduced that would further complicate the 
management of natural resources in the rural locations, by introducing a further tier of 
govemment at 'local' level. The passing of the Native Affairs Act of 19209 provided for 
the establishment of local councils, composed of six members, although the law made 
provision for not more than nine members (Groenewald 1980:85). Section 6 of the Act 
empowered the local council to fulfil a number of natural resource management related 
9 Tandy (n.d. 2.71) observes that the Native Affairs Act of 1920 only applied to land scheduled 
under the 1913 Land Act. It thus applied to Tyefu Location. 
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functions in its area of jurisdiction. These functions included: 
(1) the construction and maintenance of roads, dams and channels and the 
prevention of soil erosion, 
(2) the provision of a suitable system of water supply, 
(3) the combating of livestock diseases, 
(4) the eradication of weeds, 
(5) an efficient system of sanitation, 
(6) the improvement of agricultural methods and, 
(7) afforestation. 
The Peddie council10 operated under the guidance of the Native Commissioner in 
Peddie, on whose request it c()uld furnish advice on any matters affecting the general 
interests of the Africans it representedn Since the councils relied on local taxes and 
fees paid by the African people in their district or location for their revenue, their ability 
to fulfil their many and varied duties was hamstrung primarily by a lack of finances 
(Rogers 1933:68;Wilson et.al. 1952:39-40). 
At village and village-section levels, these councils had to rely on the headmen and 
subheadmen to encourage people to pay taxes, to oversee the management of natural 
resources and for the mobilisation of labour. The existence of the ccuncils, while clearly 
an attempt to co-ordinate local government, appears to have (institutionally at least) 
relegated the village headmen to the position of tax-collectors and 'micro-
administrators' in the service of the councils. The fact that, as Wilson et.al. (lbid:43-45) 
noted for Keiskammahoek in 1950, there was a general apathy among village residents 
in connection with the dealings of the Local Councils (meetings to nominate councillors 
were poorly attended, as were the ordinary meetings of the Council), that people 
complained that the Council had done nothing for them 12 and that they claimed that the 
10 Although problems were experienced in establishing local councils in some areas because 
'the level of development' did not justify it, the Peddie Local Council, established by Proclamation 
No.127 of 1927, was one of nine councils established in the Ciskei reserves. 
11 In those areas where the numbers of African people did not justify a full-time Native 
Commissioner employed by the Native Affairs Department, the resident magistrate served in this 
capacity (Rogers 1933:9) . 
12 Except for overseeing the dipping of stock. 
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Council was powerless as the 'Government laws were against it', did not alter the fact 
that there was now a new 'official' institutional tier of natural resource management in 
the rural areas. Crucial however, as Mager (1995a:50) has argued, was that, 
notwithstanding the existence of the local councils, the chain of command was still the 
location headman - Native Commissioner - Chief Native Commissioner - Minister 
(Secretary) of Native Affairs, indicating the ambiguity and dissonance that had crept 
into the management of these rural areas (see Wilson et.al 1952:22-23). No wonder, 
then that rural people were apathetic and sceptical about the role of the local councils. 
The Native Affairs Act of 1920 also made provision for the establishment of General 
Councils, but it was to take another fourteen years before the Ciskeian General Council 
(the 'Bunga') was established in 1934. Mager (1995a:59) notes that the men of Tyefu 
Location refused to elect representatives to the Bunga, claiming that there was no such 
thing as the Bunga in Tyefu. Once established, the Ciskei General Council and its nine 
elected local councils were used by the Native Affairs Department (NAD) as the 
interface between white officialdom and the geographically scattered rural locations of 
the former Ciskei (Mager 1995a:50; 1992:764). 
Relations between the NAD officials, the Bunga and the headmen became strained as 
frustration grew over the rapidly diminishing resources of land, cattle and labour (Mager 
1995a:50). The position of the headmen as paid government officials was all the more 
problematiC because their key responsibilities were to exercise control over access to 
land and to collect taxes, issues that were the source of most of the friction in the 
overcrowded, land-hungry and impoverished locations. 
The Native Administration Act NO.38 of 1927 provided for the appointment of six Chief 
Native Commissioners who were the regional representatives of the NAD. Responsible 
to the Minister of Native Affairs, one of these Chief Native Commissioners was based 
in King Williams Town, from where he exercised supervision over all the Native 
Commissioners, Agricultural and Engineering officials, Tribal chiefs, headmen, 
subheadmen and other officers of the department in the reserve areas (Rogers 1933:8). 
The Native Administration Act further stipulated that appointed chiefs were, through 
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local headmen, to 'exercise control over the 'Natives' in their areas, to allot in a just 
manner land for arable and residential purposes and to act as 'upper guardian' of 
orphans and minors. For this, they were to be paid allowances as might be authorised 
by the Minister' (Rogers Ibid: 12). If there had been any lingering doubt as to the extent 
of the de jure local authority of the appointed chiefs and headmen, the Act quashed this 
by stipulating that chiefs and headmen were authorised, inter alia, to: 
(1) carry out lawful orders (given to them by the Native Commissioner); 
(2) render assistance in tax collections, the prevention and eradication of animal 
diseases, the collection of statistics, the administration of land laws (including the 
settling of boundary disputes), the prevention and detection of crime, the supply 
of labour, public health and sanitary measures, eradication of noxious weeds, 
preservalion of game, forests (which meant a limitation on the gathering of 
firewood) and public property and such other matters as the Native Commissioner 
might prescribe; 
(3) report outbreaks of stock diseases, outbreaks of notifiable diseases among 
persons , death of persons through violence or other unnatural causes, crime, 
unlawful presence of strangers, unauthorised occupation of land , presence of 
fugitive offenders, illicit introduction of arms and ammunition and intoxicating 
liquor, unlawful meetings and the unauthorised presence of strange stock, 
(4) prevent , as far was lawfully possible, veld burning , soil erosion, interference 
with bona fide travellers , sa le of poisons and love philtres, and the practice of 
witchcraft and other 'Native' customs which were contrary to the laws and 
principles of decency and humanity; 
(5) give assistance to Government officials employed in connection with 'Native' 
welfare, convene tribal meetings when so directed by the Native Commissioner 
and disperse riotous assemblies of 'Natives' ; 
(6) have the powers of peace officers in regard to any 'Native' in their areas and 
may search without warrant any 'Native' or place occupied by a 'Native' for stolen 
slock or produce, intoxicating liquor or arms and ammunition wrongfully obta ined 
and, 
(7) to impound stray stock (Rogers 1933:13). 
For conducting all these duties, the appointed chiefs and headmen received 
allowances from the Government and might be awarded pensions upon retirement after 
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long continuous service (Rogers Ibid: 13).13 The role of the headmen was thus 
regarded by government as a pivotal one in the administration of land and natural 
resources in the rural locations, but as the duties listed above show, the headmen were 
expected to be the policemen of the government in the locations, in an atmosphere that 
was increasingly charged between the needs of rural people and the designs of the 
state. As with the local councils, headmen were not granted sufficient funds with which 
to conduct the administration of villages and locations effectively. 
The Development Trust and Land Act No.18 of 1936 envisaged a far more active role 
for central government in respect of land conservation and resettlement inside the rural 
locations and to this end, Native Commissioners were key to attempts to rehabilitate 
the rural locations from 1939 (Switzer 1993:223). These attempts did not give rise to 
serious opposition in the locations until after the Second World War (Haines and Cross 
1988:83). The rural locations of Peddie District, and specifically Tyefu Location also 
fell under the Trust in terms of this Act (Hirson 1977). 
The influence of successive Native Commissioners at Peddie increased in all the rural 
locations with regard to natural resource management during the period 1927 to 1951. 
From the late 1940s in Tyefu Location and in the locations in Peddie South, they met 
with vehement opposition to the implementation of Betterment Planning. Leadership 
in the early resistance to Betterment rested on 'traditional' authority figures, namely the 
chiefs and prominent cattle owners (Mager 1992:769-771). Headmen as paid 
government officials were placed in an unenviable position as, on the one hand, they 
were required by the State to curb the local resistance, while, on the other hand, they 
needed the support of the residents in the locations in order to fulfil their duties 
effectively and to maintain their positions in local hierarchies. 
It does not seem unreasonable to speculate that this form of State intervention has 
done great damage by alienating the local people from accepting the (at least potential) 
usefulness of measures aimed at the management of natural resources in the locations. 
13 See Wilson et.a!. (1952:25-6) for a similar rendition of the duties and powers of village 
headmen legislated in Government Notice NO.2252 of 1928 and as amended by Government Notice 
NO.911 of 1947. 
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Certainly, resistance to any form of State intervention into the management of village 
natural resources has been noted (Loxton et.a!. 1987) and is still palpable in Tyefu 
Location: "Hayi, angahlaziywanga" ("No, it is not improved [fenced],,), followed by the 
assertion that "Our livestock have always been free to roam anywhere in this location", 
was a constant and forceful refrain made to me on a number of occasions in these 
villages with regard to grazing management. 14 
The imposition of chiefs and headmen in the form of Bantu Authorities, 15 in 'retribalised' 
positions of authority which exercised control over access to and the rearrangement of 
productive resources in the locations struck a nerve with the people of Tyefu Location. 
Resistance to the dipping and branding of cattle was particularly vigorous: the local 
people reasoned that the dipping of cattle allowed the authorities to count the numbers 
of cattle in the Location in preparation for their stock-culling programme. 
The Bantu Authorities Act 68 of 1951 abolished local and district councils and 
delegated much of the local administrative authority to a system of direct rule through 
ethnic and reconstituted, pseudo-traditional chiefs and headmen (Bundy 1979:226). 
This was implemented in spite of the fact that, as the Chief Native Commissioner of the 
Ciskei claimed, 'the [traditional] power of the chiefs had gone and the people were 
leaderless' (Mager 1995a:66;Groenewald 1980:88). Tribal Authorities (TAs) consisted 
of a tribal chief and his councillors and dealt with local tribal matters by virtue of the 
chiefs powers (Jackson 1975:3). The TAs answered to the district magistrates who in 
tum reported to the relevant department of the former Ciskei govemment. 16 Up to the 
passing of the Self Government Act in 1971, district magistrates, more by default than 
by design, co-ordinated all service provision of the six line ministries of the Territorial 
Authority within their districts (Tandy n.d. 2.78). 
14 It represents an expression of defiance that has not always been borne out in practice : in all 
the villages of Tyefu Location, people who can afford to do so, have fenced in their residential and 
(where they are still in use) their arable lands. Also, the periodic maintenance of a perimeter fence 
around the Location to keep livestock off the roads constitutes a valuable (if temporary) source of 
employment which the people of Tyefu Location continue to embrace. 
15 The Bantu Authorities Act 68 of 1951 was only applied to the former Ciskei in 1956 (Branch 
1994:17). 
16 Since 1969, the finances of Tribal Authorities were handled by the Department of the Chief 
Minister and Finance in the former Ciskei. 
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Tribal Authority councillors were nominated by the TA itself (in essence, by the chief-
see Holbrook 1992:206) and were thus not necessarily representative of any major 
constituency in the rural villages. Manona (1995:16) has suggested that the weakness 
of the TAs was their lack of contact with the village they served, and that this reflected 
the authoritarian and repressive nature of the Ciskei government as a wholeH 
Another weakness was that both Sebe's ruling Ciskei National Independence Party 
(CNIP) and before him, Mabandla's Ciskei National Party (CNP), sought to manipulate 
the tribal authority structure in the locations as a means of exercising control over the 
rural people. Sebe managed to establish himself and his CNIP as the dominant party 
in the former Ciskei, and appointments to the key role of (salaried) headman, crucial 
in the management of local political processes at village level, were linked increasingly 
to membership of the CNIP and commitment to its political agenda (Charton and 
kaTywakadi 1980: 131). This gave rise to resistance and conflict from those quarters 
which were opposed to the whole existence of the Ciskei bantustan. 
The councillors who served on the TAs were practically all old men, often without much 
schooling, with limited collective management abilities and as a result, limited executive 
capacity. They were nevertheless required to fulfil a wide range of local government 
functions. These included the organisation and promotion of agricultural activities, 
such as the control of grazing and arable land; the promotion of education including 
the granting of bursaries and loans to scholars; screening applications for old age 
pensions and other social benefits and for business premises and, the preservation of 
law and order (Tandy n.d.:44). 
Groenewald (1980:89) argues that these Tribal Authority bodies were limited in terms 
of both personnel and finances and were too small to perform meaningful local 
government functions. This inevitably led to the centralisation of these functions, as 
17 As DBSA (1985:2) claimed, 'being in the best position to determine the subsistence needs of 
the rural people, the Tribal Authorities are used by the [Ciskeij Government as its "agents" in providing 
work opportunities in terms of the drought relief scheme.' 
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many of the chiefs themselves were also members of the Territorial Authority18 and 
later, of the Legislative Assembly and Cabinet of the Ciskei. Several chiefs thus 
became salaried Ciskeian government officials and gained political prominence, even 
though they risked losing legitimacy with sections of their rural constituencies. 19 The 
tier above the TA was the Regional Authority20 and above this, the Territorial Authority 
of the Ciskei. In this situation, chiefs were both the policy-makers and the local 
administrators and thus accountable to no-one21 The chiefs could only be dismissed 
by the central government (Switzer 1993:306). The extensive but vague powers and 
limited funding allocated to the TAs led to a situation where patronage and corruption 
could easily prosper (Anonymous 1992:5;Tandy n.d:1.5). 
5. Institutional Dissonance·: The Tribal Authority in Tyefu Location 
The historical legacy of ongoing institutional change has imbued the contemporary 
resource management situation in Tyefu Location with certain characteristics. One of 
these is the ongoing contest for the right to control people's access and use of 
resources at the village level. Documenting this process adequately requires the 
sourcing of rich archival material on local (i.e. villages in Tyefu Location) circumstances 
and their fluidity over a long period. 22 Doing justice to this would require more archival 
work than I have been able to conduct during the course of this thesis , but the case-
study that follows dates back some forty years and gives an indication of these ongoing 
18 In Peddie, the Ngqushwa Regional Authority, which was made up of local chiefs and the 
district magistrate, had limited resources with which to fulfil its obligations. 
19 This did not follow automatically, however, as it was possible for a chief to consolidate his 
support by intervening wherever possible to ensure a steady flow of resources to his rural 'constituency.' 
20 I have deliberately refrained from discussing the Ngqushwa Regional Authority in any detail -
even though I found extensive archival material on this structure - simply because it was nothing more 
than an advisory body, made up of local chiefs, that had limited resources and thus impact on local 
affairs , except as a further contributor to 'institutional dissonance' at the district level. 
21 Tandy (n .d:1.S) , writing of the late 1980s, argued that, 'Tribal Authorities have become little 
more than instruments of the central [bantustan] state, devoid of significant finances and power. 
Resources, often inappropriate and decided on without adequate consultation with the intended target 
population, now flow into communities via central [bantustan] government ministries rather than through 
legitimate [sic] local structures.' 
22 The oral record is patchy, partly because people are reluctant to dredge up the recent, 
somewhat controversial past, and partly because many of the men who are prepared to discuss these 
issues, were migrants and were not necessarily always present on a full-time basis during the preceding 
decades. As a result their knowledge of the past is, at times, vague. 
r 
104 
struggles and dynamism in rural institutions seeking to maintain a measure of local 
control of natural resources. 
The Politics of Resistance 
When Alfred Msuthu was removed as headman of Tyefu Location in 1954 because of 
h is opposition to Betterment and his links to the ANC, Gladstone Mpahla (like the 
Msuthus, a member of the Radebe clan) from the village of Rura, was appointed to 
replace him.23 Mpahla and his supporters were soon lobbying the Chief Native 
Commissioner for the name of the Tribal Authority to be changed to the Mpahla Tribal 
Authority.24 
The latter was established in February 1959 by Government Notice No.285 (Loxton 
et.a!. 1991 :30). However, the unpopular appointment of Gladstone Mpahla neither 
quelled nor dissipated the resistance to government intervention in Tyefu Location 
during the period between 1954 and 1965 that had been initiated by Chief Alfred 
Msuthu. Records of the magistrate's monthly meetings with all the chiefs and headmen 
in Peddie District during this period, testify to the uneasy relations that existed in Tyefu 
between Mpahla and 'urban trouble-makers' who agitated against the implementation 
of Betterment in the Location 25 
When Mpahla died in 1965, Alfred Msuthu's son Douglas, was 'called' back from Port 
Elizabeth by the people of Tyefu Location to take over the chieftaincy in the Location 
(Mzozoyana 1995a:4). Douglas Msuthu had been a member of the ANC Youth League 
in the early 1950s and had assisted in mobilising the people of the Location against the 
implementation of Betterment Planning. Despite his inspirational role as an ANC Youth 
League activist in the area in the 1950s, Douglas' term as chief was not very successful 
23 Mager (1995a:57-59) documents the role of one Alfred Giba who was controversially 
appointed as Acting Headman during the NAD's struggle against Msuthu . 
24 De Beer (1984:198) argues that the appointment of Mpahla was not endorsed by the 
majority of people in Tyefu, because he was not of the same lineage as the Msuthus and because he 
supported plans for the implementation of Betterment in Tyefu Location. 
25 Magistrate's records on Monthly meetings with chiefs and headmen, Provincial Archives, 
King Will iams Town (File No. N2I8/3-B :Tyefu Location) . 
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as he had allegedly taken to drinking heavily while in Port Elizabeth.26 In August 1968, 
at the request of the local people, the name of the Tribal Authority was changed to 
Tyefu Tribal Authority (TTA).27 
During its approximately thirty-one year (1959 to 1990?8 existence, with its office first 
in Rura (the home of Gladstone Mpahla) and then in Horton village, the TA in Tyefu 
Location was embroiled in the ethnic/party politics of the former Ciskei. The fortunes 
of Mfengu dominated areas in the Ciskei (such as Peddie District) tended to decline to 
some extent once Mabandla had been politically eclipsed by Sebe in the early 1970s. 
In Tyefu Location, the Mfengu-dominated villages on the plateau (and Ndwayana in the 
Fish River valley) were practically ignored during 'the time of Sebe' with regard to basic 
services, such as agricultural extension and animal husbandry (cf. Holbrook 
1992:200).29 Economic conditions deteriorated with successive droughts and, by the 
mid-1970s, arable land use had been abandoned in many villages. Population 
increases, the result of forced removals and the influx of farmworkers from white-owned 
farms, had put pressure on natural resources and village level institutions, such as the 
headmanship and village moot (inkund/a), were found wanting in mediating access to 
scarce resources. 
The familiar hyperboles used in the reports of bantustan agricultural planners in the late 
1970s probably had a disturbing element of truth in them with regard to the conditions 
in Tyefu Location: 
'The land has been seriously abused and erosion and veld degradation have 
26 Interview, Mr.M, Mankone village, 5/6/1995. This is in contrast to Mager (1995a:59) who 
writes that, 'leadership came easily to Douglas Msuthu who was quick to exploit his position in an older 
patriarchal ordering.' De Beer (1984:200) suggests that Msuthu and his headmen were weak leaders 
who 'could not motivate their followers.' 
27 By Government Notice No.1 470 of 1968 (De Beer 1984:198). 
28 During 1994, the Tyefu Tribal Authority was still issuing orders to village headmen to attend 
meetings at the Komkhulu or Great Place. 
29 The whole of Peddie District is said to have suffered this fate (interview, Mr. M, Gwabeni, 
25/2/1997; De Beer 1984:199), but it is possible that the 'antipathy of the villagers towards official 
services [sic] ..... precluded progress' (Loxton et.a!. 1977:4) by scaring the service providers away, and 
was one of the reasons for the lack of overall infrastructural development in the area. 
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assumed catastrophic proportions. Large volumes of staple food have to be 
brought into the area every year. The only potential for significant economic 
development lies in irrigated crop production' (Loxton et.a!. 1977:1). 
The Xhosa-dominated villages of Ndlambe and Pikoli along the Fish River, were 
suffering a similar fate but these areas were to be the main beneficiaries of the multi-
million rand Tyefu Irrigation Scheme that was intended to create employment 
opportunities and boost the local economy.30 
When Douglas Msuthu died in 1976, his younger brother Dolphin (aka Diba)31 took over 
as regent for Douglas' son (De Beer 1984: 198). Two different issues soon arose that 
worked together to unseat Diba : Firstly, political divisions within the Location were 
reinforced by the presence of large numbers of (Ndlambe) Xhosa-speakers who lived 
in the villages32 along the banks of the Fish River, furthest away from the Tyefu Tribal 
Authority (TTA) office. Conflict arose in the predominantly Xhosa villages over local 
opposition to these villages falling under a Mfengu chief. Secondly, the 'ministers of 
Sebe' apparently wanted to exercise more control over the affairs of the Tribal 
Authority, particularly in view of the prominence that was afforded to the 'showcase' 
irrigation scheme. Once they had decided that having Douglas' wife as regent would 
better suit their objectives, they proceeded to exploit a schism that apparently existed 
among the Msuthu family over the 'true' paternity of Douglas' son, Sabelo.33 Under 
consistent pressure, Diba 'relinquished' the regency and was replaced in 1982 by the 
wife of Douglas, Nomalungelo Esther Msuthu, who is still the 'Acting Chiefiainess' and 
regent for her son, Sabelo (De Beer 1984:41). 
In the mid-1980s, this highly contested institutional environment was complicated even 
30 Holbrook (1992:59) indicates that the idea of an irrigation scheme at this point along the Fish 
River had already been mooted in the 1950s, long before the political struggle between Sebe and 
Mabandla. 
31 Oral testimony has it that Douglas and Diba were half-brothers, since Diba was born out of 
wedlock to a woman in Ndlambe village. 
32 De Beer (1984:199) notes that many of the inhabitants of Pikoli were of Gqunukwebe 
descent. 
33 Interview, Mr.M, Gwabeni, 25/2/1997. 
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further when the Sebe government relocated the reconstituted amaMbalu people in two 
settlements, on a 'consolidated' farm adjacent to the Tyefu Location villages of Hlosini 
and Mqwashini.34 Once they were settled there, much to the displeasure of the local 
residents who had hoped to secure the farm as additional grazing and possibly arable 
land, the Ciskeian authorities proceeded to seek a chief for them. They identified one 
Swelindawo as a suitable chief for these people, although they were not specifically his 
subjects,3S The two settlements are only separated from the Tyefu villages by a road, 
and hostilities between the two groups simmered until the early 1990s, when the Tyefu 
Location residents were forced, mostly through the intervention of SANCO activists, to 
reconcile themselves to the fact that the amaMbalu people could not be intimidated into 
going away and would have to be tolerated in situ36 
The Economics of Acquiescence 
As Holbrook (1992:62-4) points out, the Tyefu Irrigation Scheme (TIS)37 was heralded 
as an attempt by the former Ciskei state to create local employment (and generate 
income for the bantustan government through the export of vegetables) that would win 
over the people of Tyefu Location. The latter, it was argued (Loxton et.al. 1977: 1), had 
suffered because of a lack of state intervention in the area, which was itself a product 
34 These settlements were called 8hongweni 'A' and 8hongweni '8'. 
35 Informants in Tyefu Location claimed that these people relocated from various areas of the 
Eastern Cape, including Albany District and Cradock. The chief, Swelindawo, apparently came from 
Kakamas. 
36 An earlier event, important to an understanding of the management of natural resources in 
Tyefu Location, was to complicate the contestation between institutions tasked with local government in 
the area: In 1979-80, the South African government organised the removal of some 4 500 people from 
various 'blackspots' around the Eastern Cape, including Alexandria, Coega, Colchester and some from 
Grahamstown, to a site just across the Fish River. These people were settled on the previously white-
owned farm, Commituys, which is strictly speaking outside the official boundaries of Tyefu Location. As 
the settlement of Glenmore does not owe allegiance to any Ciskiean chief, the community was (until 
1994) controlled by a Community Authority and was administered by a Town Manager who was 
employed by the Ciskiean Department of Internal Affairs (Loxton el.al1991 :31). In the post -1995 local 
government elections era, the Glenmore community reluctantly forms part of the Peddie Transitional 
Representative Council. 
37 In the discussion that follows concerning the impact of the Tyefu Irrigation Scheme, I am not 
concerned with adjudging the 'success' or 'failure' of the Scheme. Rather, I want to examine the ways in 
which the local institutions in Tyefu Location reacted to this latest in a series of interventions by the State 
into the management of natural resources. 
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of their resistance to the state in the past. 38 
The planners of the Scheme, while noting the need for sensitivity to the attitudes of the 
local people, decided that a prerequisite for the economic success of the irrigation 
project was an entirely revamped system of tenure (De Beer 1984:221; Holbrook 
1992:65,67), The same land that had served as both economic and social resource in 
the villages, was to be placed under capital-intensive agricultural treatment with access 
decided upon by outside managers employing an alien performance-related measure, 
'Tribal farms' that would occupy about half of the irrigated land were to be farmed 
commercially by the Scheme management, on behalf of the TT A. 
These plans posed a serious challenge to the accepted social order in Tyefu villages, 
and opened up new avenues for contesting control over local natural resources, 
Established patterns of rights and access to arable land historically allocated by the 
local headmen, were already under threat because land scarcity (which resulted in 
residential sites spilling over on to commonage areas) was heightening discontent 
between various interest groups in the villages, 
To effect this agrarian and social transformation, the Scheme planners enlisted the 
support of the previously 'unco-operative' Tyefu TA and the local headmen, Besides 
the promise of jobs in the area, the carrot held out to the TTA was that profits from the 
'tribal farms' would go to the TTA for use in community development programmes (De 
Beer 1984:220), The TT A was consulted and was drawn into the decision-making 
processes regarding the nature of operational services and practices on the Scheme 
itself (Holbrook 1992:69), 
Holbrook (lbid:76) suggests that acceptance by local people of the Scheme was not so 
smooth : the initial overtures by the planners of the Scheme to the elders of the 
predominantly Mfengu Ndwayana village were rejected and the latter expressed 
38 The planners of the Scheme also motivated for its implementation by referring its potential 
for reversing the serious environmental degradation and poverty that was in evidence in the area, 
Another motivation was strategic and related to improving the security situation of white farmers across 
the Fish River in relation to a hostile and impoverished African population by establishing a class of 
commercial African farmers in this sensitive 'frontier' zone (Holbrook 1992:61-2,64), 
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misgivings about the motives of the planners and the state interests they represented. 
In contrast, the response particularly from women, in the mainly Xhosa villages of 
Ndlambe and Pikoli was far more positive and the planners were given approval to 
implement the Scheme in these villages, although this acquiescence angered returning 
migrant men when they learnt that the scheme would allow access to natural resources 
to be governed by criteria that were set by outsiders. Planners' documents also 
indicated that 'there had been some evidence of attempts by people in Port Elizabeth 
to stir up opposition to the scheme (Holbrook 1992: 185). 
Widespread resistance to the scheme probably floundered for a number of reasons: 
the authority and the historically defiant stance of the TT A was weakened by the 
declining health of Douglas Msuthu and his subsequent death in 1976; the TT A was 
effectively co-opted into the management of the scheme, with promises of income from 
the scheme's 'tribal farms' and; given the economically depressed state of the Location, 
the prospect of jobs which the scheme held out to local people was too attractive to 
resist. This lack of organised resistance did not mean that the people in the affected 
villages simply accepted the management approach adopted on the scheme (see 
below). 
Institutional changes 
Holbrook (lbid:185) suggests that in anticipation of the contest over the control of the 
Scheme's resources, political mobilisation and state manipulation had started in the 
Location by the early 1970s. In 1969, the Magistrate from Peddie is said to have visited 
the TTA office in Horton and proposed the excision of five villages (the Mfengu 
dominated Gwabeni, Qamnyana, Ndwayana, and the Xhosa dominated Ndlambe and 
Pikoli) from the TTA to form a separate tribal authority, the Lower Tyefu TA. 39 The 
official ethnic label of the new tribal authority was particularly controversial because of 
the varying claims to ethnic identity (and the entitlements that accompanied these 
claims) made by the affected villagers. Furthermore, as Holbrook (Ibid : 186) points out, 
39 Although the matter requires more archival research, it is entirely possible that, in antiCipation 
of the implementation of the Scheme, this move was designed to dissipate the authority and potentially 
negative influence of the TTA over the villages that would be affected by the Scheme. In the process, 
the issue of playing off Xhosa-Mfengu ethnicity, a central part of the 'official' discourse in the former 
Ciskei at that time, might also have been a conscious consideration . The pending removals to 
Glenmore might also have played a role in this regard (Holbrook 1992:225). 
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the villages of Ndlambe and Pikoli were accustomed to running their own affairs and 
their ties to the TT A in the past had been tenuous at best. 
In 1970 Douglas Msuthu's brother, Diba, had taken up residence on the Mankazana 
River, between Ndlambe and Pikoli, as the chief of the Lower Tyefu TA. Although the 
new tribal authority was never promulgated, it became closely, if only relatively briefly, 
involved in the implementation of the Irrigation Scheme (Holbrook 1992: 191). This 
move was interpreted by the people in these villages as an unwelcome extension of the 
administrative reach of the Mfengu TTA into their area, and they opposed it. When 
senior (Port Elizabeth-based migrant) men from these villages approached Sebe's 
govemment and requested that they be placed under a Xhosa chief and tribal authority, 
they were told to identify a chief for this purpose. 
After several years of searching for a suitable candidate, the group located a Chief 
Makinana in Centani, Transkei who agreed to release his second son, Hamilton 
Makinana, to take on the chieftaincy and leadership of the proposed Mhala TA 
(lbid:190-2). In the ensuing period, this Xhosa faction agitated against the role of the 
Mfengu-dominated Lower Tyefu TA in the implementation and management of the 
Scheme (Ibid: 191-2). 
In 1982, in a Management Committee meeting on the Scheme, Diba Msuthu and his 
supporters called for the removal of 'Chief' Makinana from the area. The mood turned 
ugly and several members of the Xhosa faction were arrested. Diba and his supporters, 
however felt threatened enough (Makinana had become, Holbrook (1992: 192) notes, 
an important member of the fomer Ciskeian parliament by this time) to leave the area 
and return to Horton, apparently abandoning his claim to the leadership of the Lower 
Tyefu TA. 
Another faction, which coalesced around the headman in Ndlambe, were opposed to 
both the Scheme management and the imposition of the new chief, Makinana, the latter 
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having implications for their continued control over access to key resources40 on the 
Scheme. The faction that had 'called' Makinana to the area in the first instance, 
meanwhile clamoured for him to playa bigger role in this respect. 
The headman in Ndlambe retired due to ill health in 1982, and through the intervention 
of the former Ciskei government, a pro-Makinana man was appointed as headman for 
both Ndlambe and Pikoli. In terms of Ciskeian Government Notice NO.84 of 1983, the 
villages of Ndlambe and Pikoli were excised from the TTA, and with the two 'private 
locations' of Woodlands and Runletts, formed the Mhala TA of the Ndlambe 'tribe' with 
Makinana recognised as chief of the new Tribal Authority (Holbrook ibid:198).41 The 
Mhala TA quickly asserted itself on the Scheme, aided by the recognition afforded to 
it by the Scheme management (lbid:200).42 This honeymoon period was shortlived 
however, and soon the members of the TA were engaged in a struggle with the Scheme 
managers for control of the Scheme43 
The political situation throughout the former Ciskei deteriorated in the mid-to-Iate 
1980s. The Mhala TA was to be the second casuality on the Scheme, as 'grassroots' 
political activism against the stifling traditionalism of the TA system swept through the 
former Ciskei, from the late 1980s. The growing perception regarding the inefficiency 
and corruption of the tribal authorities across the bantustan, also affected the Mhala 
TA. 
The Gqozo era of the former Ciskei was accompanied by widespread violence and 
even deaths in the villages that formed part of the Tyefu Irrigation Scheme, as 
40 These resources included salaried and wage employment on the Scheme and access to 
irrigated land. 
41 The portion excised from the area covered by the TTA, constituted the Mhala Tribal 
Authority, which comprises some 7370 ha (Loxton, Venn and Associates 1987,VoI.5). 
42 As yet uncatalogued archival records (Provincial Archives) show just how comprehensively 
Chief Makinana and his TA sought to stamp their authority on the local people : fines were levied for 
trespassing, for chopping 'weI' wood or collecting wood in the wrong areas; dog taxes were collected 
diligently and a number of cases with the charge of 'disrepecting the chief were referred to the Peddie 
Magistrate. 
43 Chief Makinana himself had become involved in 'national' poliUcal matters in the former 
Ciskeian capital of Bisho and had delegated responsibility to some of his supporters (Holbrook 
Ibid:202,205). 
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emerging Residents' Associations, aligned to SANCO, began to challenge the Mhala 
TA for control of the Scheme. The fluctuations in Gqozo's policy regarding the position 
of the TA's and the headmen, deepened the chasm between these local institutions and 
the mass of the rural villagers. The situation could not be resolved easily, as influence 
over the resources of the Scheme was a key political resource in the location that 
would not be relinquished lightly. Loxton et.al (1991 :30) noted that an application was 
submitted to Gqozo's Council of State to have the area under the jurisdiction of the 
Mhala TA re-incorporated into the Tyefu Tribal Authority, but this was unsuccessful. 
In early 199444 it was clear that although the dominant village representatives on the 
Lower Fish River Development Project Steering Committee (LFRDPSC) were by now 
the members of the SAN CO-aligned Residents' Associations (RA) in these villages, the 
representatives of the Mhala TA were fighting a rearguard action on the Scheme itself. 
By this time, the RA representatives were obstructing Management meetings as long 
as the TA representatives were in attendance. The 'neutral' chairperson of the 
LFRDPSC felt obliged in terms of the existing Council of State proclamation to 
recognise the 'legitimate' presence of the TA representatives. The effect was that the 
Management meetings could not make any headway since every item raised for 
discussion elicited an angry response from the RA representatives that 'nothing could 
be discussed while these people [the TA representatives] are present.' 
In summary, this review of institutional arrangements in Tyefu Location shows how 
contested, complex and sometimes intractable the conflicts around institutional 
arrangements have been. I argue that the continuous and often hard-fought struggles 
over a number of institutional issues have had a substantial negative impact on the 
management and control of natural resources over a period of several decades. These 
institutional issues, including contestation over identity (in this case, Xhosa-Mfengu) 
and claims to prior occupation of the area, intervention by parties outside of the 
location, struggles over issues of legitimate leadership and of control over access to 
resources, including natural resources and (on Tyefu Irrigation Scheme) sources of 
44 The following account of the struggle for control of the Scheme is based on my fieldwork 
notes of meetings of the Lower Fish River Development Project Steering Committee (LFRDPSC), 
recorded during fieldwork conducted for the 'Mid-Fish River Zonal Study' project. 
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employment, have contributed to a situation of significant institutional dissonance in 
Tyefu Location 45 
I argue that this institutional dissonance has consistently distracted and seriously 
undermined the ability of local people and local institutions to make any visible impact 
on the sustainable management of the natural resources in their areas.46 Local people 
and local institutions at village and location level are embroiled in ongoing struggles 
over the right to administer and control the allocation of the various 'bundles' of rural 
resources, be these natural resources, employment opportunities or access to 
pensions. In the absence of one or more broadly acceptable (i.e legitimate and 
preferably statutory) institution for the management of natural resources, including the 
mediation and adjudication of disputes over resources, it is a case of the existing 
institutions, which generally lack both administrative capacity and authority, being 
constantly under siege and in conflict with each other, to the detriment of land and 
natural resource management. As I argue below, however, this institutional dissonance, 
which characterises the way institutions in Tyefu Location are constituted and operate, 
has not been the only cause of the lack of resource management regimes in the 
location. 
7. Other institutional interventions by the state in Tyefu Location 
The provision of state old age pensions 
Lawry (1990:410) argues that a prerequisite for collective action in resource 
management is that the resources in question must be critical to local incomes. In this 
context, the existence of external sources of income can undermine village level efforts 
to collectively manage natural resources (ibid:415). In Tyefu Location, it is particularly 
45 Based on research conducted in 1975-76, Charton and kaTywakadi (1980:136) alluded to 
the same institutional dissonance when they argued that 'Communication between the village [of 
Gobozana, near King Williams Town] and the authorities did not seem to be at all good. Villagers 
misunderstood the reasons for official actions .... ... They maintained that [certain official actions] were 
clearly ethnic discrimination against a Fingo minority by a Xhosa government... .... One may infer that the 
troubled relationship between village and Tribal Authority has reflected adversely on its ability to 
communicate felt needs up the traditional hierarchy, and the modern channels.' 
46 See Manona (1980:113-118) for a detailed discussion of sirnilar issues in the ongoing 
institutional conflict experienced in Nyaniso village, Peddie District , up to the late 1970s. 
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the payment of old age and disability pensions (albeit at sub-subsistence levels) that 
reinforces an essentially dependent, outward-focussed and reactive rural economy.47 
The payment of pensions also impacts negatively on the management of natural 
resources, by reducing the overall dependence of recipients of pensions on these 
resources, and thus lowering the incentive for them to commit themselves to collective 
resource management activities. 
Non-contributory old age pensions have been available to black South Africans, both 
urban and rural, with certain conditions, since 194448 Applicants had to be men over 
65 or women over 60 years of age. The maximum amounts available to black South 
Africans in 1949 were £12, £9 and £6 per annum for pensioners living in cities, towns 
or rural areas respectively (Hellmann 1949:424). Wilson and Ramphele (1989:64) 
argue that the state did not provide pensions to rural black people until 1965 because 
to do so would 'conflict with or break down their tribal food-sharing habits.' Records 
show, however, that old age pensions of £6 were indeed paid to a small number of 
elderly people in Peddie District since the 1 950s. 49 By 1965, it was found that 70 per 
cent of black pensioners were in fact resident in rural areas and the state realised that 
the payment of old age pensions to people in rural areas might well serve as a 
deterrent to black urbanisation (Wilson and Ramphele ibid:64; Breslin et.a!. 1997:25). 
Average old-age pensions paid to black South Africans having been rising in real terms 
for the past twenty seven years: In 1970, a pension was worth around R67 per annum; 
in 1981, it was worth R162 per annum and in 1985, an old age pension was pegged at 
R948 per annum, at which level it was still below the poverty datum line and 'pitifully 
small' (Wilson and Ramphele ibid:64;343). In 1992, old age pensions paid to black 
South Africans achieved parity with those of white South Africans and the amount paid 
out as old age pensions has increased consistently: In 1994, elderly people in Peddie 
47 These features are a legacy of migrant labour practices, amongst other things. 
48 Before this time, the state had deemed that since black pensioners had access to their 
'Native custom which makes provision for maintaining dependent persons' they did not require state 
pensions (Wilson and Ramphele 1989:64; Bhorat 1995:598). 
49 Peddie Magistrate's records in the KWT Archives. An even smaller number of war veterans 
in Peddie were recorded as recipients of War Veterans' Pensions. In 1979, an estimated 29 000 elderly 
people in the Ciskei were receiving old age pensions (The Quail Report 1980:33). 
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District were receiving R390 per month, paid out bimonthly. This amount was 
subsequently increased to R430 and then to R470 in September 1997.50 
While it is sometimes the case that pensions are the only difference between survival 
and starvation for vast numbers of rural (and urban) people, I argue that for rural areas 
like those in Peddie District, the net effect of increased pension disbursements has 
been to further economically marginalise these areas and the people resident in them, 
or as Beinart (1994:205) puts it, to 'systematically externalise poverty' from the urban 
core to these areas. This phenomenon is particularly apparent in the context of rising 
urban unemployment, where those people who have lost their jobs in cities and towns 
are able to return to the rural areas in the knowledge that they will be able to eke out 
an existence by making a claim to the pension of an elderly relative (see Call ear 
19934) 
In the same way, Breslin et.al. (1997:26) found that 'pension ..... .. income is too small to 
be used for meaningful economic upliftment' and that this dependable income tends to 
contribute towards the emergence of 'granny households', in which large numbers of 
dependent people coalesce around one or more pensions. The payment of rural 
pensions has undoubtedly had the unintended effect of putting rural sociar networks 
under increased strain as greater demands are placed on what is often the only reliable 
source of income for imizi in the villages of Tyefu LocationS1 It has also meant that 
some people (i.e. those assured on pensions payments) are not forced to address local 
resource degradation dilemmas as readily as would have been the case if their 
livelihoods depended on the sustainable management of their natural resources. This, 
in turn, undermines collective efforts to manage resources. These issues are taken up 
in the following chapter. 
50 Daily Dispatch (9/10/1997) reports that black pensioners whose pensions were paid out to 
them in the former Transkei and Ciskei, only achieved parity with those getting pensions in the former 
Cape Province in September 1997, five years after overall parity was supposed to have been effected. 
51 Of course, in the absence of pension payments, the conditions that rural people would have 
to contend with, would be far harsher and the strain on social networks even greater (see Sharp and 
Spiegel 1985). 
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Natural resource management projects 
The state and its agencies have long recognised the degradation of natural resources 
in the reserve areas and the need for action to counteract this degradation. Indeed, it 
was the spectre of widespread environmental degradation that provided at least part 
of the impetus for Betterment Planning in these areas. In 1944, the government's 'post-
war' scheme for the reclamation of the Native reserves was announced by the Minister 
of Native Affairs. It would cost millions of pounds, would take twelve years to complete 
and significantly, it would employ large numbers of African returned soldiers on soil 
reclamation works and the building of dams and fences, thereby introducing a wage 
economy [directly] into the reserves (Hellman 1949:188) [my emphasis]. 
A survey conducted in Tyefu Location in 1947 noted that the area was 'intensely 
infested with prickly pear and ....... the hill-slopes suffered erosion to such a degree that 
the soil cover has been completely removed, leaving a gravel and shale surface 
scarred by incipient dongas.' The report recommended that it was imperative that 
'immediate measures to re-vegetate and rehabilitate the whole area .... ... be undertaken 
simultaneously with the eradication of prickly pear.' 52 
Such measures as were implemented in Tyefu Location did not to have an immediate 
effect, nor were they sufficiently wide-ranging in scope, and the state seemed to hold 
out in favour of (eventual) wholesale Betterment, rather than piecemeal interventions 
at village level. But as the implementation of Betterment in Tyefu Location was 
inexorably delayed, those responsible for efforts aimed at resource rehabilitation 
resorted to other, piecemeal approaches to resource conservation. These efforts, in 
retrospect practically futile given the enormity of the task, included the establishment 
(in 1953) of a few experimental sites in the Location where the reintroduction of 
palatable species was attempted. 53 
52 'Eradication of Prickly Pear - Ciskeian Native Areas' a 'Report by [a] Committee appointed by 
the Secretary for Native Affairs.' Peddie Archival Records (PAR), King Williams Town (File No. N2/8/3-
S, Tyefu Location). 
53 PAR, KWT (File no.N2/8/3-S) gives the impression that more work was done in respect of 
paperwork to set up, fund and report on the project, than on the demonstration plot itself : A reminder of 
the rather limited overall ability of the state to intervene and reverse the degradation of natural 
resources in areas like Tyefu Location. 
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What these rehabilitation efforts effected most comprehensively was to commercialise 
the conservation and rehabilitation of natural resources in the eyes of the local people. 
By continuing a long-standing pattern of paying local people to perform certain 
categories of conservation-related tasks (such as fencing), these interventions 
undermined any voluntary efforts that might have arisen in these villages.54 
The authorities were aware of the predicament they were in with regard to payment for 
the completion of these projects, but by prescribing to local inhabitants what work was 
to be done and by providing them with cash incentives to do this work, they (i.e. the 
authorities) had come to be regarded by local people primarily as employer in this 
regard . It was a perception that would not be shaken very easilys5 As long as the 
state could be relied upon to come along at intervals and pay poor people to do this 
work, it was ludicrous for local people to undertake resource conservation projects 
voluntarily.56 Given this scenario, it is important to note that the state has never made 
adequate funding available to seriously address the degradation of resources in these 
areas (besides lacking the political will, it probably did not have sufficient funds, given 
the enormity of the task). The result has been a situation in which, firstly, local people 
have very little incentive to pro-actively and voluntarily manage their resources, 
because the state might intervene and provide some jobs to undertake at least part of 
this function, and secondly, where the state does not have sufficient resources to 
properly commercialise these activities so that they are performed adequatelyS7 
54 In 1952, for instance, a fencing project in Tyefu Location required the labour of 4 men for 30 
days, while in 1953, the fencing of springs employed 3 labourers for 6 days, supervised by a ranger and 
agricultural foreman. In 1968, the labour intensive eradication of prickly pear was eventually 
undertaken, employing 46 'Bantu' who were supervised by two 'Bantu' foremen (PAR, King Williams 
Town, File NO.N2/8/3-B). 
55 See a letter from the Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Peddie to the Chief Bantu Affairs 
Commissioner, KWT dated 16/811966, stressing the need for voluntary labour by local people. (PAR, 
KWT). 
56 'Voluntary' in the sense used here does not mean that people should work on such projects 
free of charge, rather that village residents could choose to pool their resources and pay for resource 
conservation work to be done by local work teams. This WOUld, of course, require strong institutions and 
a common interest in the management of local natural resources. 
57 Hellman (1949:184) noted that, 'While a considerable amount of attention has been given by 
the Department of Native Affairs to the problem of improving agricultural practices in the reserves, the 
amount of money actually expended is only a small fraction of that devoted to helping European 
farmers. The efforts of the sub-department of Native agriculture have thus been hampered until 
recently by the lack of funds.' 
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De Beer noted that during 1984,180 Tyefu residents were engaged by the Soil 
Conservation directorate of the Ciskei's Department of Agriculture to undertake the 
construction of stonepacks to prevent the spread of dongas. Such projects formed part 
of the Drought Relief programme. These people were employed on a piecework basis 
and were paid at a rate of R1 ,25 per meter of stonepack, the latter measuring 600mm 
high. Because the stones had to be brought to the work sites mechanically (by tractor) , 
it was rare for a person to pack more that two meters a day. The authorities in charge 
readily admitted that this method of erosion control might in fact have caused more 
erosion than it prevented, since by removing stones and rocks from areas to be packed 
elsewhere, the original areas were left exposed to accelerated erosion. They were also 
aware that local people were not interested in the reclamation of dongas on abandoned 
arable land and they acknowledged that as soon as the payment of wages stopped, so 
would the construction and the maintenance of stone packs (De Beer 1984:211-12). 
This analysis of the situation proved to be accurate and by 1994, not much evidence 
of the stone packs remained , although they seemed to have been partially successful 
in slowing erosion in a very limited number of hillside areas in Tyefu Location. 
Besides stonepacks, the authorities also sought to plant Agave americana 
('garingboom') in an attempt to prevent soil erosion. Another project that was initiated 
involved efforts, again using the labour of local people, to eradicate the invasive 
Pferonia incana ('blue bush'). Little evidence of the effects of these projects is visible, 
except at a site at Qamnyana and one at Mankone and Rura respectively, where a 
small stand of agave took root. Concerning another recent project, an informant 
claimed that the 
'ka/yi project (to eradicate noxious weeds) lasted two months and employed ten 
people for each month. People were interested because they were going to get 
paid. People are living in poverty, so they want money. The project happened all 
over Tyefu Location, but we were soon told that there was no money left to 
complete it. ' 
In 1994-1996, a number of fencing projects were undertaken in the villages of Tyefu 
Location, mostly keep livestock off the roads through the area. As before, these 
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projects provided much needed employment opportunities for local men and (some) 
women. In these most recent instances, the projects were subcontracted to private 
contractors with the proviso that they employ local labour and provide a training 
component for those employed on the projects. This new approach has succeeded in 
increasing the stakes with respect to who is selected (and how) to the project work 
teams : it has not addressed the fundamental problem of how villagers might overcome 
constraints to the emergence of local collective action aimed at sustainable resource 
management in their villages. 
Gendered Institutions 
The institutions tasked with natural resource management in Tyefu Location and 
general administration in the villages in question, have in the past practically all been 
the preserve of senior men. Writing about the Keiskammahoek area, Manona 
(1992:111) argues that in the 'traditional' inkundla (village moot) , women as individuals 
were only present when they were involved in a particular case, and for the rest, they 
did not participate in the deliberations of these gatherings. Although women were 
involved in the protests and resistance of the 1940s and 1950s, the introduction of 
Bantu Authorities ensured that the elderly men would again assume at least nominal 
control over local institutions (see Mager 1992). 
The irony of this male domination is that in the areas under discussion, not only have 
women outnumbered men (by an average of 8 per cent) in every census since 1936 
and probably before this, but women in these villages are more intimately involved in 
the use of a broad range of natural resources, such as firewood, water and wild 
vegetables and fruit, and should thus have been in a position to make an informed 
contribution to the management and regulation of this use. 
Women have, however, not only had to contend with their variable, but often 
structurally weak, position in the household and the village, but also with the fact that 
they themselves did not constitute a homogeneous group with identical interests and 
needs. Indeed, in the absence of an overarching institution for regulating resource use, 
and given the daily struggle to provide resources for consumption in their respective 
imizi, most women continue to be in competition with each other in respect of the use 
I 
I 
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of natural resources around the village. As a result, they are unlikely to co-operate 
across lines of class or kin and local networks to collectively co-ordinate and manage 
the natural resources of their villages. 58 
8. Conclusion 
This chapter focussed on the legacy of institutional changes in the management of 
natural resources in Tyefu Location. I argued that 'institutional dissonance' (see 
Thomas-Slayter 1994:1481) has long been a key component of the (mis)management 
of natural resources in this area. I sought to demonstrate that, far from being the ideal-
type 'robust' institutions expounded in the literature, that have local legitimacy and are 
able to adapt to change and thus to persist over time, local institutions in Tyefu 
Location have been engaged in continuous struggles over their very form, character 
and respective influence. 
I showed that, at practically every level of the institutional hierarchy, overlapping 
responsibilities and differing agenda have, by keeping people focussed on 
contestations over structure and authority as opposed to substance and action, 
hamstrung the ability of local institutions to manage natural resources. The 'system' 
of land management in the area and its encompassing institutional framework, are 
characterised by dissonant and contested forms of local governance with all the 
contradictions and flexibility that 160 years of institutional layering has engendered. 
Just which institution (or combination of institutions) is responsible for different aspects 
of resource management, remains a mystery to the majority of the residents of Tyefu 
Location. 
The institutional dissonance experienced in Tyefu Location is, in large measure, the 
result of the fluctuating and sometimes contradictory state policy towards rural 
institutions responsible for the management of rural resources. 
58 This competition for certain natural resources (for example, firewood) has possibly been 
reduced by the increasing contribution of pensions to the overall livelihoods of many rural imizi, but has 
been replaced by increased individualism (in the sense that women are only concerned about the 
economic security and consumptive needs of their respective imizi) and a reluctance to contribute to 
collective projects on the part of women. 
I , 
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Throughout these shifts in policy, state manipulation of the local institutions, particularly 
the headmanship, which should have been well placed to contribute to the management 
of village-level natural resources , has had an uneven effect on the performances of 
these institutions by sometimes bolstering and sometimes undermining their local 
legitimacy. Headmen have historically borne the brunt of mediating and implementing 
the changing state policies towards resource management at the crucial levels of 
village and location. On the Tyefu Irrigation Scheme, state intervention included the 
radical transformation of tenure arrangements and the recognition of a new chief and 
tribal authority in the area, the latter resulting in antagonism between two factions in the 
Location. By drawing people's attention away from other facets of local administration, 
and by embroiling local institutions and leaders in political conflicts for the control of the 
, 
Scheme's resources, this intervention weakened the capacity and legitimacy of the 
Tyefu TA and the headmen linked to it.59 
If the state was capable of manipulating local institutions it was also guilty of 
undermining existing institutions through neglect: as De Beer (1984:208) argued, 
between 1980 and 1984 (and possibly longer) Tyefu Location did not have the services 
of a single agricultural extension officer. People requiring advice with regard to 
agricultural production had to go to the offices of the Department of Agriculture in 
Peddie.60 A livestock inspector based in Horton village found that he was unable to 
perform his duties adequately because he had to rely on public transport to get to the 
59 In Gwabeni, after the infiuential headman and mphakati (counsellor) to Gladstone Mpahla, 
Dumo (Wellington) Manala passed away, the village lost its voice and infiuence at the Komkhulu (Great 
Place) and was later relegated to only having an unpaid subheadman under the authority of the 
neighbouring headman in Qamnyana. The subheadman in Gwabeni was still expected to attend 
weekly meetings at Horton and to administer the affairs of the village. This demotion in status resulted 
in apathy in the village, the position of subhead man changed hands several times, and, with the 
incumbents not always attending meetings, Gwabeni became politically marginalised. The authority of 
the TTA was seriously undermined in the eyes of residents of Gwabeni who began to ignore directives 
from Horton and agitate against the TTA. This agitation culminated in 1990 with the residents 
threatening to burn down the house of the then sub-headman - who had taken to attending meetings at 
the TTA offices at Horton against to the wishes of a majority of Gwabeni people - and to expel this man 
and his family from the village . This drastic step was not required, as the encumbent chose the prudent 
route and relinquished his responsibilities as sub-headman. 
60 In 1988, Steyn argued that 'from an extension point of view the situation in this region is most 
unsatisfactory .. . [with] only two extension officers at ward level serving the entire [Peddie District], (Steyn 
1988:89) . He goes on to argue that the Veterinary Division of Ciskei at the time was staffed by only one 
veterinarian who was having to run all seven clinics in the Ciskei. The low number of field veterinarians 
meant that little attention could be given to the animal health problems of individual livestock owners 
(Ibid :91) . 
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other ten villages in the location. This man complained to De Beer (1984:210-11) that 
the animal health and herd management information workshops he conducted during 
stock inspections were not successful, because livestock were invariably driven to 
stock inspections by young boys who were not interested in the workshops (and who 
were not necessarily an appropriate target group). 
Some state interventions have had more unintended consequences for natural 
resource management than could have been anticipated. The initiation of state-
sponsored resource rehabilitation projects and the payment of old age pensions have 
both had the effect of undermining the ability of local institutions to undertake local 
resource management initiatives. The local institutions that were impacted on by 
changes in policy, have sought to mediate the way in which these changes affected 
their control over local resources. Local people continue to find ways of resisting, 
ignoring, evading or changing the ways in which state-sponsored resource 
management programmes were carried out 'on the ground.' 
During a period of rapid population increase in Tyefu Location, with the concomitant 
increased pressure on local resources, rapid social and economic change and 
heightened institutional vulnerability, unambiguous support on the part of the state for 
local institutions that are engaged in resource management - and that have legitimacy 
in the eyes of the majority of residents in the location - has been (and remains) a critical 
factor for effective resource management. As I have demonstrated in this chapter, state 
intervention has increased institutional ambiguities in the villages of Tyefu Location, 
and the cost of the resulting institutional dissonance has been the gradual collapse of 
local resource management institutions and the degradation of natural resources in the 
location. 
Introduction 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Resource management dynamics in Gwabeni village, 
Tyefu Location 
This chapter builds on some of the historical and institutional themes developed in the 
previous chapters and provides contemporary ethnographic data on natural resource 
management practices in Gwabeni village, Tyefu Location. It shows how, in reaching 
the limits to the expansion of arable land holdings in the village, and given the pressure 
of an increased population which was already having a negative effect on both the local 
resources and local institutions, people have been forced to adopt strategies in line 
with the changes in resource availability. The more individualist strategies they have 
adopted should be seen in the light of the overall changes in the village away from an 
agrarian economy, the institutional dissonance prevalent in the location, and the 
marked socio-economic stratification that has become a reality among the constituent 
imizi in the village. 
1. Access to natural resources 
Gwabeni is one of eleven dispersed villages in Tyefu Location. Although there are no 
fences separating the eleven villages within Tyefu Location itself, the natural features 
of the area, such as the deeply incised valleys, restrict residential and arable 
expansion, and thus tend to separate one village from the next. For the past 
approximately 140 years, Tyefu Location has been bound on all sides by relatively 
impermeable boundaries, namely fences and rivers, which separate the location from 
neighbouring land held under freehold title. 1 To the south and west of Tyefu Location 
lies the Fish River (beyond which are freehold farms in the Albany District) and in all 
other directions are to be found the fenced boundaries of freehold farms and, since 
1 Some of this freehold land is, in fact, owned by the state, since being expropriated from 
commercial farmers to consolidate the boundaries of the Ciskei bantustan in the late 1970s. Under 
State ownership, the boundaries tend to be more permeable than they were previously. 
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resources like grazing, water, firewood and wilderness resources are held and used in 
common by all the residents of Tyefu Location. 
While there are natural boundaries and social norms which recognise, demarcate and 
restrict the access of neighbouring villagers to the 'commons' resources 'belonging' to 
anyone village, these restrictions have proven to be difficult to monitor and enforce in 
practice, partly because the boundary demarcations are negotiable. In this way, key 
resources, such as water and firewood, are collected by the members of a specific 
village either within the boundaries of that village or on 'neutral' land (such as the 
expropriated farms adjacent to Tyefu Location) . 
Prior to the early 1990s, disputes between villages over the unsanctioned use of these 
resources by individuals were resolved by the headmen of the affected villages or were 
referred to the n A, with fines levied in some cases, such as for 'trespassing' and for 
collecting wood in the commons area of another village. After this period, committee 
members of the Residents' Association or other senior men have been relied upon to 
apprehend those found gathering wood on Gwabeni land. This has happened very 
haphazardly and many people are afraid to challenge those found infringing on 
Gwabeni's resources, in case they are assaulted for being trouble-makers. One senior 
man, who travels by car along the road to Committees Drift regularly, is not afraid to 
chase women, children and even men, from the neighbouring village of Qamnyana 
away from the edge of the Breakfastvlei Outspan that is claimed as Gwabeni land. 
Territorial restrictions on the rights of men to hunt are least clearly articulated, perhaps 
because much of the hunting in the past was illegal and therefore clandestine. Men in 
Gwabeni tend to hunt on the farms to the north of the village, where spill-over game 
from the reserve are quite plentiful. They also hunt in the valleys below the village, but 
informants claim that the game here has been depleted by hunting and has been 
scared off by the amount of other human activities in the area. 
Unlike the norms regulating access to certain 'commons' resources referred to above, 
residents are quick to assert that grazing is the one resource that is explicitly available 
throughout the Location to all villagers who own livestock, including those people who 
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are not full-time residents of the area (but whose rights of membership to a homestead 
in Tyefu Location are recognised). The livestock of villagers in the Fish River valley 
are consequently allowed to wander, unattended, onto the plateau areas around 
Gwabeni and Mankone and, more recently, onto the vacated freehold land to the north 
and east of these villages. Although its origins are unclear, this 'open grazing' practice 
which exists in Tyefu Location appears to be a concession to the many villages, 
including Gwabeni, which have limited grazing - relative to the numbers of livestock 
held - available locally. 
The village of Gwabeni is situated on the high-lying plateau section in the north-
western corner of the Location. Gwabeni borders the Breakfastvlei Outspan (part of 
which falls inside the Double Drift Game Reserve), the Peddie-Committees Drift road 
and the fences of three freehold farms. To the west, lies the village of Qamnyana and 
to the east, that of Mankone. Gwabeni does not have access to piped water, water-
borne sanitation or electricity. Seasonal streams with very local catchment areas run 
in each ofthe valleys separating the village sections, and all these streams have been 
dammed in the respective valleys below the village. People rely for their water 
requirements on their rainwater tanks or on water from the dams in the valleys below 
the village. Livestock make use of the latter sources and seasonal ponds on the plateau 
areas. 
The 'enclosure' of Gwabeni vii/age: a historY 
Before Ciskeian 'independence' in 1981, the area to the north of Gwabeni had been 
white-owned freehold land for some 120 years, and the people of Gwabeni had had 
very limited access to its natural resources. Individual village men had apparently 
'always' engaged in (illegal) hunting activities on these farms. Gwabeni informants 
remember how some of the neighbouring farmers used to patrol their farms on 
horseback and how they would 'apprehend' any people found trespassing on their land. 
In those days, the Breakfastvlei Pound was a focal point of friction and contestation 
between the villagers and the farmers. In an area which is prone to droughts, and 
3 Some of the material in this section also appears in Palmer (1997) . 
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where grazing is a key economic resource, white farmers took the regulation of access 
to grazing seriously. Any livestock from Gwabeni that strayed onto the neighbouring 
farms or onto the Breakfastvlei Outspan would be impounded at the Breakfastvlei 
Pound and the owner(s) thereof duly fined 4 
Informants in Gwabeni noted that their livestock numbers were far higher in the past 
(making herding more difficult, for one thing) and that the impounding of livestock by 
the neighbouring farmers was a constant source of irritation to livestock owners in the 
village. One informant related to me how, in an act of defiance in the early 1970s, two 
young men from the village had taken the cattle of the farmer adjacent to Gwabeni to 
the Pound after these cattle were found trespassing on Gwabeni land. The response 
of the farmer was to have the young men arrested, telling the police that they must have 
removed the cattle from his farm. The two youths received eight lashes each at the 
police station in Peddie for having impounded the farmer's livestock. 
But interaction between the white farmers and the residents of Tyefu villages was more 
complex than such anecdotes suggest. In previous years, the grandfather of one 
informant in Gwabeni, who had been adept at training ploughing oxen, was paid (in 
cattle) by the local white farmers to train their oxen for this purpose. Many of these 
neighbouring white farmers were beef farmers and were involved in relationships of 
exchange with livestock owners in Gwabeni on the following basis: since the farmers 
wanted mature cattle for slaughter, they would exchange two calves for one full-grown 
beast. In this way, livestock owners in Gwabeni were able to increase the size of their 
herds and the white farmers had access to cattle which could readily be converted into 
cash. 
Men and youths from the village were called upon at times to chase kudu out of the 
dense bush when the farmers went hunting. Their payment in such cases was a portion 
of game from the hunt. Even though the Outspan had been rented out exclusively to 
white farmers in the vicinity of Breakfastvlei for the purpose of grazing their livestock 
4 See the Provincial Gazette of 17 March 1961 for the adjusted rates of 'pound fees, trespass 
fees and sustenance fees' in respect of the Breakfastvlei Pound (Cory Library, PR 3929, Files of the 
Peddie Farmers and Fruit Growers Association). 
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there, livestock owners in Gwabeni were not entirely excluded: informants remembered 
one farmer, who had rented the Outspan over many years, allowing the ploughing oxen 
of Gwabeni residents to graze on the Outspan overnight on condition that they were 
removed early the following morning. Some farmers were also amenable to renting out 
grazing resources on their own farms on a controlled basis for use by Gwabeni 
livestock (and that of other Tyefu villages) during times of drought. 
Contests over natural resources on land adjacent to Gwabeni 
The shortage of land available to them has vexed the people of Gwabeni for at least 
three generations, and the need for more land for residential, grazing and arable 
purposes is still a constant refrain for many of the men and women in the village.5 
Given the generally accepted historical account that the Mfengu inhabitants of Peddie 
District were recipients of confiscated lands or umhlaba webhaso (gift land) previously 
inhabited by Xhosa6 people, the (Mfengu) people of Gwabeni do not appear to have a 
historical claim to any of the adjacent land occupied by the white farmers. However, 
the fact that the village population has been augmented by ethnic Xhosa people over 
the past nearly one hundred years or more - many of them having moved off farms in 
the vicinity of Gwabeni - has allowed exactly this sentiment (Le. the making of claims 
to adjacent farmland) to take root in the discourse over land and land dispossession in 
the village.7 
If land-hunger was a pervasive feature of villages like Gwabeni possibly even before 
the turn of the century, then the fear of land concessions being made to these villages 
seemed to be a very real threat to the white farmers adjacent to them. In 1957, the then 
Secretary of Native Affairs, Mr. L.B. Lang, proposed to alienate a portion of the 
Breakfastvlei Outspan in favour of the Department of Native Affairs. The response from 
the Divisional Council in Peddie, supported by the Peddie Farmers and Fruit Growers 
5 This is in spite of the fact that during my study, livestock numbers in the village seemed fairly 
low and field cultivation had been abandoned by almost every Gwabeni umzi for twenty years or more. 
6 Ndlambe and Gqunukhwebe people. 
7 In this way, both Mfengu and ethnic Xhosa people in Gwabeni made claim to all the land 
which made up the Double Drift Game Reserve as far as Ngqakayi, a stream which was situated close 
to Sheshegu and some fifteen kilometres from Alice. 
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Association (PFFGA), was that the Outspan was 'essential for the use of the travelling 
public', and that 'the leasing of the Outspan was [done] in order to protect the grazing 
for that purpose from the encroachment and trespassing of Native owned stock.' 8 It 
is clear from the records of PFFGA correspondence from the late 1960s, that the white 
farmers whose farms bordered on this section of Tyefu Location regarded the Outspan 
(and the Peddie-Committees Drift road) as an important buffer between them and the 
people of the Location. The farmers were unsettled by talk of government plans to 
consolidate the boundaries of the Ciskei, which they believed would be started (in this 
area) through the proposed alienation of the Outspan,9 and possibly be followed by the 
expropriation of their farms. Their response was to ensure that the movements of 
Gwabeni cattle were strictly regulated and that any use of the Outspan grazing 
resources by the livestock of Gwabeni residents took place only under their close 
supervision. 
Despite protests from the affected white farmers in Peddie District, the government 
plans to consolidate the boundaries of the Ciskei through the expropriation of white-
owned farms went ahead and by 1982, the last white farmer had left the area adjacent 
to Tyefu Location. The L.L. Sebe Game Reserve, comprising some 21 000 hectares, 
was established on ten farms in the Peddie and Victoria East Districts.10 
In the euphoria that followed Ciskeian independence in 1981, the villagers that were 
neighbours to these consolidated farms, mistakenly believed that they would be given 
the use of this land. For a nine year period (between 1981 and 1990) - during much 
of which period the area was drought-stricken - people from neighbouring villages had 
unofficial access to the resources on both the Reserve and the adjacent commercial 
8 Cory Library, PR3929, Files of the PFFGA. 
9 Contestation over access to the resources on that portion of the Outspan which is situated 
between the village and the Breakfastvlei Hotel are discussed in Chapter 7. 
10 Other farms that were expropriated but not included into the ReselVe, were intended for 
commercial use by 'emerging' Ciskeian farmers, rather than by the people already resident on such 
farms or by the neighbouring villagers. Several of these farms were leased or sold at very reasonable 
prices to Ciskei government bureaucrats who did not farm them commercially, but who ran their 
livestock herds there and attempted to evict many of the farmworkers and tenant families resident on 
these farms. 
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land." These resources included game, firewood, prickly pear and wild vegetables. 
As the drought of the early 1980s progressed, the common pool grazing resources in 
Tyefu Location came under considerable pressure and a few livestock owners began 
to make unofficial use of the additional grazing resources by allowing their livestock to 
'wander' into the land which comprised the reserve. Even this action could not prevent 
the heavy, drought-induced stock losses that were incurred at this time.'2 The access 
to these resources remained unofficial, because if caught by conservation authorities 
inside the reserve fences, people (and their livestock) from the neighbouring villages 
could be arrested, charged with trespassing and fined. 
While the L. L. Sebe Game Reserve was officially proclaimed a reserve in terms of the 
Ciskei Nature Conservation Act 10 of 1987, it was only in 1990 that high game fences 
were erected around the reserve perimeter for the first time. These fences were 
impermeable to livestock and far less permeable (to hunters and hunted) so that 
successful hunts became less frequent. At the same time, the attitude of the 
conservation authorities hardened, increasing the stakes for the hunters from the 
village if they were caught hunting illegally inside the reserve area. People were 
forbidden to collect natural resources such as firewood or prickly pear from inside the 
reserve (although a permit system was later introduced to facilitate the controlled use 
of these resources) and the dogs of suspected poachers were shot by the conservation 
authorities, on occasion inside the villages that were adjacent to the reserve. 
One of the farms adjacent to Gwabeni was not included in the Game Reserve and was 
used extensively for hunting purposes by the men of Gwabeni. During the period 1982-
1988, Gwabeni residents grazed their livestock there, hunted game and collected 
firewood and prickly pears on this land, which offered welcome relief to the exhausted 
resources of the village. Since 1988, the (then new) owner of the Breakfastvlei Hotel, 
a businessman from Alice, had rented this farmland from the Department of Agriculture 
" There were in fact 90 households (with over 400 people in total) residing within the 
boundaries of the game reserve in this time. These people were the former employees and tenants of 
the 'white' farmers who had left the area. 
12 Between 1982 and 1984, livestock numbers in Peddie District plummeted: the number of 
cattle fell from 20 219 to 13 572; sheep from 27 833 to 14690 and goats from 40 668 to 30 214 
(Ciskei Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Annual Report 1983/84). 
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for R3995 per annum in order to graze his cattle there. He owned 80 head of cattle, 
but was instructed by the officials of the Department of Agriculture in Peddie that the 
land could only support forty-five of these cattle and this was made a condition of his 
hiring the land. 13 
As the fencing around the perimeter of this farm and along the road between the farm 
and Tyefu Location deteriorated, the cattle of Tyefu Location residents began to intrude 
on the area hired by the Hotel owner. Some residents also began to exploit the 
firewood resources of this and other farms quite openly, in defiance of the authorities 
and those who were hiring the farms. This practice became increasingly common for 
all the expropriated farms bordering onto Tyefu Location. There was also a rapid 
deterioration in the perimeter fencing of these farms, as people availed themselves of 
fencing material for use around their imizi. 
Anxious not to challenge local livestock owners over this incursion onto land he was 
renting, in case his hotel was burnt down, the hotel owner decided to stop paying for 
the hire of the land. 14 In February 1993, he did not to renew his grazing lease on the 
land, claiming that he would be subsidising the use of the grazing resources by the 
cattle of local residents if he continued to rent the land. He also resolved to move his 
cattle to his brother's two farms on the other side of Alice. In the build-up to the April 
1994 general elections, the Department of Agriculture officials in Peddie were reluctant 
to intervene in the situation of free-for-all access to the grazing resources on the farm, 
as they did not wish to antagonise Tyefu villagers at this critical juncture in Ciskeian 
history. By the end of 1996, however, most of the hotel owner's cattle were still grazing 
around Gwabeni, and he was availing himself of the now free grazing for this purpose, 
as were the livestock owned by Gwabeni residents. 
13 It is not clear whether he adhered to this condition or not. 
14 As a local man, having grown up in Rura village, and as a cross-cousin to the current adult 
generation of a prominent Manala lineage (his mother having been a Manala), he also was involved in 
the web of local kinship relations and village politics. Moreover, as a businessman who did not want to 
offend his customers, he also had to tread sensitively around the issue of other livestock encroach-ing 
onto the rented area. It was easier for him to stop paying the rental on the land and to see what the 
Department of Agriculture would do about it. 
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The scenario described above suggests that while the boundaries of Tyefu Location 
and of Gwabeni in particular have been fixed for a considerable period, an increasing 
population confined to this finite space has meant that interest in and pressure on the 
resources of neighbouring lands has been consistently high. Access to particularly the 
grazing and wilderness resources of these areas has long been contested. At various 
times, the relations between the inhabitants of the Location and their neighbours have 
been relatively structured and certain (such as with the white farmers and game reserve 
management) or more fluid and uncertain (as with the hotel owner, or the state, as is 
presently the case). The present utilisation of natural resources 15 on the farms adjacent 
to Gwabeni - the Breakfastlei Outspan excepted - appears to be entirely unregulated 
since the state institution responsible for this area, namely the Department of 
Agriculture, lacks the capacity - and possibly the will - to enforce some form of resource 
management regime in this area. 
2. Managing arable land in Gwabeni 
Historically, once land on the flatter, plateau area had been allocated, no expansion of 
grazing and arable landholdings in Gwabeni has been possible in any direction except 
southwards. Even in this direction, the steep narrow ridges, characteristic of Gwabeni, 
have hampered the expansion of arable landholdings. As a result, the availability of 
arable land of adequate size, soil depth and slope in the village has long been severely 
limited. In the past, many people were allocated arable land on steep, erosion-prone 
hillsides, where ploughing involved far more effort and effected a rapid loss of topsoil. 
Widespread and severe gully erosion features became commonplace around the 
vi l lage and, coupled with drought and declining production levels, field cultivation in 
Gwabeni declined and was finally abandoned altogether by the mid-1970s.16 
The majority of arable fields in Gwabeni are to be found on both the higher-lying, flatter 
15 Including livestock grazing, hunting, as well as the co llection of firewood, prickly pear and 
other wilderness products . 
16 In 1995, after an absence of any arable cultivation for nearly two decades in the village, and 
after two seasons of good rains, a solitary resident of Gwabeni cultivated his arable land. At the end of 
the season, he harvested 17 bags of peas and also a considerable amount of beans, melons and 
pumpkins. 
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ground to the north of the village, especially north of Bhobho section and around the 
perimeter of the Outspan. The fact that these fields are grouped together, meant that 
they could (in the past) be enclosed by a single perimeter fence, rather than having to 
be fenced individually, to ensure that the crops were not damaged or eaten by 
livestock. By the 1950s, this 'fencing' consisted of both wire fencing (along the 
Outspan perimeter), which was expensive, and amahlahla (branches) chopped from 
trees nearby and stacked up so as to be impenetrable to goats in particular. The 
maintenance of both types of fencing required a co-operative effort by the affected 
individuals if their crops were not be to damaged by livestock. 
Other more isolated arable fields are situated on the few more gentle valley slopes and 
valley bottoms around the south-western section of the village. By the mid-1960s, 
many of the latter fields had been abandoned as they had become so eroded that they 
promised practically no returns if cultivated. Interspersed between these allocated 
fields and in other areas closer to the imizi, are smaller areas or 'gardens' that were not 
included in a particular individual 's arable allocation (of eight acres, see below), but 
which were previously ploughed or hoed and sown along with an individual's other 
fields. Many of these smaller 'gardens' were primarily the responsibility of women. 
Table 5.1. Access to Arable Land by umzi in Gwabeni (n=67) 
IMIZI TOTAL PERCENTAGE 
Access to Land 46 69 
No Access to Land 21 31 
Total 67 100 
Although Table 5.1 shows that 69 per cent of the imizi in Gwabeni have 'access' to 
arable land, the nature of this access is often limited by the existence of multiple 
claimants to each inherited field. The shortage of arable land in Gwabeni is illustrated 
by the predicament of the oldest male resident in the village. K.S is an 84-year old 
member of the Khala clan who was born in Gwabeni. K.S. was allocated one arable 
field in his own right, but his three younger brothers did not receive fields of their own. 
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Instead, like all those who currently hold arable land in Gwabeni, K.S. and his brothers 
'share' (but have not subdivided) the one field inherited from their father, J.S.17 Should 
K.S.'s sister who left the village upon getting married, decide to return to Gwabeni , she 
would also have a claim to the use of this field. 
The shortage of arable land does not, however, mean that all men are restricted to 
having only one field. In fact, in the past, each married man in Gwabeni was entitled 
to eight acres of arable land, which did not have to be contiguous. For the male 
members of the longer-established families in the village, this meant that one man 
could have rights over three fields or more, as long as the total area of his fields was 
deemed to be no more than eight acres. Moreover, once a man had been allocated a 
field, it was very rare for the field to be confiscated by the headman and re-allocated, 
even though legal provision was made for such reallocation if the field had not been 
used for three consecutive years. 
The oldest generation of a senior Manala lineage in the village consists of four brothers 
and a married sister. The sister and one of the brothers are permanently resident in 
Port Elizabeth. Their father, Esau M., who was born in 1899, had enjoyed access to 
two fields: one of his own and one inherited from his father. The fields were last 
ploughed in 1975-76 with a team of oxen, at which time Esau's widow had been in 
charge of the ploughing. When their mother passed away, the four brothers inherited 
these two fields, but the fields have never been cultivated again. 
What inevitably happened with arable land in Gwabeni in the past was that a field was 
inherited by a man's son(s) via his widow. I recorded one case where the young widow 
(with 2 sons and 2 daughters), whose husband had died in 1942 without having been 
granted arable land, was allocated a field which she, with the assistance of her 
youngest son, ploughed until 1966. In this case, the younger son and his mother had 
ploughed the field for 24 years without any assistance from the older son. When the 
mother died in 1986, the field was nevertheless inherited - and has since been 'shared' 
17 K.S. told me that although he had a field of his own, he inherited (with his brothers) the field 
of his father, because he was the eldest son and because he owned sufficient ploughing oxen to plough 
both fields. He ploughed the fields and shared some of the harvest from the inherited field with his 
brothers. 
135 
- by the two brothers. By this time however, access to arable land was of academic 
interest to these men - at least in terms of arable production18 which had ceased 
entirely in Gwabeni - because neither brother had either the resources or the desire to 
cultivate the inherited land, which did not promise much in the way of arable yields. 
Informants told me that there was a realisation that, given the finite number of arable 
fields available, it did not make sense to sub-divide a field into smaller and smaller 
units and parcel the sub-divisions out, to be ploughed by individual sons, because this 
would render these sub-divisions economically unviable. At the same time, multiple 
claims on these larger, single field allocations could become socially disruptive in the 
event of disputes over inheritance between the sons of a deceased man and over 
pressures for re-allocation of unutilised land between the landed and the landless men 
in the village. 19 A deliberate effort was thus made, from before the 1950s, to prevent 
inherited fields in Gwabeni from being subdivided and to opt for such land to become 
the 'family field' which would be kept in perpetuity for the oldest generation of male 
members of that lineage. In effect, it appears that once all potentially arable land in the 
village had been allocated, the allocation and subdivision of land in Gwabeni was 
'frozen' in favour of those men (and some widows) who had rights to arable land at the 
time. Given the decline in arable production soon after this time, it would be interesting 
to know what contribution this freezing of arable land rights made to hasten the 
complete abandonment of arable production in Gwabeni. The case study of Ndlovu 
(see below) gives some indication of the role land shortage, in combination with other 
factors, played in the decline of field cultivation in Gwabeni. 
In the period before the mid-1970s, when arable land was regarded as 'lineage' land, 
some members of the umzi were not involved - perhaps chose not to involve 
themselves - in arable production. Use of arable land naturally had economic 
18 Rights to arable land nevertheless conferred a certain status on men in the village, even if 
they had not ploughed the land for two decades or more. 
19 One dispute over arable land exists between two half-brothers. W.M.'s mother had died 
giving birth to him and his father (T.M.) had subsequently remarried . When T .M. passed away, his 
elderly second wife moved into the household of her eldest son, S.M. In theory, both T.M.'s livestock 
and arable fields passed to his widow, but in practice, S.M. has taken over ownership of the livestock of 
his father and use of the arable land. When the elderly widow passes away, W.M. told me, the mailer of 
who has control over these resources will have to be addressed. 
r 
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consequences, in that those who cultivated a field bore the costs of inputs and also 
reaped the prOfits, if any, of doing so. As some informants pointed out, some people did 
not get involved in cultivating the 'family field' because they had noted the diminishing 
returns from arable production due to drought and increasing soil erosion, the shortage 
of oxen for ploughing and problems experienced with maintaining the fencing around 
arable fields. Some men who were migrants chose not to participate in cultivation when 
they had a brother who was resident in Gwabeni who wanted to cultivate the 'family' 
field. Some of the produce of this field WOUld, however, be given to the imizi of migrant 
brothers of the cultivator. 
In some cases, the time-consuming and potentially conflictual reality of 'sharing' a field 
with one's brothers, which meant reaching agreement on who would plough it, what 
contributions each man would make to fencing, seed and the hiring of a team of oxen 
or tractor, and how the produce would be disposed of, was a factor which served to 
undermine arable production in Gwabeni. In the case of K.S. and his brothers, I was 
told that the "we the sons of J.S. have never ploughed [our one field] together." 
As long as field cultivation was still practiced in the village, social and economic 
distinctions were possible between those imizi that had access to land and who were 
making use of it and those imizi that were landless. Socially, arable cultivation 
reinforced the distinction that was drawn between the longer-established imizi with 
access to arable land and 'newcomer' imizi that were landless. Amongst the landed 
imizi, those still involved in cultivation would have been the imizi with the necessary 
economic and labour resources to cover the costs of arable production, so that relative 
wealth was another distinguishing factor that was brought to light by field cultivation. 
In this situation where the amount of arable land available for allocation has long been 
severely limited, one might expect to find that contestation of claims to fields was fairly 
common, at least while the general level of interest in cultivating the land was high. On 
the contrary however, the system of inheritance seems to have been widely accepted, 
or at least, to have been enforced by the landed imizi who had kinship and 
neighbourhood ties to the successive headmen of Gwabeni. I have only recorded two 
cases where the 'ownership' of a field was contested and subsequently changed hands: 
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the first case, which occurred in 1956, concerned Nkwenkana K's field, which was 
'taken' from him by a certain Bennett M. An informant related it as follows, 
'Bennett M went to Nkwenkana and spoke about the tax problem, saying that he 
(Bennett) was far in arrears in his payment of tax. Nkwenkana admitted that he 
too was in arrears. Bennett went straight to the magistrate and told him that, 'I 
haven't got a field even though I pay tax. This man [Nkwenkana] does not pay 
tax.' The magistrate then ordered that Bennett be granted Nkwekana's field. 
Bennett was a big cheat, so much so that his son, Bornwell, said that he would 
never take the field. Bornwell left Gwabeni and moved to Wesley [in Peddie 
District], and has since died. His children moved out of Gwabeni and so no 
member of the M family has claimed the field. The land can automatically go back 
to the K family now.' 
The second case also involved a field that was taken by one man going to the 
magistrate in Peddie and complaining about not having a field. This time it was Dimas 
M who secured the magistrate's authorisation for the headman in Gwabeni to re-
allocate a field held by Mtutu to him, on the grounds that Mtutu, who was migrant on the 
mines in Kwazulu/Natal at the time, had not paid his tax and was not present to plough 
the land. 
New settlers who came to Gwabeni from neighbouring farms were generally used to 
cultivating and owning some livestock on the farms from whence they came. Many, 
particularly those who had arrived in the village from the early 1960s, were to be 
disappointed when, upon settling in Gwabeni, they discovered that there were no 
arable fields that could be allocated to them. One case in particular, where a newly 
settled man, Ndlovu sought to borrow a field for cultivation, is a telling example of how 
the abandonment of arable production in the village was imposed on everyone, lest 
their agricultural successes reflect on those imizi that were either not willing or not able 
to plough their fields. 
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The case of Ndlovu: 20 
Ndlovu is a seventy-seven year old man who settled in Gwabeni some 29 years 
ago." His parents had moved from a white-owned farm in the area, where they 
had been sharecroppers, to the Tyefu village of Ndwayana. They had moved to 
Ndwayana with their many goats and cattle . Later they moved to the farm, 
Inkerman, which was less than four kilometres from Gwabeni, where his father 
was employed to herd and dip the cattle. He was allowed to run his own livestock 
on the farm . At the time of his father's death in 1947, Ndlovu was a migrant 
labourer in Port Elizabeth. He had been remitting the largest proportion of his 
wage and was able to build up a large number of cattle and goats, so large in fact 
that he lent some of his many livestock out to relatives in neighbouring villages. 
He sent some to an agnatic relative in Ndlambe, while others were sent to his 
father's brother's son who had settled in Bhobho section of Gwabeni in 1952. 
Ndlovu returned from Port Elizabeth to work on the farm to ensure that his 
dependents were not evicted from the farm . After working there for 11 years, 
Ndlovu was troubled by the shortage of money that prevented his children from 
attending school and he asked the farmer for permission to .Ieave for Port 
Elizabeth to seek employment there. Since his wife was in domestic service in 
the famner's home, his dependents were allowed to remain on the farm. The farm 
was sold in 1967 and the workers and their dependents were told to leave, as the 
new owner was bringing in his own work-force. Ndlovu moved his family to 
Bhobho section of Gwabeni in 1968. At that time, he had seven cattle and 30 
goats and the area was in the grip of a prolonged drought that was to last three 
more years. 
To secure pemnission to settle in Bhobho, Ndlovu had to consult the headman in 
Gwabeni at the time, a Mr. B. At a meeting in the village, the people of Gwabeni 
agreed to Ndlovu and his family settling in the village and the headman relayed 
this endorsement of Ndlovu's request for a residential site to the chief. Ndlovu 
said that he liked the village and was attracted by the good ploughing fields he 
saw close to Bhobho, some of which were still in use at this time. He soon found 
the people of Gwabeni to be 'funny' because they claimed to have insufficient 
20 This case-study is also discussed in Palmer (1997:172-174). My case-study of Ndlovu is 
based on interviews I conducted in Gwabeni. 
21 That is, from 1968 to 1997. 
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arable land available for allocation to him and he was forced to borrow 
(ukuboJeka) a field in order to plough. He was however, satisfied with the 
communal grazing that was available in the location for his livestock. 
With his family relocated and settled in Bhobho section, he could continue to work 
as a migrant labourer in Port Elizabeth. This he did until 1974, when at the age 
of fifty-four, he had a dispute with his employer over wages and was discharged 
without a pension. He returned to Gwabeni and continued to cultivate the field 
for three more seasons until 1976. Ndlovu claims to have supported his family 
during this time through the sale of arable produce and the occasional sale of 
livestock. His eldest son, who was working in Port Elizabeth by then, also 
assisted by remitting cash to the umzi in Gwabeni. Subsequently, a dispute 
arose, as some of the men in the village, who had abandoned field cultivation by 
this time, appeared to resent the fact that Ndlovu had independently fenced the 
field he was using and continued to cultivate the land successfully, while the 
majority of established imizi in the village had abandoned their fields. They drove 
their cattle into this field of ripe maize to signal their displeasure and this hostile 
action convinced Ndlovu to abandon ploughing.22 After this disagreement, Ndlovu 
fenced in an area adjacent to his residential site and began to cultivate a 
vegetable garden. He has also established a number of fruit trees in this garden, 
something which is uncommon in this semi-arid area. After the 1994 general 
elections, discussions arose in the village concerning the redistribution of arable 
land in Tyefu Location. Not surprisingly, Ndlovu was an enthusiastic proponent 
of the idea that all imizi in Gwabeni should be given access to arable land. 
Landed imizi were not nearly as enthusiastic as people like Ndlovu about this 
idea. 
What Ndlovu's dogged attempts to continue cultivating in Gwabeni did was to 
challenge, more than anything else, the wholesale abandonment of the land and the 
move, certainly on the part of the wealthier, landed imizi, to an essentially post-agrarian 
22 This incident is widely cited in the village, although the details were (I think) kept deliberately 
sketchy. One informant put it thus, "You see, if one person is successful, the others become jealous. 
They were jealous of his big, ripe mealies." Another informant put it more obliquely : "People had a 
public [communal] fencing system first. Then some [people] started fencing their own fields as well, 
depleting the public fences in the process. Their own fences weren't good, and goats and sheep began 
to ruin their crops." 
140 
economy in Gwabeni. 23 Whereas previously many of the men who were engaged in 
migrant labour attempted to retain a measure of economic independence through their 
stake in the rural production sector, particularly in livestock ownership and also through 
arable production, this had changed irrevocably by the mid-1960s. These imizi were 
no longer prepared to engage in the increasingly (economically) risky pursu it of arable 
production, but at the same time, they were not happy to see a newcomer to the village 
overcoming the adverse conditions that had led them to abandon arable production in 
the village. 
3. Patterns of residential land-use 
The 68 imizi in Gwabeni which have been permanently occupied by at least one 
member for the past four years, are divided into four village sections which are 
scattered across three ridges.24 Deeply-incised valleys form natural boundaries 
between the four village-sections of Nala, Bhobho, New Brighton and Nqwebeba 
sections (see Map 4, Chapter Seven). The most recently settled section of the village, 
which has only been inhabited25 since 1995, is the 'Sites' area, which is situated on a 
portion of the Breakfastvlei Outspan. Table 5.2. lists the village sections and their sizes. 
A concentration of imizi in Nala section is noticeable. 
23 The end of arable production in Gwabeni in the mid-1970s was not, however the end of all 
agriculture in the village: many imizi attempted to retain their investments in livestock, and sought to 
build up these holdings after periodic droughts. A few imizi tried to intensify garden cultivation , mostly for 
sUbsistence purposes. 
24 In every section, there were imizi that were unoccupied for the greatest part of the year, the 
members only returning during holiday periods. Still other imizi were virtually derelict, but the members 
still returned sporadically to conduct rituals there. The imizi listed in the table are those at which at least 
one member was present for practically the entire research period . In the case of single person umzi in 
some of the imizi listed, the person may have gone to Port Elizabeth or Cape Town for a visit lasting up 
to a week, but the umzi is still considered to be 'permanently occupied.' 
25 Many of the younger generation from established village imizi, especially from Nqwebeba 
section, are settling there . This resettlement is discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven. 
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Table 5.2. The village sections of Gwabeni and their sizes.26 
VILLAGE SECTION NO. OF IMIZI 
Nala 27 
Bhobho 14 
New Brighton 13 
Nqwebeba 10 
Outspan 4 
Total 68 
Notwithstanding the limited area for settlement given the steep topography, there is 
much evidence of residential mobility by people within Gwabeni. For a number of 
reasons, people have moved, and continue to do so, from one residential site to 
another, and from one village-section to another. 
Firstly, the movement by men who, during the course of the developmental cycle, get 
married and move out of the imizi of their fathers to establish their own imizi, is a well-
known phenomenon. In the past, sons tended to establish their imizi in the same 
village-section, but at some distance from the imizi of their fathers. When Ncamazana 
wanted to establish his own umzi, he moved from his father's (Mbhono) site in New 
Brighton section to the top of Nala section. When in turn his son, Aaron, wanted to 
establish his own umzi, he approached the headman for a site about halfway between 
that of his father and his grandfathers residential site. This site is now the 'family umzi' 
looked after by one of Aaron's four sons, although two other sons live on the site in 
separate buildings. 
Secondly, imizi relocate when the natural resources in an area are exhausted. This 
deliberate strategy on the part of local people to deal with resource depletion is a 
legacy of past practices, when it was possible for smaller groups of people to leave an 
area in order for its natural resources to be given an opportunity to regenerate. 
26 For the sake of clarity, the number of imizi on the Outspan refers to those which settled 
there in 1995. See Chapter Seven for more recent data on imizi settling on the Outspan sites. 
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Evidence of resource degradation in Tyefu Location suggests that this strategy, 
although still widely practised, has not been very effective since the time that villages 
have been confined by fixed boundaries, thus ruling out any possibility of expansion 
and resettlement onto 'new' land. The result has tended to be a steady, downward 
spiral in the condition of many of the available natural resources within these fixed 
boundaries. Despite this restriction, there is a pattern of umzi mobility in Gwabeni, 
visible in the way, for instance, in which seven residential sites and arable lands on 
Gunyeni ridge were abandoned over the years when the imizi from this degraded and 
denuded section relocated elsewhere. 
Previously, the ploughing fields and gardens of the imizi on Gunyeni ridge were situated 
close by and were readily accessible. They were, however, situated on the steep 
slopes of the ridge and by the mid-1970s, serious gully erosion features were prevalent 
here (visible on air photographs). In fact, as early as 1954, evidence from air 
photographs shows the Gunyeni area to be denuded of vegetation, and especially of 
trees for firewood . Former residents of this village section claim that it became more 
onerous to gather firewood, while the collection of water from dams and springs down 
the steep slopes of the ridge, was a constant source of difficulty and irritation for 
women. The exhaustion of natural resources in the local area (especially around 
Nqwebeba section) is also a central component of the motivation of people currently 
resettling on the Outspan sites. 
As one informant, Maxwell, explained: 
'People used to migrate because of the pastures. If they think or they see things 
are better over there, then they go there. If people reap lots of mealies this side, 
then they [other people] think 'Oh, there's a big harvest there' and they move up 
here. They wouldn't need to have family there to be able to move, because it was 
just a question of the chief knowing where you are. If you want a new place, you 
go to the headman, and the headman will see to it that all the men agree to you 
settling in that place and then the chief will acknowledge that. That is all that 
happened. There was no written record, so it was a matter of knowing that this 
man stays here now.' 
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As an emphasis was increasingly placed on ease of access to and from one's 
homestead, it is clear why most of the intra-village umzi mobility over the past 50 years 
has been from the two most inaccessible sections, Gunyeni and Nqwebeba, to the more 
accessible village section of Nala27 As noted above, seven imizi from Gunyeni 
relocated to Nala section, with the first of these moving in 1944 and the last one in 
1990. A further five imizi have relocated from Nqwebeba section to Nala village 
section, four of them between 1977 and 1994. Informants from all of the imizi cite the 
denudation of the area, the distance from the store at Breakfastvlei and the steepness 
of the ridge that had to be climbed to reach Nala section and the facilities beyond it, as 
reasons for their move. 
Four Mabhele imizi moved to up Nala section between 1977 and 1994. All of them cite 
the distance and inconvenience of living down the steep slope in Nqwebeba as the key 
reason for their move to Nala section. Three of these imizi are in the upper stratum of 
'wealthy' imizi in the village and were thus able to cover the considerable costs of 
relocating from the more inaccessible Nqwebeba section. The fourth umzi consists of 
a single male pensioner who has taken over and refurbished an abandoned umzi in 
Nala section. 
Ironically, the wealthier imizi, that relocated from Nqwebeba to Nala, have been left 
behind by the movement of Nqwebeba imizi, spearheaded by a group of Mabhele men 
in Port Elizabeth, onto a portion of the Breakfastvlei Outspan. This new settlement is 
adjacent to the road and very close to the Breakfastvlei Hotel and is thus the best 
situated site for a post-agrarian rural settlement. Having made considerable 
investments in their new imizi, in what they imagined would remain (at least in their 
lifetimes) the centre of the village (Le. Nala section), the four Mabhele imizi that moved 
to Nala section are understandably reluctant to participate in the latest movement of 
people onto the Outspan sites. 
Intra-village mobility has not been the only type of movement of people in GwabenL 
27 Two imizi relocated from Gunyeni to Nqwebeba in the mid-1970s. Both of these imizi were 
members of the Mabhele lineage, which is centred in Nqwebeba section. 
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Since the turn of the century, people have been moving into Gwabeni from 
neighbouring areas, particularly off the freehold (previously white-owned) farms in the 
vicinity of Tyefu Location. Although most of Tyefu Location - and indeed Peddie District 
- is regarded as being predominantly Mfengu in its ethnic composition, data collected 
in Gwabeni shows that the village has absorbed 'newcomers' of ethnic Xhosa origin, 
as well as Mfengu imizi from elsewhere, at various times over the past century. An 
examination of the clans represented in the village, reveals that 27 (or 40 per cent) of 
the contemporary imizi comprise ethnic Xhosa people, and that the balance is made up 
of people of Mfengu origin 28 
Informants claim that in most respects, the ethnic background of an umzi does not play 
any significant role in social relations in Gwabeni, but stressed that newcomers (known 
as amarhanuga29 or imfiki) were settled "away from the established imizi." Only in time, 
as more settlers arrived, did the earlier arrivals gravitate towards the hub of the village, 
or altematively, the hub expanded to accomodate them. This can also be interpreted 
as symbolic of a gradual acceptance of their credentials as members of the village 
'community' and their slow social integration into the decision-making structures and 
affairs of the village. Informants claim that no restrictions were placed on newcomers 
concerning the use of the communal rangelands of Tyefu Location to graze their 
livestock or on the use of the other natural resources on the commons30 
In this way, new arrivals in Gwabeni were settled in New Brighton, the extension of 
Nala section. Eleven of the 27 Xhosa imizi currently in the village, the oldest of which 
have been in Gwabeni for over seventy years, are situated in New Brighton section. 
Other newcomers during this period were given sites in Bhobho section, to the south 
of the arable fields. One umzi that settled in Bhobho comprised the Jakuja family which 
28 Most of my informants seemed uneasy about me pursuing a line of enquiry concerning 
(Xhosa-Mfengu) ethnicity, suggesting a lingering sensitivity over these issues. I resorted to approaching 
the subject obliquely, such as identifying Xhosa and Mfengu clan names, asking whether informants' 
families had 'arrived' in Peddie in 1835 or before this time, and so on, to see what role issues of ethnicity 
played in the management of natural resources in Tyefu Location. 
29 Amarhanuga refers specifically to 'people from the farms' (Manona 1980:115) . 
30 See Manona (1980:114) for an interesting discussion of these issues for Nyaniso village in 
Peddie District. 
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had occupied one of the farms adjacent to Gwabeni. When the oldest brother of the 
family neglected to pay rent on the land, the farm was sold and, in 1929, the family was 
obliged to move to Bhobho section in Gwabeni, a stone's throwaway from their former 
farm. 
A total of 11 imizi of Xhosa origin are situated in Bhobho section, while Nqwebeba is 
home to three Xhosa imizi and Nala to two. Many of the imizi in Bhobho were 
established over a period of nearly 100 years by Xhosa people who left freehold farms 
in the neighbouring districts. The period 1966-1971, saw six families (separately) 
leaving commercial farms in the vicinity of Gwabeni, and securing permission to settle 
in the village. None of these people came from the same farm, but most had either 
kinship or clan links with Xhosa families already settled in Gwabeni. 31 
Table 5.3. Differential Access to Arable Land by Mfengu and Xhosa Imizi 
ACCESS TO LAND MFENGU IMIZI XHOSA/MIZI TOTAL 
Access to arable land 32 (48%) 14(21%) 46 (69%) 
No Access to arable land 8 (12%) 13 (19%) 21 (31 %) 
Total 40 (60%) 27 (40%) 67(100%) 
Table 5.3. indicates the differential access to arable land in Gwabeni. It suggests that 
imizi that have settled in the village more recently (these are mostly of Xhosa origin) 
have fared less well than the longer-established Mfengu imizi in terms of access to 
arable land. Eighty per cent of Mfengu imizi have access to arable land, while the 
equivalent figure for Xhosa imizi is 52 per cent.32 It should however be noted that a 
sizeable proportion of the Mfengu imizi share arable allocations with lineage members 
in other imizi, and that their 'access' in terms of being able to use the land productively 
is in fact quite tenuous. This also applies to the Xhosa imizi that have been settled in 
the village for the better part of this century. 
31 
Gwabeni. 
It is not clear how many, if any, imizi coming off the farms were turned away from 
32 This is a function of the landless Xhosa imizi having arrived in the village after the last 
available arable land had been allocated and not because of any ethnic divisions in the village. 
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4. Social and agrarian change in Gwabeni 
Not only have a number of imizf33 moved into Gwabeni over the past century, but a 
considerable number of Gwabeni people have moved out of the village to other parts 
of Peddie District and to various metropolitan centres.34 The Sishuta family left 
Gwabeni for Bira on the coast of Peddie District, only to return some years later. The 
Shuma family moved to Ndwayana village, while the Kondiles moved to Port Elizabeth. 
The Mpetsha and Mlungiso families also moved away. A few Manala men also left the 
village and set up themselves up in other villages: Oyama Manala left the village in 
1930 and settled on D'Urban mission station in Peddie, while Mtheto Manala left 
Gwabeni and, in search of better opportunities to cultivate, he settled in Wesley village, 
near the Peddie coast. Phila Manala moved to Port Elizabeth permanently in the mid-
1970s and only returns to Gwabeni very occasionally. 
Migrant labour contracts and urbanisation are strategies that were widely adopted to 
escape the economic decline in Gwabeni from the early 1960s. In response to recurrent 
droughts, to the limited availability of arable land and to a marked decline in the quality 
of arable land in the village, a generation of migrant workers began to take a different 
view of the village and of their stake in it. This group consisted of both men and women 
and constituted the emerging, urban-focussed, more educated elite in the social milieu 
of the village. For them, the village became essentially a rural base, where they spent 
their holidays and periods of unemployment or a place to which they would retire, rather 
than a place in which they could generate reliable and sufficient incomes from 
agricultural production. 
Since at least the early 1960s, the former role that the rural umzi economy in Gwabeni 
had played for this group as unit of economic production (or at least a significant 
component thereof) was in terminal decline and was steadily replaced by the notion of 
33 Fifteen contemporary imizi represent the imizithat have moved into Gwabeni over the past 
100 years. 
34 I have a list of 27 imizi (comprising some 205 people) that are originally from Gwabeni but 
which are now permanently resident in a metropolitan centre, predominantly in Port Elizabeth and Cape 
Town . 
l 
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the rural umzi as a base for social reproduction. Henceforth, the rural umzi became a 
place where one's children could be left in the care of rural relatives - more recently, 
specifically that of their pensioned grandparents - where they would assist the latter 
with domestic chores and livestock herding responsibilities and attend the local primary 
school. It was also the place to which the umzi and lineage members who were away 
working as migrants 'in the city' and who were in most respects effectively urbanised, 
returned for holidays and ritual occasions. 
If the rural umzi was becoming engaged primarily in social reproduction, then the 
emphases of space and place were very different to that required for agrarian economic 
production: for the latter, people needed space between imizi, for privacy and in order 
to reduce competition for key resources such as water and firewood. For the former, the 
emphasis fell on access and comfort: ease of access to the store at the Breakfastvlei 
Hotel for domestic consumer goods, and to the bus and taxi stop for transport needs; 
easy vehicular access to one's umzi (in case of emergency) and ready access for 
young children to attend the local creche and school (both in Nala section). Similarly, 
access by especially women to the church - also in Nala section - became a more 
important consideration in the (re)location of particularly female-headed imizi. 
In an effort to make this essentially post-agrarian rural life more comfortable, those 
people who can afford to, have begun to invest some of their urban earnings in the 
infrastructure of the rural umzi itself: bigger and more expensive houses are being built, 
often with a face-brick exterior, and earnings are being employed in the procurement 
of rainwater tanks, comfortable furniture and domestic appliances. As field cultivation 
declined, the people who made attempts to cultivate domestic gardens found it 
necessary to invest in fencing to shield the produce of their gardens from the attention 
of unherded livestock that are free to roam around the village. Even garden production 
suffered, however, in the face of recurrent droughts and the changing lifestyle in 
Gwabeni, so that in 1995, I found that 58 per cent of the imizi in the village had 
abandoned garden cultivation entirely. 
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5. Conclusion 
This chapter has described how the modified communal land tenure system prevalent 
in Gwabeni has been constrained by the natural environment (especially the steep 
topography of the area), and more specifically by the 'enclosure' of the village. 
Gwabeni is bounded by neighbouring freehold (and later state-owned) land in the only 
direction that arable and residential expansion may have been feasible, namely onto 
the flatter plateau area to the north of the village. 
The 'enclosure' of the village and the subsequent overcrowding and landlessness 
experienced in Gwabeni has put the local resource base under considerable pressure. 
It has also led to far greater umzi mobility than might be expected, considering the 
material investment that an umzi has come to require: one strategy people have 
adopted has been for individuals and entire imizi to relocate out of specific local areas 
in which the natural resources have been exhausted. This relocation has occurred 
particularly at times when the sons of an umzi head take the opportunity to leave a 
more degraded village section and to set up their own imizi in better resourced areas, 
either in the village or further afield. 
Another strategy adopted by a number of individuals and imizi has been to leave the 
vi Ilage and rural area altogether and to settle in a metropolitan centre. The latter 
strategy has been an important factor in the increased socio-economic differentiation 
between imizi in the village and has complicated the management of local resources 
because of the communal system of membership conferred by birthright (or 
subsequently) allows such people to continue to have a stake in the affairs of these 
areas (and to graze their livestock on the communal rangeland) even when they are 
away for long periods, or even permanently. 
The impact of limited arable land available to imizi in the village has been analysed. I 
argued that, in spite of the efforts of the village to prevent any subdivision of land 
holdings (by ensuring that each arable allocation was shared by the descendants of the 
man to whom the field was allocated), arable production went into a decline by the early 
1960s. Declines in arable agriculture are also linked to the relatively frequent 
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occurrence of drought, increased soil erosion, institutional weakness3s and the 
inadequacy of state support for agricultural production in modified communal tenure 
areas. 
The consequent re-orientation of rural livelihoods, which has been documented in other 
parts of Africa, can be described as a process of de-agrarianisation (8ryceson 1993). 
In Gwabeni, this process left residents with essentially three options: (a) migrate (i.e 
'oscillate') between town and village (b) move permanently to an urban centre or (c) 
adapt as best possible to a rurally-based (but not agriculture-centred) lifestyle. All 
these options, and various combinations of them, have been adopted by the different 
imizi in Gwabeni, with varying degrees of success. The net result has been a 
divergence of interests between imizi and individuals and an overall increase in social 
and economic heterogeneity in the village. 
Overall, a number of fairly distinctive, but dynamic categories of imizi are discernible 
in Gwabeni . I argue that these imizi can be grouped in a way that generates insights 
into their respective capacities and interest with regard to making a contribution to the 
collective management of natural resources. The criteria for this grouping include the 
primary source(s) and reliability of umzi income and the overall employment and 
economic profile of the umzi. These criteria are informed by the stage of a particular 
umzi in the development cycle, and serve as a good indication of the orientation of the 
umzi and its members as either locally or outwardly oriented. Another important 
criterion, the social structure of the umzi is also linked to the development cycle. The 
social status or standing of an umzi and its members in the village, including the 
influence of the lineage to which an umzi and its members belong, are also important 
(if less easily quantifiable) aspects to be considered in developing an understanding 
of what contribution specific imizi are likely to make to collective resource management 
decisions. 
In Chapter Four, I argued that contemporary institutions at village level lack sufficient 
35 The integration of the agricultural activities of field cultivation and livestock grazing, requires 
effective institutions to regulate the behaviour of people and to mediate in disputes that may arise when, 
for example, livestock damage crops. 
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authority to sustain and implement local resource management decisions. This chapter 
has examined the measures that people in Gwabeni, in the absence of 'robust' local 
institutions, have adopted (individually and collectively) to deal with resource scarcity 
and degradation. I have also analysed how sustained pressure on local natural 
resources, and people's changing perceptions of arable production, has brought about 
a process of de-agrarianisation in Gwabeni, and alluded to the increasing social 
heterogeneity that has undermined efforts to manage natural resources on the 
commons. In the chapter that follows, emphasis is placed on describing the types of 
imizi in Gwabeni. I address the question why these imizi are collectively unwilling or 
unable to endorse and maintain 'robust' local institutions seeking to manage their 
common pool natural resources. 
CHAPTER SIX 
Social Heterogeneity and Collective Action in Resource Management 
Introduction 
The size and socio-economic characteristics of the resident population of Gwabeni 
(and those who return periodically to the village) are important variables in 
understanding local natural resource management practices in the village. Lawry 
(1990) argues that as rural areas and people are integrated into the wider, national and 
even global political economies, their degree of local social and economic 
differentiation increases. This differentiation poses particular challenges for the 
management of natural resources that are held in common at village level, because it 
results in people having widely divergent incentives for complying with these 
management systems. 
For certain rural dwellers, their reliance on specific natural resources1 diminishes to the 
extent that the transaction costs of involving themselves in resource management 
systems becomes prohibitive and outweigh any benefits their participation in these 
systems might hold in store for them. Local institutions are not always in position to 
increase the overall incentive for a differentiated village and location population to 
engage in the management of shared resources. 
In this chapter, I describe and analyse what I consider to be the significant categories 
of social difference and similarity at the level of umzi in Gwabeni, and provide reasons 
why these differences appear to undermine collective efforts aimed at managing 
common pool resources. 
1 The perceived need to manage the use of natural resources in Gwabeni is graded by villagers 
according to a specific umzi's actual reliance on that resource, the perceived availability of a particular 
resource and according to which category of resident is primarily responsible for collecting and using 
this resource. Mud, which is a common resource used bywomen in especially the poorer imizi for the 
plastering of walls and floors, does not feature in any discussions concerning the management of 
natural resources in the village. On the contrary, strong opinions are voiced by both men and women 
about the state of water, grazing, firewood, and wilderness resources, specifically prickly pear and 
game. Other natural resources that people utilise are regarded as plentiful and thus as not in need of 
any management regime. 
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1. The demography of Gwabeni 
Official population estimates for rural villages in the Eastern Cape are known to be 
inaccurate, partly because the methods used have been based on extrapolations of 
counts in a limited number of sample areas. 2 One reason for the inaccuracy of these 
estimates is that counting an identifiable group of people who are 'normally resident' 
in the village, is made difficult by the high mobility of these people between rural and 
urban centres.3 
Official estimates of population are also inaccurate because of the suspicion and 
hostility shown by rural people towards census enumerators (OBSA 1985:2). This may 
result in enumerators being furnished with inaccurate data, since people are unsure 
how this information could be used by the government of the day. The manipulation 
of population data for political and economic ends is, of course, not unheard of: one 
obvious criterion for the allocation of the resources of the Ciskeian state to Tribal 
Authorities was the population estimates for each of these units4 For this reason, it 
made sense for chiefs and headmen to inflate the numbers of people living under their 
jurisdiction, thereby misrepresenting the need for state resources in their areas. 
Be that as it may, the estimated de facto population of Gwabeni village has been 
2 Possibly the least accurate part of one of these methods was the extensive use made of air 
photographs from which data is extracted concerning the number of dwellings or 'building structures' for 
all the rural villages in the Ciskei. Population figures were subsequently extrapolated from a 5 per cent 
sample of villages for the number of people per structure to establish a relationship between structures 
and population (DBSA 1985 Chapter 3) . 
3 Gwabeni is two hours by motor car from East London and about three hours from Port 
Elizabeth. Nevertheless, many urban-based people only return to the village at Christmas or Easter 
time or to attend ritual events and other ceremonies. 
4 The phenomenon of inflating population statistics was observed during fieldwork in Gwabeni 
when the Amatola District Council sent a 'development planning' questionnaire to the village. The 
questionnaire, which made explicit reference to the long-awaited delivery of services, required the 
Residents' Association committee in the village to provide details concerning the village population and 
the particular needs of the residents. Although it was clear that committee members did not know what 
the exact population of the village was, (they deferred to me to provide an estimate), they were not 
prepared to submit a figure of below 2 000 and a few members suggested giving the village population 
as 5 000, believing (probably correctly) that the higher the official number of residents that was on 
record, the more likely they were to get a response from the Council with regard to the meeting of their 
needs. After some discussion, the committee agreed to submit a figure of 2 000 as the permanent 
residents in the village, nearly ten times the actual resident population. Needless to say, this approach 
would not have promoted sound planning for, inter alia, the provision of infrastructure in the village . 
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pegged at 600 people (OSSA 1985) and 903 people (Setplan 1985). In contrast, I 
recorded a total of 227 people resident in the village at the time of my census of the 
sixty-seven occupied imizi in the villageS This made for an mean of 3,4 people per 
umzi. While this figure suggests a radically smaller population than the official 
estimates, I recorded a further 451 people as the 'absent' (but bona fide) members of 
these imizi, which would constitute a total village population of some 678 people. It 
should be noted, however, that at no time are al/ of these people present in the village, 
nor are they ever likely to be, even over the festive season holiday. For one thing, the 
inconvenience caused by locally scarce natural resources (especially water and 
firewood) would probably keep many people away or restrict their visits to short 
periods. 
Table 6.1. Gwabeni residents by age category (n=67) 
AGE CATEGORY NO. OF PEOPLE PERCENTAGE 
less than or equal to 6 years 43 19 
between 7 and 18 years 59 26 
between 19 and 60 years 70 31 
over 60 years 55 24 
Total 227 100 
Two features of the resident population of Gwabeni, as presented in Table 6.1. are 
immediately apparent: Firstly, this population is dominated by the young and the aged. 
Fully 45 per cent of those in the village are eighteen years old or younger, with the 
mean age of the category 7-18 years, a youthful 10,8 years. The mean age for males 
in the category 7-18 years old is 11,7 years, while for females the mean age is 10,1 
years . For both boys and girls in this category, there is only one person older than 
fifteen years and this person is a sixteen year old male. This underscores just how 
young this category (7-18 years) of the resident population of Gwabeni actually is. The 
youthfulness of this group is to be expected, since an important reason for the 
5 This census, which involved administering a detailed questionnaire schedule to every 
occupied umzi, took place over a three month period in 1995. This period did not include either the 
Easter or Christmas holidays. As mentioned above, one questionnaire CQuid not be used. 
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presence of this number of youths in the village is to take advantage of the primary 
schooling opportunities and the safe environment for children in Gwabeni. The vast 
majority of these children are enrolled at Gwabeni Primary School. Once children have 
advanced past the primary school level, they often leave the village to attend a 
secondary school in an urban centre. The remaining few children attend Sotinini 
Secondary School in Horton village. 
The aged, or those in the over 60 years old category, comprise a further 24 per cent 
of the local population. The aged category include some people who are considerably 
older than sixty and the mean age for this category is 67,7 years. The remaining 31 per 
cent of the population of Gwabeni is between the ages of nineteen and sixty, and can 
thus be considered potentially economically active. 
A second feature of the Gwabeni population, as can be seen in Table 6.2. below, is that 
although males are outnumbered by females only marginally overall (at a ratio of 
1: 1 ,06), it is significant that in the 'mature' categories (19 years and over), the ratio of 
males to females is 53: 72 (or nearly 1: 1,4). There are thus noticeably more 'mature' 
women than men in the village. 
Table 6.2. Gwabeni residents by age and gender 
AGE CATEGORY MALES %OFTOTAL FEMALES %OFTOTAL 
less than or equal to 6 years 20 8,8 23 10,1 
between 7 and 18 years 37 16,3 22 9,7 
between 19 and 60 years 30 13,2 40 17,6 
over 60 years 23 10,1 32 14,1 
Total 110 48,4 117 51,5 
There are conspicuously more males in the second category (7 to 18 years) who are 
present in the village than females and this is possibly because young girls are more 
useful to their parents in the urban environment, where they help with domestic tasks. 
In Gwabeni, boys are expected to help with the herding of livestock and, depending on 
the structure and size of the umzi, with the collection of water and firewood as well. 
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Of the 70 people in the category nineteen to sixty years old, there are only 13 people 
under thirty years old. This group consists of 10 females and 3 males. The important 
role played by females in maintaining the rural umzi is highlighted here: these young 
women are expected to fulfil the range of domestic chores, such as collecting water and 
gathering firewood, cooking, cleaning, washing clothes and caring for younger children 
and older adults in the umzi. The data also reflect the tendency for 'mature' women to 
outnumber 'mature' men in the village. This is the result of the high number of these 
men being resident away from the village, often employed or seeking employment in 
urban centres. 6 
In total, there are 27 males between the ages of 30 and 60 years resident in Gwabeni 
at the time of the survey. In the absence of a headman in Gwabeni, some of these 
men, together with a small number of the men older than sixty years and, to a lesser 
extent, a few of the senior women, are responsible for managing the affairs of the 
village in general , including the management of natural resources. 
As will be seen below, several of these men (aged between 30 and 60 years), 
themselves unemployed and not of pensionable age (65 years for men), are members 
of economically marginal imizi involved in ekeing out an existence. This fact tends to 
undermine their individual and collective status and thus influence in both the 
deliberations concerning administrative matters in the village and the implementation 
of decisions made during these deliberations. 
2. Umzi size and structure 
As discussed above, the fluctuating number of people resident in each umzi is an 
important variable impacting on the levels of natural resource utilisation. A second key 
variable which influences these patterns of natural resource consumption is the fluid 
household structure in the village. A number of factors are important here: whether 
6 There were a total of 152 men in the category 19 to 60 years old, who were regarded as 
members of village imizi but who were absent from the village at the time of the census. This means 
that only 20 per cent of the men in this category were resident in the village when the census was 
conducted (1995) . 
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there is an able-bodied woman present in a particular umzi who can be burdened with 
the responsibility of collecting water and gathering firewood; whether there are young 
children who can assist in these tasks and who can (if they are young boys) playa key 
role in herding livestock. Where these categories of people are not present, such as 
in imizi comprising only men, especially older men, the labour needed for these tasks 
may be requested from a neighbouring umzi, another party may be paid to render this 
service (i.e. the service would be 'outsourced') or use of the resource may be 
substituted entirely, i.e. paraffin for firewood and a rainwater tank substituting for 
having to collect water from a distant dam or spring. 
To elucidate these issues, a typology of imizi is constructed and discussed below. This 
typology is not set in stone: as was pointed in the Introductory chapter, if anything 
characterises rural imizi in most parts of southem Africa, it is their dynamism and fluidity 
in response to economic and social exigencies (see Spiegel 1990). The typology 
should rather be seen as an explanatory tool for identifying constraints to collective 
action at village level. This is because the various numerically significant 'types' of imizi, 
which differ, inter alia, in respect of their social structure and resource7 endowments, 
have different impacts on both the natural resource base and the resource 
management decision-making processes in the village. 
Type A is the most common umzi structure in Gwabeni, with 27 imizi (or 40 per cent of 
those occupied) exhibiting this pattem. This type comprises a female headed 
household, often with the head being an elderly widow'" The umzi is in receipt of one 
7 Here, I am referring to economic resources (including cash, access to pensions and livestock) 
and infrastructural assets, such as rainwater tanks and paraffin/gas stoves. 
8 Niehaus makes the point that the 'seniority of women in many households does not in itself 
indicate household headship or matrifocality ..... . [rather] to be defined as women-headed, a household 
must have a woman as the decision-maker, 'who takes major or total responsibility for the care and 
well-being of the domestic unit' [quoting Preston-Whyte (1988:59)] ..... Senior women such as pensioners 
and grandmothers may have little domestic authority and influence in decision-making' (Niehaus 
1994:118). The authority of senior (widowed) women in Gwabeni varied from umzito umzi but 
appeared to be substantial in practically all of these 'Type A' imizi. Researching these issues of 
domestic authority and decision-making for every umzi in the village was beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
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(or exceptionally two) pensions. 9 The household may include some of the head's own 
offspring, but certainly includes one or more of her grandchildren. 
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MamTshawe is a 65 year old pensioner and the head of an umzi in Bhobho 
section of Gwabeni village. She lives with her two grandsons (the sons of two of 
her daughters), both of whom are aged 14 years and scholars at Gwabeni 
Primary School. MamTshawe has four daughters, all of whom reside elsewhere: 
two of them live and work in Port Elizabeth, one lives and works in East London 
and the fourth daughter is 'married' in Gobozana, near King Williams Town. Her 
first-bom, a son, passed away in 1994. 
As newcomers to the village in the 1940s, MamTshawe's parents were not 
granted arable land in Gwabeni. MamTshawe married a man from Ngcabasa, 
near Middledrift, and went to live there. When her husband absconded sometime 
later, she left her five children in the care of her affines and found domestic work 
9 Receipt of a pension usually meant that a woman was 60 years of age or over and a man 
was 65 or over, but those receiving disability pensions could , of course be younger than these ages. A 
total of six people (all women) were in receipt of disability pensions in the village during the survey. 
Their ages were 59,59,54,52,50 and 38 years respectively. 
10 In all these diagrams, the encircling, dotted line denotes those present in the umzi during my 
1995 census. A hatched circle or triangle indicates a pension recipient, while a black circle or triangle 
indicates that the person is in full-time employment. 
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in Peddie town. As they were also struggling to make ends meet, her parents-in-
law decided to 'bring' the children to her and, with her own parents having passed 
away, she placed them in the care of her sister in Gwabeni. MamTshawe moved 
to East London with her employer and became a migrant worker, seeing her 
children for two weeks a year. She later retired to the village, and her brother, 
who lived in Alice, supported the umzi which she became head of in Gwabeni. 
MamTshawe managed, even after she became an old age pensioner, to secure 
'piece jobs' on the various drought relief/rural development projects initiated and 
sponsored by the Department of Agriculture in the village. 
Without an allocation of arable land, the umzi previously made do with cultivating 
a vegetable garden to supplement their diet. Although they later abandoned the 
garden because of the recurrent drought conditions in the village, MamTshawe 
took advantage of the rains in 1995 to cultivate vegetables in her garden again . 
At present, the only livestock owned by this umzi are a pig and three chickens. 
MamTshawe uses paraffin by preference but when her supply runs out, she 
makes use of firewood as fuel. She gathers firewood on and around the 
Breakfastvlei Outspan with other women from the village but claims that even in 
this more recently accessible area, supplies of firewood are diminishing. Her two 
grandsons help with domestic chores like washing dishes and fetching water, but 
MamTshawe does almost everything else around the home herself. 
Although her daughters sometimes bring groceries with them when they visit the 
village, the umzi is heavily dependent on MamTshawe's old age pension. She has 
to go to East London to receive her penSion, which is costly in terms of transport 
and sometimes accomodation when there is a delay in the pay-out process. 
Even though her pension allows her to purchase most of the domestic necessities 
of her umzi, they still make regular use of the range of resources available on the 
commons, including water, firewood, imifino (wild vegtables), prickly pear and 
mud, the latter for the plastering of walls and (mixed with cattle dung) of floors . 
MamTshawe is not aware of any regulations concerning the use of any of these 
natural resources. She says local people do not have much interest in resource 
management, except when the government pays them to work on conservation 
projects. Although she recognises their worth in terms of supplementing local 
incomes, MamTshawe is dismissive of the impact that these various conservation 
projects have in conserving or rehabilitating resources. Clearly an able and 
competent (elderly) woman, MamTshawe suggests that as a female headed umzi 
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(and being without sons), her umzi does not have any real influence on the way 
in which village institutions manage the allocation and use of resources in the 
village. About her conduct in meetings, she told me: "I only listen. I don't stand 
up and answer or challenge anything." (She might have added that the fact of her 
umzi being without arable land, a legacy of not being a member of one of the 
dominant 'founding' lineages in the village, also plays a role in this regard.) 
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MamThembu is a 64 year old pensioner and widowed head of an umzi in 
Nqwebeba." She used to work as a domestic in Grahamstown and retired to 
Gwabeni in 1989. She now lives with two of her daughters-in-law and seven 
grandchildren between the ages of three and thirteen years. Four of the children 
are scholars in Gwabeni and another three attend the creche in the village. 
These ten people are supported primarily by MamThembu's old age pension 
provided by the state and by remittances from her two sons to their wives. Her 
oldest daughter, Nosisi, remits money to her occasionally. MamThembu 
sometimes sells pigs in the village to augment her pension, but only irregularly. 
This umzi spends the bulk of its income on domestic necessities, namely food, 
clothes and paraffin. 
11 In 1996, this umzi relocated to the Outs pan sites. 
r 
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MamThembu's deceased husband had had access to an arable field at Dreyini. 
MamThembu took over this field upon her husband's death in 1960. She last had 
it ploughed in 1976 and is adamant that she does not have to defer to her sons 
regarding the cultivation of this field. Nowadays, instead of field cultivation, she 
cultivates maize, pumpkins and melons in a garden adjacent to her home. 
The umzi owns six cattle, five sheep (four of the sheep are owned by her third 
son, Lethu), one pig and ten chickens. Her three grandsons (aged 13,11,11 years 
respectively) are responsible for the cattle and sheep, supervised by 
MamThembu. She looks after the pigs and chickens. 
The umzi also owns a rainwater tank which constitutes a significant investment 
in terms of domestic time-saving and health (except, of course, during droughts). 
It allows them to use rainwater, rather than pump or dam water for drinking, 
cooking and for the washing of white clothes. Mamthembu, her daughters-in-law 
and the boys still collect water on a daily basis for washing other clothes and for 
other domestic needs. Members of the umzi rely on firewood as their primary 
source of fuel for cooking purposes, but also use paraffin and gas stoves. They 
use paraffin for lighting their home. Twice a week, the three women and three 
boys take turns gathering firewood in the forest area around the village. 
MamThembu remembers that previously there was a rule that no axes should be 
used to gather firewood (i.e. only dry wood was to be gathered), but now there 
are no rules in respect of gathering firewood. 
The umzi makes extensive use of a wide range of other natural resources on the 
village commons. These include saplings for building, mud, thatching grass, 
imifino , prickly pear and medicinal plants. The boys hunt casually and collect 
honey wherever they can. 
Being married into one of a handful of predominant ('founding') lineages in the 
village, in this case a Mabhele lineage, means that MamThembu has a greater 
influence on the affairs of the village, relative to many other women in Gwabeni. 
Because of her long absence from the village, however, she is not among those 
who appear to be party to key decisions on matters of concern to the entire 
village. Rather, she has thrown her time and energy into the committee planning 
(and latterly, executing) the move of people to the Outspan sites area. She is, in 
fact, secretary of the Outspan sites committee (discussed in Chapter Seven) and 
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shows a keen grasp of affairs in the village in general and of the Outspan sites 
section in particular. 
Type B consists of male-headed imizi, in receipt of one or two pensions. These imizi 
include the wife of the head, one or more of their offspring and some grandchildren. 
There were ten (15 per cent) imizi in Gwabeni which exhibit this domestic structure. 
Most of these imizi have very little impact on decision-making around natural resource 
management in Gwabeni, as the majority of them consist of people too frail to attend 
meetings in the village. 
The umzi of K.S. : 
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This umzi in Nala section consists of K.S., his wife, Nowethu, one of their sons 
(44) and four of their grandchildren (three girls and one boy between the ages of 
six and thirteen. K.S. (81) and Nowethu (72) are both pensioners. Their son is 
unemployed at present and does small 'jobs' around the village. All the 
grandchildren are scholars in Gwabeni. Three other sons reside in Port Elizabeth 
(two of them are employed and married, the third is still at school) while their 
daughter lives in Cape Town. K.S.'s umzi is the senior umzi of the S. lineages in 
the village. The S. lineages are members of the Khala clan and as such, they 
tend to associate and support the other Khala clan members in the village. 
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Previously, K.S. worked in Johannesburg, Cape Town and latterly in Port 
Elizabeth for an industrial company for 18 years. One of his sons now works for 
the same company. K.S. eventually retired to Gwabeni, where his wife had been 
residing with his parents. 
The umzi shares access to the arable land of K.S .'s deceased father with K.S.'s 
two brothers who are resident in the village. The brothers have never ploughed 
together and the land was last ploughed in 1976. K.S's umzi does not cultivate 
a garden. They own four goats, five sheep, five pigs and three chickens. K.S.'s 
grandson, Ncedo, is responsible for looking after the goats and sheep, while his 
wife, Nowethu, looks after the pigs and chickens. The grandchildren collect water 
on a daily basis from the big dam in the valley below them, even though the umzi 
has a rainwater tank. The grand-daughters are responsible for gathering firewood 
and do most of the domestic work around the umzi. 
Both K.S. and Nowethu are in increasingly poor health. K.S. travels to Port 
Elizabeth regularly to get medical attention. He complains that his (urban-based) 
children do not contribute financially to the education and care of their children 
resident at his umzi. 
Because of his ill-health, K.S. is only able to attend community meetings 
infrequently. He is too old and too ill to be interested in the temporary 
employment opportunities offered by the various resource conservation projects. 
He regards the younger generation [of men] as 'inactive' and as people who must 
be induced by cash incentives to do the important tasks that need to be done 
collectively by the men in the village. 
He is adamant that Tyefu Location is one piece of land which cannot be 
demarcated by villages and fenced separately. As a result, he is sceptical of 
proposed plans to fence the grazing land of Gwabeni so as to better manage the 
grazing resources. 
The umzi of Tamkulu M : 
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Tamkulu (85) is an old age pensioner who lives in Bhobho section with his wife, 
Nofirst (69), who is also a pensioner, and their twin grandsons, aged three years. 
Tamkulu's daughter (the mother of the twins) works as a housekeeper in 
Mdantsane. The urnzi is dependent on the two old age pensions it receives from 
the state. 
Tamkulu's umzi does not have access to arable land,12 but he and Nofirst do 
have a garden in which they cultivate crops of maize and beans. Besides caring 
for their young grandchildren, Tamkulu and Nofirst are responsible for collecting 
water from the nearest dam as they do not have a rainwater tank. Nofirst gathers 
firewood, their primary source of fuel for cooking purposes, ehlatini (in the forest) 
around the village. like most people in the village, they use paraffin for lighting 
purposes. Increasingly, they rely on ilima (workteams) of young girls (aged 
between eight and fourteen years) to collect firewood for them. These workteams 
are paid with tea and sandwiches. They prefer to ask young girls, because young 
men expect to be paid in cash to collect firewood for them. 
The umzi owns three goats, one pig and five chickens and the labour involved in 
looking after these livestock is provided by Tamkulu and NofirsL Neither of these 
two are able or have the inclination to attend village meetings, which are held in 
Nala section (about 50 minutes return walk from their home) on a regular basis. 
12 The arable field of Tamkulu was one of those mentioned earlier which changed hands 
during his absence from the village. 
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Type C consists of a male headed umzi in receipt of one pension (exceptionally two) 
in which the head lives alone, with one kinsperson or with a domestic helper. This 
category comprises eight imizi (12 per cent) and includes those imizi in which the heads 
were long-term migrant workers who spent the best part of two to three decades away 
from the village. In that time, they established urban homes and raised their children 
in places other than Gwabeni. Some of them returned to the village upon retirement, 
leaving their respective wives in urban centres, because the latter who saw no reason 
to leave the city to return to an under-resourced rural village. Their wives visit them for 
short periods in the village or see them when they go to town to collect their pensions 
or to get medical attention. Others chose to return to Gwabeni, because their wives had 
passed away and their offspring had all established their own urban-based homes. Two 
men in this group had never married and returned to the village upon retirement. 
The case of Madoda's umzi: 
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Madoda is a 71 year old pensioner and head of an umzi in Nala section of 
Gwabeni. He lives with his youngest son, Sizwe (30) who is occasionally 
employed to do 'piece jobs' around the village. Madoda's wife and six of his eight 
offspring - they have four sons and four daughters - live in Port Elizabeth. The 
other two children live in Johannesburg. 
Madoda was bom and grew up in Gwabeni. His father was a relatively wealthy 
man and had sent Madoda, his first-bom, to school in Healdtown and 
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Grahamstown, where Madoda completed his Junior Certificate. Madoda left 
Gwabeni in the late 1940s in order to work in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Port 
Elizabeth. He met his wife in Port Elizabeth and they were married in Cape Town 
in 1954. For the period that Madoda worked in Cape Town , his wife resided in 
Gwabeni. When he joined the South African Police in Port Elizabeth in 1955, she 
moved there to live with him. He was transferred to Paterson (in 1958) and then 
to Grahamstown (in 1960). His wife continued to reside in Port Elizabeth. He 
resigned in 1973 and took on a post as municipal constable in Grahamstown 
before being transferred back to Port Elizabeth to be with his family. When he 
retired in 1986 and came 'back home' to his umzi in Gwabeni, his wife and (by 
then, adult) children opted to stay in Port Elizabeth." His wife only makes brief 
visits to the village now. 
Needless to say, circumstances in the village are very different now to those 
Madoda remembered from his youth: then, people had plenty of livestock and 
were able to plough their lands and harvest successfully. They lived happily and 
'only needed to buy coffee, tea and sugar.' Upon returning to the village, Madoda 
found the fact that his father's livestock and arable land had been taken over by 
his father's oldest son by his second marriage (i.e. Madoda's step-brother) to be 
a constant source of irritation. He has to be content with cultivating a vegetable 
garden and realised that he would have to do a 'lot of shopping' as he couldn't 
rely solely on the produce from his garden. 
He and his son rely on Madoda's old age penSion for their everyday needs. 
Madoda does all the housework himself and complains that 'children of today do 
not help financially or around the house.' He says that 'Sizwe is absent most of 
the time and it is as if I am alone here. I have to cook and do every1hing for 
myself.' Instead of his children sending him money, they expect him to give them 
financial support. He currently has 13 goats and 25 chickens. He personally looks 
after these livestock. 
Madoda's rainwater tank is worn out and he collects rainwater in plastic drums. 
He also has to collect water from a nearby dam himself. He does not need to 
13 Like the elderly members of many other imizi in Gwabeni, Madoda and his wife are 
separated in part because they receive their old age pensions in different centres, i.e. Gwabeni and Port 
Elizabeth respectively. Both of them have been warned that they could 'lose' their pensions if they were 
to relocate across the former Ciskei boundary, something they can ill afford. Another reason that 
Madoda's wife stays away from Gwabeni is that she belongs to a church which is apparently frowned 
upon by the majority of people in the village. 
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gather firewood as he only uses paraffin for his domestic fuel needs. He makes 
use other of 'commons' natural resources, including mud for plastering, grass for 
thatched ceilings, imifino (wild vegetables), itolofiya (prickly pear) and honey. His 
son hunts in the vicinity of the village. 
As a devout Christian, Madoda does not conduct 'traditional' rituals, nor does he 
eat the meat of livestock ritually slaughtered by other people in the village. He 
does not drink any alcohol either, and thus does not socialise with the many other 
Gwabeni men on the verandah of the Breakfastvlei Hotel. Perhaps partially as a 
result of his more than 35 year (virtual) absence from the village, Madoda 
appears to be fairly peripheral to the decision-making processes in the village. He 
is nevertheless eager to voice his opinions during 'community' meetings but these 
are not always well received , as he told me, "You saw that when I stand up in a 
meeting, everyone starts to mumble, mumble ....... they don't like me, because I 
am a straightforward man. Me and .... ... , they don't like us. All they do is backbite 
people." 
Thus far, the three 'types' described account for 45 (or 67 per cent) of the imizi in 
Gwabeni. As the case studies have argued, most of the heads of these imizi are fairly 
peripheral in respect of overall decision-making at village level, having only a minimal 
impact on deliberations in these fora. 14 Many of them are on the periphery of these fora 
by choice, in that their livelihoods are pension-based and thus secure, and because 
the village Residents' Association is not able to offer them anything substantial by way 
of improvement in their living conditions.15 Indeed, efforts to raise funds for communal 
projects in the village (such as building a new creche) inevitably turn to the imizi in 
receipt of pensions for the majority of the required funds. This is not always well-
received by the people in question, many of which are already under considerable 
financial strain because of the numbers of people they support. 
14 Certain individuals within these imizi (i.e not the heads) are active in village level institutions. 
15 People in Gwabeni complain that they are always last in line in respect of being granted 
funding for community projects by the non-statutory Peddie Development Forum and latterly, the 
Transitional Representative Council in Peddie. One cause of their inability to secure funds is their 
persistent absence from meetings of these fora , even when applications for projects are sought and 
funding allocated. A key reason for this absence is that the Residents' Association committee members 
in Gwabeni are unable to raise the Rl 0-00 return taxi fare from the cash-strapped imizi in the village in 
order to attend these meetings in Peddie town more regularly and thereby stand a chance of securing 
fu.nding for various development initiatives in the village. 
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The remaining 22 (33 per cent) imizi in the village mirror the three umzi types described 
above, with only one significant difference: that they do not have access to old age 
pensions (there is one exception - see below) and are consequently reliant on other 
sources of income. One interesting feature of these remaining imizi is that 13 (19,5 per 
cent) of them have resident male heads. Of these thirteen, only one umzi head has 
secure, permanent employment and can be described as financially well-off. 
The other 12 umzi heads are all reliant for their livelihoods on combinations of local 
piece work ('jobs'), building alterations and renovations, remittances from urban centres 
or livestock herding. Their lack of secure employment means that these men are not 
always present in the village, as they visit urban centres to hear of job opportunities, 
or find 'jobs' in other villages in Peddie District. When they are doing 'jobs' for other 
people around the village or location, they cannot be relied upon to attend general 
meetings in the village. As some of them serve on the Residents' Association 
committee, their absence thwarts the attempts of other residents to debate issues 
(relating to resource management or other administrative affairs in the village) and to 
reach agreement about implementing any decisions that might be taken. 16 
Nevertheless, in the absence of any other body of senior men, it is this group of 
unemployed (or sporadically employed) men that are most influential when decisions 
relating to natural resource management in the village are made. Not that any decisive 
natural resource management-related initiatives have been started: the fact that these 
men are in dire need of money to support their families and themselves, means that 
they are unwilling to start any resource management projects that will involve men 
(including themselves) in the village providing their labour free of charge. 17 In part, the 
long legacy of government funded projects has set a precedent that makes it illogical 
16 Two elderly men complained bitterly to me that the most pro-active young (35 year old) 
'community leader' in Gwabeni, who had been unemployed for practically all of the past four years, had 
left the village to take up a job in King Williams Town. They felt that without his energy and leadership, 
"nothing will be done in the village." The same young man told me that he was totally frustrated with the 
apathy of the people in Gwabeni who "wanted everything to be done for them." 
17 A 'robust' local institution might, in theory, be able to raise funds locally in order to pay people 
who provided their labour for natural resource management projects, so that they are not required to 
volunteer their labour free of charge. The Residents' Association in Gwabeni has had no success in this 
regard, for the reasons described below. 
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for villagers to initiate projects themselves. In this way, an initiative aimed at retrieving 
superfluous fencing poles along the Peddie - Committees Drift road (where the fence 
and poles had been replaced) failed, partly because these men could not afford to 
sacrifice their time doing unpaid work. 18 In the same way, they are unable to persuade 
other people (for example, younger men) to volunteer their services for locally-initiated 
resource management projects, because they themselves are reluctant to work on 
these projects. As a result, very few locally-initiated projects are started and, during my 
fieldwork period (1994-1997), none can claim to have achieved the modest targets that 
they set for themselves. 
By contrast, work parties of young men are still relied upon to volunteer their services 
to dig graves in preparation for funerals and to assist with the collection of firewood 
before a ritual occasion. Most other tasks relating to the use, management or regulation 
of natural resources are done by individuals themselves, or by men employed to do 
them. These instances of the commercialisation and individualisation of everyday 
natural resource-related tasks, subverts attempts by people and institutions, like the 
Residents' Association in Gwabeni, to make a visible and proactive contribution to the 
management of these resources. 19 
I found that only two (3 per cent) imizi fit the more orthodox model of a migrant male 
umzi head who is absent from the village, and whose wife and children remain behind 
18 One man, who is a bona fide member of the Gwabeni community, resides in Peddie town, 
subsisfing off his disability pension. He nevertheless spends most of his week days in the village, 
tending to his vegetable garden . In 1995, he managed to persuade a few of the senior men to assist 
him in retrieving the fencing poles in question for use in 'community projects.' The only way he could 
get (about seven of) these men to assist him was by telling them that he would keep a record of the 
hours worked by each man and they would be paid the next time a resource rehabilitation-type project 
was 'brought to the village by the abalimi (agricultural extension officers) .' Over a period of about three 
days' work, they realised that he was not keeping a very close check on who was working and who was 
not always present. They also realised that other people in the village might not agree to their being 
paid with unrelated project money at some point in the future . The work party collapsed after about 
forty poles had been retrieved . 
19 One example of this is the young women who served as secretary of the Residents' 
Association (i.e. someone who was regarded by Gwabeni residents as a 'community leader'), told me 
that she would "never" join other people in starting a community poultry project, because she "wouldn't 
like to work with a group of people in this village. They are just a lot of trouble." Another example is the 
educated and wealthy man , from an influential lineage in the village, who makes no contribution to the 
affairs of Gwabeni. When I asked him about this, he told me that "People here don 't want to work 
together as a community. They don't want people like me at their meetings, because when I advise 
them, they say I want to be the boss of everything . Our people don't want to be helped ....... [only] when 
money is made available, [do] people take notice. It is best just to keep quiet and let them get on with it." 
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in the village, supposedly dependent on remittances from the head. In both cases, 
however, the wives in question are reasonably financially independent: one receives 
a pension and the other runs a successful spaza shop in the village. The second 
woman is one of the few women who is confident enough to express an opinion during 
village meetings. She is influential in the activities of various women's groups in the 
village20 and allows her 'guest' rondavel to be used for village meetings during bad 
weather. Her influence in the general administration of the village is constrained by the 
fact that she is married and not always willing to 'speak for' her husband at village 
meetings. 
A further seven (10,5 per cent) imizi are nominally female headed, although four of 
these imizi are heavily dependent on remittances from urban-based male kin. Another 
umzi head (aged 53 years), who resides with her 40 year old brother and three 
grandchildren, is employed at the Day Care centre in Gwabeni. The last two imizi in 
this group consist of young women with one child each. Both of these women sell 
goods, such as clothes, fruit and vegetables. One of them runs a hair salon from her 
home. Both imizi are amongst the poorest in the village and rely on remittances from 
urban-based kin. Because of their impoverished state, both women are able to put 
forward a strong case for temporary employment on the intermittent resource 
management projects conducted in and around the village. 
3. The socio-economic stratification of imizi in Gwabeni 
Formal employment opportunities 
Reasons for the high degree of socio-economic stratification in the villages of Tyefu 
Location include the very limited 'formal sector' job opportunities that exist in these 
villages and the varying degrees of success that people enjoy in generating other local 
livelihoods. Only 12 people resident in Gwabeni (or 17 per cent of the able-bodied) are 
formally employed. These 12 people generate a total monthly income of about R8 800, 
20 These include Manyano (Wesley Methodist Church) prayer groups, burial societies, imiga/e/o 
clubs (rotating credit associations) , year-end grocery buying clubs , and groups of women who 
volunteer to help during preparations for funerals and other rituals . 
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with 68 per cent of this generated by the members of one umzi. These 12 people21 are: 
• a husband (47 years) and wife (43) who are school teachers in the neighbouring villages 
of Ndwayana and Qamnyana respectively *22; 
• a man (31) employed as a labourer on the Double Drift game reserve *; 
• a woman (31) who is employed at the Ripplemead orange factory near the village; 
• a woman (53) employed at the creche in Gwabeni *; 
• a woman (47) who works at the creche in Gwabeni; 
• a woman (53) employed in the kitchen at the Breakfastvlei Hotel *; 
• a woman (38) employed in domestic service in Gwabeni; 
• a woman (48) in domestic service in Gwabeni *; 
• a woman (32) in domestic service in Gwabeni; 
• a woman (21) temporarily employed as an assistant supervisor on the state-sponsored 
fencing project in Debe Nek and *; 
• a woman (24) temporarily employed in a similar capacity on the fencing project at Hlosini; 
The data above show that only two men resident in the village are in permanent 
employment. The rest of the men in Gwabeni are dependent on their savings 
(sometimes in the form of livestock) accumulated through periods of migrant labour, 
piece work around the village (see below), the 'formal' employment (detailed above) of 
their wives or other kin attached to their imizi, or on state transfers (i.e. old age 
pensions and disability grants) to themselves or to those in their imizi. Cash 
remittances from urban-based umzi members in most cases are low and irregular, but 
remittances nevertheless playa vital role in the physical survival of the marginal23 imizi. 
Despite the fact that 10 women are employed, i.e. five times as many as employed 
men, the women in the village are as affected by the chronic lack of employment 
opportunities in the area as the men. The consequences of such high levels of 
21 Soon after the census, three of these women lost their jobs: the woman employed at the 
hotel resigned, citing insufficient remuneration, while the fencing projects that employed the two young 
women ended, leaving them without work. 
22 An * indicates that the imizi in question have no other reliable source of income. 
23 I use 'marginal' to refer to the socio-economic status of the imizi that do not have access to 
regular and reliable cash income from either a pension or from the income of a formally employed 
resident or absent member. Marginal imizi in Gwabeni often have to rely on the charity of other people 
for their daily subsistence needs. 
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unemployment include a village depleted of its young people who have left for the 
metropolitan areas in search of work, and a resident population that is overwhelmingly 
outward-focussed and dependent in respect of economic activities and umzi incomes 
on outside inputs. These two factors alone make collective action in the management 
of natural resources, which are not central to the livelihoods of all imizi, extremely 
difficult to achieve. Underpinning these factors is a village economy which exhibits a 
marked dependence on the state pensions of the elderly and disabled. 
Access to state transfers 
Access to 'formal sector' employment is one measure of stratification in the village, as 
evidenced by the fact that this category of work is limited to only 12 of the 70 people 
in the 'mature' age category (i.e.19 to 60 years old). But this is not the only measure, 
nor even the most important one: a key index of socio-economic stratification in 
Gwabeni is whether an umzi has access to state pension disbursements, and how 
many dependents are supported by each pension. In 1997, these old age pensions are 
valued at R470-00 (per month) and are paid out every two months. Disability grants 
are of equivalent value and are also disbursed bimonthly. In many cases, as has been 
found for imizi in rural areas elsewhere in the country (see May 1995:23), these 
pensions and grants form the primary and most reliable form of umzi income and are 
a critical component of the multiple income bundles of the majority of the imizi in 
Gwabeni. Table 6.3. below lists the relative access that Gwabeni imizi enjoy to this 
source of income. 
Table 6.3. Imizi and pensions 
ACCESS TO PENSIONS NO. OF IMIZI PERCENTAGE MEAN IMIZI SIZE 
No pensions 21 31 2,1 
One pension 34 51 3,7 
Two pensions 12 18 4,7 
Total 67 100 3,4 
Table 6.3. shows that 69 per cent of the imizi in the village are recipients of at least one 
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pension. A total of 58 pensions are paid out bimonthly to Gwabeni imizi.'4 At 1997 
pension values, this means that R27 260 per month is being disbursed to imizi in the 
village by way of state pensions, or more than three times the amount coming into the 
village through formal employment. Table 6.3. also shows that a positive correlation 
exists between the number of pensions per umzi and the number of people per umzi 
that are resident in the village. This is indicative of the key role that pensions have 
come to play in the economy and social structure of Gwabeni: the imizi with access to 
two pensions can be considered to be in a relatively secure financial position - certainly 
in relation to the imizi without access to pensions - and are able to provide reliable 
support to a greater number of dependents. Hence they tend to have more resident 
members than the other imizi. 
Of the 21 imizi that do not receive pension payments, four imizi are not in the marginal 
category. These four include the husband and wife team of teachers and the umzi in 
which a woman is employed at the creche in Gwabeni (both referred to above). The 
third umzi has a considerable cash income remitted by the Port Elizabeth-based head 
of the umzi. A fourth umzi is headed by the woman employed at the Breakfastvlei Hotel. 
Although she left this job in 1995, she has been able to support her umzi through 
livestock sales and with the money remitted to her by her urban-based son. This leaves 
the resident members of 17 marginal imizi reliant on income from sources other than 
pensions. 
Economically marginal imiz; 
The sources of income for these 17 marginal imizi does not vary greatly: Eight of them 
rely on piece 'jobs' for their incomes; five rely on remitttances from urban kin and four 
imizi rely on a combination of 'jobs' and remittances. These remittances are not paid 
monthly, but rather 'sometimes', and vary between the sums of R50-00 and R200-00 
at a time. Among these marginal imizi, three people (all women) own small spaza 
shops in the village. One man's income derives from the sale of his own livestock when 
24 Since old age pensions and disability grants have the same value, the latter have been 
included under the general rubric of 'pensions'. This does not include any pensions from the private 
sector which individuals in the village might receive at the time of their retirement. To my knowledge, no-
one is currently receiving such a pension, even though some of the older men claim to have received a 
pension payout when they retired. 
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in need of cash and from his 'job', which consists of herding the cattle of other imizi; 
another man sells herbal medicines for livestock and does some manual labour, while 
the piece 'jobs' of another man consist of making and selling axe handles, repairing 
kraals and digging pit-latrines. Two men from different marginal imizi are builders who 
undertake building 'jobs' for people around the village and sometimes in neighbouring 
villages. Since mid-1996, fencing people's new residential sites and garden plots on 
the Outspan has also provided 'jobs' for a number of individual men. What the 
examples mentioned above indicate is the extent to which these people rely on their 
right to exploit the common pool resources available around the village, in order to 
survive. 
Given that these imizi have no reliable source of income, it is not surprising that the 
resident members of these imizi are few in number and that the mean number of umzi 
members for these 17 imizi is two. As Table 6.4. shows, five of these imizi consist of 
men living alone. Another two imizi consist of only two men (in one case, two brothers, 
in the other, a father and son) residing together. Six of the 17 (35 per cent) marginal 
imizi are female-headed. 
Table 6.4. Resident members of marginal imizi 
NO. OF RESIDENTS NO. OF IMIZI NO. OF FEMALES NO. OF MALES 
1 6 1 5 
2 6 5 7 
3 4 6 6 
4 1 3 1 
Total 17 15 19 
As noted above, three of the female-headed imizi rely on remittances from urban-based 
kin. In all three cases, these cash remittances come from the umzi head's son, brother, 
and both son and brother, respectively, i.e., close kinsmen are investing in the rural 
sector and in an umzi in which they undoubtedly have longer term interests. 
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Livestock ownership as a measure of socio-economic stratification 
Differential levels of investment in livestock have often been regarded as an indicator 
of the economic stratification which exists in the rural sector of the country (De Lange 
et.aI.1994). Although informants claim that the numbers of livestock in Gwabeni has 
declined overall since the late 1970s, mainly as a result of the prolonged drought, the 
degree to which imizi are stratified according to livestock holdings, and the absolute 
numbers of livestock, has implications for the management of particularly grazing and 
water resources in the village. 25 A closer scrutiny of the livestock holdings by umzi in 
the village, indicates that only eight imizi (12 per cent) own no livestock at all. Another 
eight imizi (12 per cent) have very modest livestock holdings, with a total of 3 goats 
(owned by 2 imizl) , 11 pigs and 24 chickens between them. In total then, 21 per cent 
of the imizi, make no use of the grazing resources in the village and another 3 per cent 
(the 2 imizi with a sum of 3 goats) make very minimal use of these resources. 
Table 6.5. Total livestock holdings in the village2S 
LIVESTOCK TYPE TOTAL IN GWABENI 27 NO. OF IMIZ/WITH ... .. PERCENTAGE 
Goats 292 45 67 
Sheep 282 23 34 
Cattle 70 20 30 
Pigs 87 43 64 
Poultry 316 41 61 
Table 6.5. illustrates the uneven ownership of particularly cattle and sheep in Gwabeni, 
25 Livestock also have an impact on soil management and arable land-use. 
26 Livestock holdings are by no means as static as this section suggests: After three seasons 
of good rains, imizi in Gwabeni are in the process of rebuilding their livestock herds; people are not 
averse to slaughtering one or more of their sheep during the Festive season; the numbers of especially 
pigs and poultry fluctuated on a weekly basis; also, people are concerned about the number of cattle, 
goats and sheep that have been stolen by 'syndicates' from outside the District. Nevertheless, the 
patterns of ownership give some indication of socio-economic strata in the village over the long-term. 
27 A total of 51 goats and 23 cattle owned by Gwabeni residents have been sent to farms in the 
vicinity of Alice and near Wesley in Peddie District, where there is more grazing and they can be looked 
after by kinsmen. Two cattle were sent to Ripplemead (on the Keiskamma River and about four 
kilometres from Gwabeni) because the owner, an elderly widow who lives alone, does not have anyone 
to look after them in Gwabeni. 
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with 70 per cent and 66 per cent of all imizi not owning these types of livestock 
respectively. Only six of the 20 imizi (or 9 per cent of all imiz/) that own cattle have more 
than five of these livestock units. One umzi that owns 16 head of cattle has them taken 
care of on a farm in Alice District, while another umzi has chosen to loan its two cattle 
to someone in Ripplemead village close to Gwabeni. This means that there are a total 
of 70 cattle that are actually in the village. The mean cattle holdings (including the 
cattle not held in Gwabeni) for these 20 imizi is 4,4 units. 
Although the vegetation around Gwabeni was previously deemed to be unsuitable for 
sheep, the 'opening up' (removal) of the dense shrubland, particularly on the high-lying 
ground, means that grazing for sheep has increased and that they can be farmed quite 
successfully. Sheep are ritually slaughtered during social occasions, such as 
weddings, graduation ceremonies and to provide meat over the festive holiday period. 
Even though sheep are shorn and an income can be derived from the sale of the wool, 
such sales have all but collapsed in the last few years. As sheep require closer herding 
than goats, particularly given the reportedly high incidence of jackal in the area, the 
imiziwith a labour shortage are not inclined to own sheep.28 As a result, sheep are held 
by only 23 (34 per cent) of the imizi in the village, at a mean of 12,3 sheep per umzi. 
Even more than in the case of cattle holdings, a few imizi own a disproportionately large 
number of sheep: five (22 per cent) imizi own 61 per cent of the sheep in the village, 
with two imizi having 56 and 52 sheep respectively. While both these imizi owned goats, 
neither of the two large sheep-owning imizi ha'Je goats in the village. Instead, their 
goats are placed with kinsmen on farms in the vicinity of Alice and the coastal strip of 
Peddie District. 
In contrast to sheep, holdings of goats are more evenly spread across the imizi in 
Gwabeni, with 67 per cent of the imizi owning at least one goat. The mean for goat 
ownership (including the 51 goats not held in Gwabeni) is 7,6 goats per umzi, but again 
this is dominated by five (11 per cent) owners of goats, who owned 35 per cent of the 
28 Men complain that the high incidence of jackal around the village is the direct result of their 
dogs being shot by the conservation authorities, so that they are unable to deal with jackal taking their 
small stock. 
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goats. Only two imizi own more than 20 goats, and these hold 46 (not held in Gwabeni) 
and 21 goats respectively. 
Pig and poultry ownership is also spread fairly evenly across the village, with mainly 
the imizi consisting of elderly men or women, often living alone, who do not own pigs. 
Poultry ownership is almost exclusively associated with women, except for Madoda who 
owns 25 chickens, the highest number in the village. Popular with imizi of all socio-
economic strata, pig and poultry keeping made economic sense for especially the 
marginal imizi in Gwabeni, since neither of these animal types require much cash to 
purchase, nor do they need close attention. Both are fast growers that reproduce 
abundantly and both can easily be sold for cash. 
Marginal imizi and livestock holdings 
In the section above, use was made of the source and reliability of an umzi's cash 
income as a measure of socio-economic marginality, and 17 imizi (25 per cent of the 
total) were categorised as marginal. Significantly, of the 17 marginal imizi, only three 
(four per cent of the total imizi in the village) have no livestock whatsoever. A further 
seven (nearly 11 per cent of the total) have limited livestock holdings, such as only one 
or two goats, or one or two pigs and some chickens. In total, these seven imizi own 
three goats, six pigs and seven chickens, with a mean investment of R322 per umzi. 
One umzi that was categorised as marginal , however, owns 46 goats that are in the 
care of the umzi head's kinsman on a farm. The same umzi owns 56 sheep, two head 
of cattle and a pig. Although the male umzi head has no other form of income and lived 
alone, his umzi clearly does not the same socio-economic constraints that other imizi 
in the marginal category have. 
Livestock ownership is relatively unevenly spread across the imizi of the village, with 
a moderate concentration of sheep and cattle holdings in the village. Goat ownership 
is more evenly distributed across the village, as are pig and poultry ownerShip, but it 
is possible to identify a core of 10 (15 per cent) marginal imizi without access to state 
transfers nor regular remittances, that have no or only modest livestock holdings. One 
important factor identified in influencing the pattern of livestock ownership is the 
structure of the umzi, i.e. whether there is sufficient labour to tend to the livestock, 
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including dipping, herding and kraaling them. 
A critical point to stress is the amount of variation between imizi in Gwabeni, with regard 
to livestock ownership and farming patterns. Some imizi are almost wholly reliant on 
periodically selling off some livestock to meet their basic SUbsistence needs. Other imizi 
maintain relatively large herds of goats and sheep for reasons other than purely 
economic ones, while (as we have seen above) there are imizi that do not own any 
livestock at all. There is thus considerable differentiation between imizi in respect of 
their economic means to invest in livestock, their motivation for keeping livestock, their 
levels of interest in the health and quality of their animals and their interest in the 
condition of the grazing resources. This degree of diffentiation affects the very varied 
incentives the different imizi have for supporting a system of grazing management. 
4. Common pool grazing management in Gwabeni 
I would describe the 'system' for managing of local grazing resources around the village 
and indeed across the whole of Tyefu Location as minimalist, in that there are 
ostensibly no formal and very few informal strategies and regulations in place for the 
management of rangeland. If we assume that practically all of the inhabitants of Tyefu 
Location have a stake in the long-term management of grazing resources, it is 
remarkable that there IS no well articulated and uniformly recognised grazing 
management system in the location29 Upon closer investigation, the reasons for this 
are not hard to see. Firstly, there is a small group of imizi that owns a significant 
proportion of the livestock in the village30 This group's high levels of investment in 
livestock might suggest that these people have sufficient incentive to internalise the 
29 Before the late 1970s, when field cultivation was still practised in Gwabeni, the management 
of grazing and of livestock movements had, of necessity, been more carefully regulated. Owners 
incurred fairly high fines and social costs when livestock entered other people's fields and destroyed 
their crops. Cattle were only allowed to enter the fields after the crop had been harvested, to consume 
the crop residues. At present, people in Gwabeni know each other's livestock and are fairly familiar with 
the livestock of other Tyefu villagers. As a result, some local people (especially senior men) are quick 
to notice when livestock owned by non-Tyefu residents are using their grazing resources. I have not, 
however, come across any cases where such livestock has been evicted from the location. 
Mechanisms to enforce exclusion from local resources are thus not strong. 
30 A group numbering 18 imizi (27 per cent of the village total), own 64 per cent of the goats, 
73 per cent of the sheep and 49 per cent of the cattle in Gwabeni. 
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transaction costs involved in devising a grazing management strategy in some form, 
and to implement such a strategy. One reason they might have for doing this is to 
prevent their individual livestock numbers from 'crashing' during droughts, as they have 
done regularly in the past. 31 
This scenario does not hold true for Gwabeni : only 27 per cent of the imizi are in this 
category of significant livestock owners, while the remaining 73 per cent of the imizi in 
the village have few or no livestock. The social transaction costs of implementing a 
grazing management strategy (for example, a system of camps and rotational grazing) 
in the village would require securing the ongoing support of these 73 per cent of the 
imizi, since even those without livestock are hoping to build up a herd in future and 
would have to be convinced to abide by new grazing regulations. 
This would involve not only high 'start-up' transaction costs (such as holding meetings, 
motivating the perceived merits of a new grazing management system, and providing 
explanations of the operational plans of the system), but also require close regulation 
(i.e. more transaction and possibly financial costs, such as paying for a ranger to 
monitor the use of grazing resources and to act against deviant behaviour) ad infinitum. 
These requirements pose serious challenges to the larger livestock owners or any other 
people who may want to initiate a new grazing management system. Moreover, such 
a system could, if proposed and promoted by the larger livestock owners, draw 
unwanted attention to the differential impact their (more numerous) livestock are having 
on the grazing resources and could thus be interpreted by the other imizi as unfair and 
inappropriate regulation inspired by self-interest on the part of the larger livestock 
owners. 
Secondly, as long as the available grazing resources in the area (including the grazing 
on neighbouring farms) are sufficient to absorb the grazing demands of the livestock 
holdings of these 18 imizi, together with the relatively meagre holdings of the other imizi 
31 This assumes, of course, that a critical mass of these people would be able to overcome 
their differences of interest, intra-group animosities and conflicts, and mobilise themselves as a group to 
achieve this end. Given the amount of individualism and lack of confidence in the weak local institutions 
that people in this category exhibit, this does not seem likely to happen in Gwabeni in the near future. 
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in the village, the former, in fact, see no need to formalise livestock grazing 
arrangements in the village. Indeed, any formalisation of mechanisms aimed at a 
supposedly more sustainable use of the grazing system (such as the introduction of 
rotational grazing, a camp system and the introduction of a ranger to monitor livestock 
movements and rangeland condition), would have the undesirable effect, several 
livestock owners informed me, of involving the input and participation of the Department 
of Agriculture officials in Peddie in facilitating the supply of fencing materials, in the 
supervision of the camps and in intermittent grazing assessments (i.e. estimates of 
carrying capacity). 
Livestock owners in Gwabeni realise that any formalisation of a rangeland management 
system cannot be sustained by'local institutions in Gwabeni in isolation, because these 
institutions lack the resources and the skills for accomplish this. Both livestock owners 
and Residents' Association committee members in Gwabeni also argue that the 'open 
grazing' arrangment in Tyefu Location means that Gwabeni is not at liberty to adopt a 
grazing management system on its own. A necessary condition for the success of such 
a system would be that it should encompass all the livestock and all the grazing 
resources in the location. This would probably require unwanted government 
intervention (by way of the institutional co-ordination across the location - and quite 
possibly financing - of a grazing system) in livestock ownership in the villages of Tyefu 
Location. In the minds of livestock owners in Gwabeni , it would be a short step from 
such intervention to the adoption of attempts to revive the unpopular livestock reduction 
programmes of the past in Tyefu Location. 
The same sentiment is expressed by the Residents' Association committee when 
recalling particularly 'the days under Sebe' when, for them, less meant more: less direct 
government supervision of common pool resource management (although, as 
discussed in Chapter Four, quite considerable institutional intervention), meant more 
local flexibility and individual autonomy over the use of grazing resources. 
Consequently, as long as the organs of the state can be held at an arm's length from 
the village and its environs, livestock could safely make use of unfenced grazing 
resources throughout Tyefu Location. Livestock owned by residents of Tyefu Location 
are also able, in the absence of local institutions or government supervision that can 
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sanction and restrict such activity, to use the grazing resources on the underutilised 
(previously commercial) farmland adjacent to the village. These farms thus provide 
considerable relief to the grazing resources of the location. 
Thirdly, and by the same token, Gwabeni imiziwith more modest livestock holdings are 
also able to make use of the grazing resources on the adjacent farmland and whatever 
grazing is available around the village. For this group, the social transaction costs of 
subscribing to and sustaining a local grazing management system are unjustifiable, 
since, considering the small size of their livestock holdings, they are unlikely to make 
substantial gains in the short-term from a new management system. If these holdings 
were to increase substantially, their cash investment would also increase and the 
overall transaction costs would be reduced, as more people would have an increased 
incentive to comply with a new grazing management regime. In the fairly unlikely event 
(given recurrent droughts in the area) that all the livestock owners are able to 
drastically increase their livestock holdings, it is more probable that increased pressure 
would be put on the grazing resources of adjacent farmland before a rangeland strategy 
is formulated and adopted for the grazing resources of Gwabeni. As mentioned above, 
a key constraint would remain that grazing in Tyefu Location continues to be available 
to the livestock of all Tyefu villagers and the villages are not in a position to manage 
what might be 'their' geographic area of the common pool grazing resources as a 
separate grazing commons. 
A rangeland management system would thus require co-operation and co-ordination 
between the imizi in Gwabeni and between the villages of Tyefu Location. At present, 
local institutions both at village level and at the level of the location, are unable to take 
on a process of this magnitude.32 
32 One elderly male informant told me that "There are no leaders in Gwabeni to push people. 
The so-called leaders that we have here, need to be pushed [themselves] to get things going in this 
village.' Local attempts to implement local resource management regimes indicate the depth of the 
problems: I recorded a case where local 'leaders', including some Residents' Association committee 
members were discussing the implementation of a grazing management system. They thought that 
they would deal with non-compliance by individuals by introducing a 'community register' which every 
member of the village would have to sign, stating that they agreed to abide by the 'community laws', 
including resource management 'laws.' This meant that those who refused to sign the register would 
not be regarded as members of the community and could (in theory) be excluded from community 
affairs generally. Several people present at this discussion immediately saw problems with this plan, 
such as the fact that the people most likely to ignore resource management regulations were also those 
who made no positive contribution to the affairs of the village anyway. People realised that, in the 
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5. Water resource management in Gwabeni 
In Gwabeni, the bulk provision of clean domestic water is of central concern to all imizi, 
but people know that a project of this nature would require considerable financial input 
and technical expertise. As a result, the residents of the village look to the government 
to deliver a domestic water supply project to them, rather than address the situation 
with whatever means they have at their disposal. Indeed, local attempts to address the 
current problems of poor quality surface water (which is shared with livestock) are 
undermined by the fact that influential (often wealthy) people and imizi in the vi llage, 
who might be expected to initiate and to lend their support to collective attempts to, for 
instance, fence in dams and prevent livestock from polluting the water, do not, in fact 
do so. Why not? Firstly, they own rainwater tanks, and are thus not reliant on the 
polluted surface water for their domestic water needs. In times of drought, when the 
water supplies in their tanks are exhausted, they have the financial means to purchase 
water from local entrepreneurs who collect and sell water from the Keiskamma River 
to the villagers in Tyefu Location . Poorer imizi are forced to rely on the irregu lar (some 
informants suggested patronage driven) supply of water by government lorries. One 
informant put it as follows : 
'These [wealthy] people think that they can exist on their own, especially once 
they've got their [pay] cheques. When we spoke about dams being expanded, 
reservoirs being built up, they said they've got their own tanks. These people are 
breaking the workforce.' 
Secondly, fencing in dams would obviously reduce the number of dams to which 
I ivestock in the village have access. I would argue that since the influential imizi are 
also the owners of the majority of the livestock in the village, they would not support this 
initiative, not least because it would reduce the number of dams that are available for 
their livestock. In other words, wealthier, more influential imizi have practically no 
incentive to make a contribution to th is project. Without their inputs, including their 
providing direction for the administration of the project and garnering the support of all 
absence of other means of enforcing compliance, the signing of a 'register' was unlikely to be enough 
of a sanction to ensure co-operation from all in the village. 
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the villagers for the project, the dams remain unfenced. 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I analysed various aspects of social heterogeneity and showed how 
these impacted on collective action in respect of natural resource management in 
Gwabeni. I examined the demographic characteristics of Gwabeni which, despite a 
fairly high incidence of rural-urban mobility, showed the population of the village to be 
dominated by young people (below the age of 18 years) and by the elderly (those over 
60 years). I argued that this fact made it more difficult for those present in the village, 
firstly to make decisions about how best to manage their common pool resources and 
secondly, to implement these decisions successfully. 
I also pointed to a predominance of women in the village and indicated that there are 
only around 27 men between the ages of 30 and 60 years who can be called upon to 
supply their labour for tasks relating to the management of communal natural resources 
in the village33 However, it is this very group of men and their respective imizi that 
feature most strongly among the economically marginal imizi in the village. As a result, 
local attempts to initiate resource management projects on the basis of a supply of 
labour free of charge from this group, are doomed to failure or, at best, to make only 
a modest impression in terms of managing resource utilisation. 
Case-studies of the social structure of imizi in Gwabeni il lustrated the constraints to 
resource management activities that these specific umzi configurations experience. In 
67 per cent of the imizi in the village, it is elderly men and women, in combination with 
young children, who gather, collect, extract and manage the common pool natural 
resources used by each of their imizi and their livestock. I argued that practically none 
of these categories of people is well-placed to make a significant contribution to the 
regulation of resource use in the village to ensure the sustainable management of local 
resources. 
A further constraint on collective resource management activities is the degree of 
economic differentiation in the village. Sixty nine per cent of the imizi in the village, for 
instance, have access to (and are dependent on) the disbursement of state old age 
pensions. Although no Gwabeni umzi in receipt of such pensions can be considered 
33 Of course, this number is variable, depending on the movements of these and urban-based 
men in this category between rural and urban areas. 
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well off, access to pensions allows people to purchase many of their domestic food and 
fuel requirements and makes what would have been, in the absence of pension 
disbursements, extremely vulnerable (elderly) imizi far less reliant on the natural 
resources on the village commons. 
Consequently, many of those in receipt of pensions are not overly concerned about the 
declining state of the broad range of natural resources in and around the village. 
Clearly, the incentives for involving themselves in the management of the overall 
natural resource base have diminished. 34 This does not mean, however, that they 
disengage entirely from all village level attempts at resource management (after all , 
some of these imizi have unemployed men and women who would benefit by being 
employed, even temporarily, on resource management projects), but that they are likely 
to be far more selective in the projects they support. 
The variable engagement of imizi in Gwabeni with the wider national political economy, 
specifically (but not only) with the state-driven old age pensions economy, has had an 
unmistakable influence on the nature of social life in this rural settlement. This influence 
is particularly noticeable in respect of the economic differentiation which exists between 
imizi and in the patterns of social difference in terms of umzi social structure. I argued 
that both these features severely constrain attempts to collectively and actively manage 
the common pool natural resources in Gwaben i, because people's incentives for 
engaging in such management differ widely. 
The following chapter examines how the orientation of individual people and of imizi 
(i.e. whether they are predominantly urban or rural focussed) impacts on the interest, 
incentives and commitment of people to collective resource management. It also 
analyses the attempts that have been made to deal collectively with the issues of 
resource degradation and decline in Gwabeni. 
34 One elderly (female) pensioner, when asked whether fencing the arable and grazing lands 
would be a useful start in addressing problems of soil erosion, overgrazing and the lack of arable 
production in the village, replied 'Is there any point to [us] fencing in all the dongas?' By contrast to this, 
a number of younger respondents (both male and female), who are as well aware as the pensioner of 
the fact that the provision of fencing materials is fully subsidised by the Department of Agriculture and 
that, in line with the long-standing tradition of the area, several local people could gain temporary 
employment on a fencing project, are far more enthusiastic about 'fencing in the dongas.' 
Introduction 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
Rural-urban Interdependence and Local Attempts at 
Managing Natural Resources 
The previous chapter described the social and economic differentiation prevalent at 
umzi level in Gwabeni which, I argued, generally undermined collective resource 
management activities. This chapter examines another factor which, while more 
ambiguous in its effects, tends to have the same impact on these activities . This factor 
is the (medium to long-term) residential and economic orientation of individual people 
and of imizi in the village. People's perceptions of their individual and collective 
futures, particularly whether they are likely to be 'full-time' residents of Gwabeni in the 
medium to long-term, affects the interest and commitment shown by individuals and 
imizi to the collective management of natural resources in the village. This chapter 
looks specifically at a recently-initiated attempt by a group of Gwabeni people resident 
in an urban centre, with the support of some people resident in Gwabeni , to adapt their 
settlement pattern to a more post-agrarian lifestyle, and to deal collectively with the 
issues of resource degradation and management in one section of the village. 
1. Rural-urban interdependence 
There is a tendency for many of the people who are resident in Gwabeni to be far more 
urban-focussed than rural-focussed in their orientation and interests. One reason for 
this is that their umzi incomes originate from sources almost exclusively outside the 
village: pensions, which play the central role in the local economy, 'arrive' in the village 
quite dramatically (with heavily armed guards) from Bisho on a bimonthly basis, giving 
rise to a flurry of commercial activity.1 Remittances from urban-based kin, on which 
'marginal' imizi are at times entirely dependent, keep people's attention focussed 
squarely on the circumstances and events affecting their relatives in urban centres. 
1 Some people have their pension paid into their bank account in Peddie. 
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Indeed, over the past three decades or more, people from Gwabeni have made 
significant economic investments, especially in housing, and social investments, in 
networks of support and reciprocity (crucial for childcare, education and for securing 
increasingly scarce employment), in urban areas that have kept their attention firmly 
focussed there2 Forty-five per cent of the imizi in the village own a house in a town or 
city elsewhere, with Port Elizabeth being the most popular urban centre 3 
Urban-based people have found, however, that an urban-centred lifestyle also means 
being exposed to increased economic risk: certain socio-economic categories of the 
urban-based Gwabeni people (especially those in unskilled jobs) are particularly 
vulnerable to the retrenchments, evictions and the hardships associated with apartheid 
policies and periodic downswings in the national and regional economy. To counteract 
these uncertainties, and to give themselves a cushion in the event of unforeseen 
economic setbacks, many urban-based people continue to retain some ties with their 
rural village of origin. By doing so, they are hedging their bets in a way that is accepted 
by those people resident in the village as a legitimate method of spreading the inherent 
risks of urban life. Bank (1995:19) refers to similar motives among hostel dwellers, who 
originate from the Transkei, living in Duncan Village, East London. The motivation of 
these people is not uniform and not purely economic: I would argue that the social 
significance of being able to claim membership of an umzi in the rural village is also an 
important consideration as a source of identity, status and social continuity for those 
in the socially and economically insecure and ephemeral environment of the city or 
town (see Bank 1995:17)4 
Some urban-based people retain this foothold in Gwabeni by maintaining the physical 
2 This tendency to invest more of their financial resources in urban areas, rather than in rural 
activities such as agriculture, partially accounts for the decline in arable agriculture in the village. 
Madoda's case, discussed in Chapter Six, is an example of a person (and his family) making a choice to 
reside and invest the majority of their resources in an urban centre. 
3 Twenty (30 per cent) imizi in Gwabeni owned a house in Port Elizabeth. 
4 Although it was beyond the scope of this study to visit Gwabeni people in urban centres, my 
'view from the village' data suggest that the mobilisation of kinship ties and social networks that have 
their basis in the social structure of the rural village, are often as important for co-operation aimed at 
economic advancement between urban-based people in the urban setting as they are for the fostering 
of the rural-urban ties that both underwrites the rural economy and render life in the city meaningful in 
the long-term for the migrant. 
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structure of their (sometimes) wholly uninhabited imizi of origin and through their very 
occasional visits to the village, often to conduct rituals. Even though it lacks 
infrastructural services, the social, economic and natural resources of Gwabeni to 
which the effectively urbanised can still claim rights of access, act as incentives for the 
maintenance of the ties with the village. To many urban-based people, especially men, 
the village represents a potential place of retirement, and maintaining one's umzi in 
terms of the physical resources and meeting a minimum of kinship and ritual 
requirements expected of a member of the village,S is a sensible way of investing in 
one's retirement. 
For men who have spent twenty or more years as migrants in an urban centre, the 
village represent a return to their rural roots and to their role as owners of livestock and 
as heads of rural imizi (see Bank 1995:19).6 Unlike conditions in the urban 
environment, village life still affords senior men a measure of respect from the youth 
and, despite their sometimes patchy understanding of local and more recent village 
affairs, these senior men are able to contribute to, if not to dominate, the discussion at 
village meetings. One elderly man, echoing the sentiments of many informants told me 
that, despite the hardships of village life, he enjoys life in Gwabeni because of the 
"absence of crime and because we do not bury young people here." 
The urban-based person who invests in livestock in his rural village of origin is 
exploiting an economic opportunity available to him by virtue of his kinship ties and thus 
his continued recognition as a member of the village, despite (in some cases) his 
prolonged absence from the village. It is important to note, however, that villagers have 
definite (if not uniform) notions of a social universe with regard to which category of 
S There is no consensus among my various informants on what these 'minimum requirements' 
might be. Some people say they include at least one annual visit to the village (Christmas or Easter 
time), financial contributions to, and presence at, the rituals and other social events of patrilineal kin, at 
least occasional remittances in cash or kind and investment in livestock for the umzi. Assistance (in the 
form of accomodation and board) to Gwabeni-based kin who visit the urban centre in search of work or 
on other business is also mentioned. Other informants say that nothing is expected of a person, IT is 
enough that they themselves still identify with the village. 
6 When I asked one elderly man, who is in poor health, why he continues to reside in the village 
when all his family, who could take care of him, are in Port Elizabeth, his reply was, "Who will look after 
my house? My goats and chickens? I have wasted a lot of money building up this house. The roof has 
blown off three times and I have had it repaired everytime. How can I leave now?" 
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individual may exploit local resources in this fashion.7 Securing access to common pool 
natural resources requires membership of an established agnatic cluster or lineage in 
the village, or recognised membership of the village 'community' as a more recently 
settled umzi. 
In terms of the flow of resources between rural and urban areas, cash transfers in the 
form of remittances are clearly expected, if not always forthcoming, from urban-based 
workers who leave their school-going children in the care of the laUers' grandparents 
or other kin in the village. The fact that one's parents are recipients of state old age 
pensions relieves one of some of the pressure of having to provide for the primary 
education of one's children in Gwabeni. Once these children reach secondary school 
level, kinship ties in other centres (Gwabeni having no secondary school) have to be 
mobilised to offset the financial burden this phase of education poses. 
Of course, the maintenance of social ties of kinship and ritual between urban base and 
rural village is not only to the advantage of those in the urban centres: the people who 
are resident in Gwabeni also gain economically and in terms of status by maintaining 
strong ties with their urban kin, especially where these kin are economically successful. 
Even though many older people in Gwabeni complain that their (employed) children are 
not remitting as reliably as they themselves did in the same situation years before, it 
is clear that substantial transfers, often in kind, are taking place from urban to rural 
areas. These transfers include fumiture, building materials, rainwater tanks as well as 
cash contributions for the purchase of livestock, food and liquor when rituals and other 
ceremonies (such as graduation parties) are conducted by a particular umzi or agnatic 
cluster. 
More recently, the increase in the value of old age pensions and the promise of 
infrastructural improvements in rural areas more generally, has coincided with 
increased investments and support from younger, urban-based residents for the 
construction of rural housing in Gwabeni. Since 1994, this phenomenon has led to the 
7 What is glaringly absent are the institutional mechanisms to enforce the exclusion of the 
people (and their livestock) who are outside this social universe. 
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start of a new settlement on the Outspan sites and substantial improvements and 
additions to a large proportion of imizi in the other sections. 8 
With regard to the management of natural resources, it is significant that all of the 451 
people who are absent from the village are regarded as bona fide members9 of the 
village, with all the rights of access to available common pool resources that this 
entails. For the young, urban-based man, future identification with and residence in the 
village often rests on whether he stands to inherit the umzi and the arable land of his 
father, whether he is planning to build a house in Gwabeni or whether he would prefer 
to establish himself in an urban centre. I asked an unemployed man in his mid-forties, 
whose children and their mother are in Port Elizabeth, why he resides in the village. His 
reply was, "There is no work in Port Elizabeth, whereas here I can sometimes find some 
'jobs'. I am the omkhulu (first-born son) here and my father is sick, so I should be here 
to help the people of this place." 
These decisions about residential preference'o are influenced, inter alia, by a man's 
immediate and long-term career prospects in the urban area. However, in a situation 
where he does not stand to inherit his father's umzi and chooses not to establish his 
own umzi in the village, he is still entitled to return to the village and to take up 
residence at some future time. He is free, if he has the financial means, to purchase 
livestock and to make use of the communal grazing in the village. The other natural 
resources available on the commons are also at his disposal. 
Since arable agriculture is deemed to be economically unviable in Gwabeni, the fact 
that there is no arable land available which can be allocated to him, should not 
8 I would argue that this particular move is symptomatic of a wider phenomenon of younger, 
urban-based people beginning to consider the merits of establishing a rural home of their own that will 
complement their urban lifestyle. For this reason, I disagree with Palmer's (1997:309) assertion that 'in 
the face of population aging and continuing urbanisation in communities like Gwabeni, the threat to the 
environment has to be a constantly diminishing one.' On the contrary, the 'threat' of degradation to most 
natural resources in these modified communal areas is likely to remain as real as ever. 
9 In theory at least, although the return of some of those who have been away and who have 
not maintained contact with those in the village, might not be greeted with equal enthusiasm. 
'0 It is not only about residential preference, of course, but crucially about where a man will 
direct both his economic resources and his social resources, in terms of attending meetings and 
supporting the work of local institutions in making a contribution to the development of the village. 
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adversely affect his economic well-being . In Gwabeni, however, having access to an 
arable field, which may have been allocated to or 'be in the name' of one's father or 
one's father's father, is a powerful confirmation of one's claim to membership of the 
village. 
The case of Mzukisi S. 
Mzukisi is a forty-four year old unmarried man who grew up in Port Elizabeth. 
Mzukisi previously lived and worked in Port Elizabeth, where he was employed 
on the railways. His five children and their mother still live in Port Elizabeth, and 
he visits them when he can. In Port Elizabeth, he first stayed in the house owned 
by his father, before buying his own house, in which his family now live. When 
Mzukisi was retrenched from the railways, he returned to Gwabeni where he 
occupied a 'flat' attached to the umzi of his father. 
The fact that both of his parents are recipients of state old age pensions means 
that, upon his return to the village, he was not in danger of being left destitute. 
While awaiting news of work opportunities in Port Elizabeth, he spends his time 
socialising at the Breakfastvlei Hotel, hunting and doing piecemeal 'jobs' for 
people around the village, such as digging pit-latrines, repairing cattle kraals, and 
doing some building alterations. He was employed for the two month duration of 
a recent government-sponsored fencing project, which involved teams of workers 
replacing the perimeter fence around the northern boundary of the village 
bordering the Peddie-Committees Drift road. Mzukisi does not own any livestock 
nor does he assist in looking after those of his elderly father. The livestock are 
tended instead by the nine year old son of Mzukisi's younger brother. The latter 
is based in Port Elizabeth and has taken over their father's house there. 
Since the umzi is not involved in any cultivation, Mzukisi does not take any active 
part in such activities either and he seems set to join the ranks of able-bodied but 
chronically unemployed men in the village. These men are accused by the women 
in the village of being layabouts who spend their time 'drinking all the money' of 
their respective imizi." 
11 Ironically, Mzukisi's fairly gloomy economic prospects may have improved as a result of a 
cruel misfortune: during a drunken altercation with a fellow villager at the Hotel, the latter hit Mzukisi 
against the head with a chair, severely damaging his left eye, and resulting in it having to be removed 
surgically. Two weeks later, after his initial shock had subsided, but still in considerable physical 
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For an unmarried, separated or widowed woman who may return to the village, the 
same modus operandi for settling in the village applied. Either with or without her 
children, she could reside in the umzi of her father, or of her deceased husband, or she 
could request a residential site from the Residents' Association to establish her own 
umzi in the village. 
The case of Nosimo M : 
Nosimo (38), an unmarried mother, left both of her children with her elder sister 
Port Elizabeth in 1989, and went to work as a stylist in a hair salon in Carletonville 
for nearly four years.12 In 1993, she returned to Gwabeni and her ten year old 
daughter joined her here. Her 16 year old son continued to reside with Nosimo's 
sister in Port Elizabeth. Upon her arrival in the village, she took up residence in 
the unoccupied umzi of her deceased parents. Her daughter attends the primary 
school in the village. Nosimo is, in theory, permitted to make use of her 
deceased father's arable land, since she has no brothers who would have prior 
claim to the land. However, no cultivation of these fields in Bhobho section has 
taken place in the past two decades and even if Nosimo wanted to cultivate here, 
she does not have the resources to fence the land and pay for it to be ploughed 
and sown. 
Nosimo supports herself and her daughter by styling people's hair in the village, 
through the occasional buying and selling of fruit and through sporadic 
employment on government-sponsored village work team projects. She also 
receives maintenance support for her children from their father, who lives in Port 
Elizabeth, and her elder sister in Port Elizabeth sometimes sends her money. 
Her relationship with one of the men in the village does not benefit her 
economically, as this man has no regular income and is not able to provide for 
her and her daughter. Nosimo, whose father had been a headman in Gwabeni 
discomfort, Mzukisi stoically assured me that not only would he be getting a replacement glass eye, but 
that his prospects of receiving a state disability grant as a result of this accident are fairly strong (I 
personally doubt this to be the case in the present administrative climate in the province). While 
procuring such a grant from the state would probably involve a great deal of bureaucratic red tape and 
would by no means make him a rich man, Mzukisi feels that his financial future is nevertheless 
practically secured, and unlike many other men of his age in the village, he will be assured of a regular, 
reliable and independent income. 
12 She told me she left Port Elizabeth to get away from the father of her two children, who 
resided in the house next door to her sister. 
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in the past, serves as the (unpaid) secretary on the Residents' Association 
committee in the village. 
For both individual women and men, the attraction that the rural umzi and village might 
hold for them, differs according to their personal and economic circumstances and 
responsibilities and the circumstances that prevail in the rural umzi itself. In Mzukisi's 
case, returning to the village was made easier by the established presence of his 
parents in the village and their regular income from state pensions. For Nosimo, trying 
to make ends meet in the village is still proving to be a daily struggle. 
Table 7.1. Absentee members of Gwabeni imizi 
NO. OF IMIZI NO. OF PEOPLE ABSENT PER UMZI 
5 less than 3 
9 3 
7 4 
3 5 
11 6 
6 7 
7 8 
6 9 
2 10 
6 11 
5 12 or more 
Table 7.1. gives an indication of the number of people absent from imizi in Gwabeni.13 
I found that sixty-nine per cent of the imizi in the village have five or more members who 
are absent from the village. Given that the average umzi size in Gwabeni is 3,4 people, 
it is clear that 64 per cent of what is considered by residents to be the bona fide village 
13 Palmer (1997:13) refers to this as the 'extensive diaspora' of Gwabeni people. De Wet and 
Holbrook (1997) speak of the 'regionalisation of the umzi.' 
192 
population, is absent from the village." 
There is a heavy concentration of people with ties to Gwabeni in Port Elizabeth. Fifty-
three per cent of the absent members of imizi in village are in the Port Elizabeth 
metropole.15 In all , a total 56 (or 84 per cent) imizi in the village have at least one of its 
members resident in Port Elizabeth. This means that only 11 (16 per cent) imizi have 
no absentee members in the Port Elizabeth metropole. Of these, two have members 
who retired to Gwabeni after working in Port Elizabeth for long periods. The remaining 
nine imizi show a marked orientation towards the East London and King Williams Town 
metropoles and hinterland.'6 
It is interesting to note however, that in only 11 of the 56 imizi with absentee members 
in Port El izabeth, are all of these absentee members resident in Port Elizabeth. The 
remaining 45 (67 per cent) imizi have members in between one and five cities, towns 
or villages other than Port Elizabeth, with a mean of three different locations. Imizi A 
and B are examples of this phenomenon. Table 7.2. overleaf shows that Umzi A has 
five members who are resident in Gwabeni and a further 13 members who are resident 
in six other places. 
14 The issue of 'absence' from the village is problematic, given the high degree of movement 
between rural and urban areas. My own definition of a person who can be considered to be absent from 
the village is one who spends less than 30 days per calendar year in the village. Although the 
ci rcumstances that affect people's fortunes are constantly changing, thus giving rise to changes in 
residence, my sense is that the overall size of Gwabeni's population remained fairly constant over the 
research period, even though I don't have exact figures to prove this. 
15 Here the Port Elizabeth metropole includes Uitenhage and the 'townships' associated with 
these two urban centres. 
16 These nine imizi also have a high correlation between th eir orientation towards the East 
London metropole (which is taken to include Mdantsane) and their places of origin, i.e. from the farms 
north of Gwabeni. 
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Table 7.2. The dispersion of Umzi A. 
PLACE OF RESIDENCE NO. OF MEMBERS IN .... 
Gwabeni 5 
Port Elizabeth 8 
Johannesburg 1 
Victoria West 1 
Aliwal North 1 
Alice 1 
Mdantsane 1 
Total 18 
Table 7.3. The dispersion of Umzi B. 
PLACE OF RESIDENCE NO. OF MEMBERS IN .... 
Gwabeni 6 
Port Elizabeth 3 
Cape Town 3 
Grahamstown 2 
Dimbaza 2 
Peddie town 1 
Total 17 
Table 7.3. shows that of the total of 17 members in Umzi S, only six are resident in 
Gwabeni. The phenomenon of having umzi members dispersed over a wide area is 
evidence of people's attempts to achieve a measure of financial security wherever it is 
to be found. The dispersion of umzi members is thus essentially a risk-minimisation 
strategy on the part ot these imizi, since it provides a cushioning effect in an 
economically insecure environment: should a member of the umzi lose their job in one 
locality, his or her offspring and any other dependants can be moved to another 
locality, where another member of the umzi has a more reliable income and could 
support, even temporarily, these dependent people, at least until the first 'breadwinner' 
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has managed to secure a new source of income. 
Many imizi in the village adopt this strategy, with the rural base in Gwabeni a popular 
site for the deposition of young children who can safely attend the local creche or 
primary school. This pattern is followed irrespective of the position of the Gwabeni-
based members of imizi in the development cycle (i.e. they may be one's younger, 
unmarried sister or one's elderly parents), but is most common in those imizi with 
members who have reliable incomes, such as old age pensions or disability grants. 17 
The dilemma of where best to educate their children beyond primary school level rests, 
not surprisingly, on considerations of affordability and the perceived quality of 
education. Affordability is influ'enced by the presence of kinsmen and women resident 
in an educational centre, such as Alice or Port Elizabeth, in whose care children can 
be placed to offset the costs of accomodation and board. 
What I would argue then, is that the rural village of Gwabeni offers urban-based people 
particular benefits (and, of course, drawbacks). These benefits include the presence 
of resident kin (often with access to pensions) who can be called upon to care for one's 
young children, a safe and relatively crime-free environment and guaranteed free 
access to the natural resources of the village commons. The drawback is that village 
does lack several critical things, specifically employment opportunities, a reliable 
domestic water supply system, a secondary school and adequate health care facilities. 
What each umzi, with its particular circumstances and developmental needs at anyone 
time, tries to achieve, is to optimally exploit all the economic, social and natural 
resources at its disposal. 
How does the fact that Gwabeni offers a specific 'bundle' of resources - some of which 
may at times be socially and economically useful and profitable to exploit, but others 
of which, like those mentioned above, are either absent or unreliable - impact on the 
management of natural resources? I argue that, given the situation described above, 
17 Sharp (1994:76) working in Qwaqwa, identified a source of income that was reliable over 
time as being of critical importance in the reconstruction and maintenance of stability in domestic 
groups. In Gwabeni, pensions have taken on this role. 
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very few imizi are prepared to totally commit themselves, socially and economically, to 
a rural existence in Gwabeni. The ever-present need to retain social and economic 
flexibility, and the frequent mobility of individuals and imizi that are the expression of 
this flexibility, means that the people who are in Gwabeni at anyone time, may well lack 
the commitment to contribute to the ongoing management of the local natural 
resources. As they are not wholly dependent on a livelihood in Gwabeni, their individual 
incentives to spend time and effort engaging in discussions and projects around 
managing the natural resources of Gwabeni, is generally low, hence the generally poor 
attendance at residents' association general meetings. 18 
Of the absent umzi members, 28 per cent are scholars, most of whom are attending 
secondary schools. Nearly 8 per cent of the absentees consist of infants and students, 
while only 1,6 per cent are listed as old age pensioners. This means that just over 37 
per cent of the absentees are in the category of 'not economically active.' 
The data also indicate that some absent members of Gwabeni imizi, even though they 
have strong ties to the Port Elizabeth metropole, have managed to penetrate the Ciskei 
bantustan civil service and the increase in jobs that developed in this sector from the 
late 1970s. A total of 18 (four per cent) absent members are employed in the public 
service of the former Ciskei. 19 By contrast, 40 (nine per cent) absentee members of 
Gwabeni imizi hold similar positions in the public service outside the former Ciskei, 
predominantly in Port Elizabeth, but also in Johannesburg, Cape Town and East 
London. This brings to sixty-two the number of absent members employed in the civil 
service and, taken with the pensioners, 69 people (or 15,3 per cent of those absent 
from the village) who are being supported by salaries and other transfers from the 
state. 
Two other categories of absent members warrant attention, namely the 'married' (five 
per cent of the total absent members) and 'unemployed' (13,5 per cent) categories. 
18 Such low turn-outs are in contrast to the numbers of people at meetings when there is a hint 
of jobs being provided for local residents. 
19 Four others are employed in the civil service of the Transkei bantustan. 
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The first refers to the people (invariably women) who have taken up virilocal residence 
outside the village after marriage. These women are still considered to be members 
of their imizi of origin in Gwabeni. This is because it is expected that, if their marriages 
should fail or their husbands pass away, these women would be free to return to their 
imizi in Gwabeni with their offspring, and to reside there permanently. Alternatively, a 
woman can re-attach herself to the rural umzi, by sending her children there, while she 
continues to reside and work in the urban centre. Some informants claimed that their 
daughters are more reliable remitters and more likely to stay in contact with their 
consanguines (although not necessarily remit money to them), even when they have 
their own offspring and conjugal responsibilities in another town or city. It is perhaps 
for this reason that the heads of nineteen imizi in Gwabeni recorded a daughter who is 
married and living elsewhere as an absent member of his or her umzi. 
The high number of unemployed people who are absent from the village, suggests that 
these people prefer to remain in an urban area, again predominantly in Port Elizabeth, 
perhaps in the hope of securing employment there in due course. Of the 61 people 
absent and unemployed, 36 are females and 25 are males. Many of these people are 
young, in fact the mean age of this group is 32,3 years (the range is 16 years to 48 
years old) and, judging from the comments made by younger urban-based people 
visiting Gwabeni, the lack of facilities and the slow pace of life in the village does not 
appeal to them. 
One point of interest is that if all these unemployed people were to return to Gwabeni, 
the population of the village would increase by 27 per cent and the potential labour 
force in the village (i.e. the 'economically active' category of those present) would 
increase by 92 per cent. In theory, this would make more labour available for work 
teams to pursue natural resource management related activities, but in reality, the 
majority of these people would be highly unlikely to engage in such activities on a 
voluntary basis and their main impact on the available natural resources would be to 
increase the existing pressure on the finite natural resources of the village. In short, 
it makes ecological sense at least from the perspective of the village - and of course, 
economic sense to them - that they should continue to reside away from Gwabeni. 
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2. Voluntary resettlement on the Outspan sites 
For Gwabeni residents, and particularly for those people who are linked to imizi in 
Nqwebeba section, the allocation of residential sites on a section of the Breakfastvlei 
Outspan since 1995, has shifted the focus away from the circumstances of the existing 
imizi and is likely to affect the social and economic strategies that have been described 
for urban-based imizi above. In terms of the arrangements of the Outspan Sites 
Committee (OSC) in the Outspan section of the village, anyone from Tyefu Location or 
beyond, whose character can be vouched for by a resident of Gwabeni, is permitted to 
pay R100-00 for a site, and to set up their umzi on the Outspan Sites. Situated close 
to the shop at the Breakfastvlei Hotel and to the road, this area promises to make 
residing in, or visiting, the village more accessible and a more attractive proposition. 
The planning and development of a new village section, which has been driven by 
young men based in Port Elizabeth, represents a marked reorientation of the umzi and 
village section social dynamics in Gwabeni. It also exhibits all the multi-layered facets 
of the institutional struggles that have long characterised access to, and the 
management of, natural resources in Gwabeni and Tyefu Location. 
A short history of the Breakfastvlei Outspan 20 
The high-lying and relatively flat area situated to the north of Gwabeni and comprising 
a total of about 300 hectares, is known as the Breakfastvlei Outspan (see Map 4). 
People in Gwabeni claim all this land for the village, citing the need for grazing and 
(irrigated) arable land for local people. This contest over land dates back to the 
nineteenth century, when oxwagon travellers from the Colony used to pass through this 
area en route to destinations in the interior such as Fort Willshire, the site of the first 
trade fairs (1824-1830) between settlers and Xhosa-speakers. An outspan was 
established on the interfluvial ridge between the Fish and Keiskamma rivers, to span 
out the oxen to graze overnight, before the wagons set off to the north and east. 
20 The earliest reference I could find to the Breakfastvlei Outspan was a hand-drawn map, 
dated 12 April 1880. which indicated that a (northern) section had been added to the Outspan in 
December 1862. At the same time, the southernmost section of the Outspan was excised and added to 
Zulu's Fingo Location (Tyefu Location) . The same map indicates that Gwabeni imizi were resident on 
the section of the Outspan to the north of this excised part (Cory Library. Methodist Archives 
PR.3605/1). 
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Map 4 : The Breakfastvlei Outspan relative to the village sections in Gwabeni 
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Although they are vague about all the details of the case, informants in Gwabeni claim 
that their forefathers 'surrendered' their exclusive usufructary rights over this piece of 
land to the government when the latter requested it to formally establish an Outs pan 
for use by the travelling public in this area. They also argue that an agreement was 
reached at the time that made provision for the continued access of Gwabeni livestock 
to the grazing resources of the area, and some people continued to live adjacent to, 
and even on, the Outspan itself.21 
21 Informants can name several imizithat had resided on the Outspan itself. 
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An old male informant told me that, by the 1940s, the Outspan was 'enclosed by fences 
and out of bounds' to Gwabeni-owned livestock and the area was leased to a 
neighbouring white farmer on an annual basis. During the drought of the late 1940s, 
the farmer leasing the Outspan allowed the ploughing oxen of Gwabeni residents to 
'sleep on the Outspan as long as they were fetched very early in the morning' 
(presumably so as not to use too much of the grazing resources for which he was 
paying and also not to jeopardise his lease of the land). In this way, the Outspan land 
and its resources which, according to my informants, the residents of Gwabeni 
continued to regard as their own, was effectively lost to them. 
Gwabeni residents, anxious to have the problem of overcrowding in their village 
addressed, continued to make requests for additional land, specifically the Outspan 
land, to be given to them to meet the need for residential and grazing land. Instead, the 
government turned the area vacated by white farmers into a game reserve, proclairning 
a large section of the area the L. L Sebe Game Reserve in 1983, and in 1990, the Ciskei 
conservation authorities proceeded to erect a 'game fence' around the perimeter of the 
game reserve. In the process, several areas which had come to be regarded by 
neighbouring villages as part of their communal land, including a large section of the 
Breakfastvlei Outspan, were incorporated into the game reserve. 22 
Hostile relations ensued between the game reserve authorities and the residents in 
neighbouring villages. Only two portions of the Outspan (the first situated between 
Gwabeni and the Peddie-Committees Drift road and the second, a camp behind the 
Breakfastvlei Hotel) remain outside the game reserve and, once the white farmer 
renting the Outspan and the ranger had left the area (in 1982), this portion became the 
focus of unsanctioned resource extraction (mostly by way of grazing by livestock, the 
gathering of firewood, prickly pear and imifino, and some hunting) by Gwabeni people. 
Around 1988, the new owner of the Breakfastvlei Hotel began paying to rent the 
remaining Outspan camps and an adjacent fann for the purpose of grazing his livestock 
22 The villages that most affected in this way were Gwabeni, Qamnyana, Ndwayana and 
Glenmore. 
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there. As recounted in Chapter Five, he stopped paying rent for the land five years 
later, when it became clear that other livestock from the villages of Tyefu Location were 
also making use of the resources for which he alone was paying. 
The seemingly endless struggle over access to, and control of, natural resources in 
Tyefu Location, a central theme of this thesis, is what is again at issue here. Resource 
scarcity, in villages like Gwabeni, heightens the pressures on both the actual resources 
available in neighbouring areas and on the local institutions that attempt to manage the 
natural resources at village and location levels. In the case-study below, I analyse how, 
despite long-standing calls from local residents for the restitution of the Outspan land 
to the people of Gwabeni, specifically for grazing and irrigated cultivation purposes, the 
changed socio-economic circumstances, and the weakness of local resource managing 
institutions, has given a small group of relatively well-resourced, urban-based young 
men the opportunity to step in - to virtually ignore the existing local institutions - and to 
claim a portion of the Outspan (an area of about 65 hectares) for residential settlement, 
all in the name of 'the community of Gwabeni.' 
Attempts to Reclaim the Outspan 
Gwabeni residents, specifically the Mabhele imizi (whose arable lands abut the 
Outspan to the south and west, and some of whose imizi had previously been in this 
area), had wanted to move back to the plateau area of the Outspan since before the 
1960s.23 The idea to move to the Outspan area was given impetus by the degraded 
and eroded state of arable lands and gardens and the exhausted grazing and firewood 
resources at Nqwebeba, and the comparatively better state of the resources on the 
Outspan. 24 Earlier attempts to orchestrate a move back to the Outspan, some of them 
directed at Chief Alfred Nkebeza Msuthu, came to naught, although in 1957 the then 
Department of Native Affairs did consider taking over the Outspan as 'Trust' land, 
23 Decades before this, some of their Nkwayi clan 'forefathers' had moved to the lower village 
section of Nqwebeba in search of grazing, water and new residential sites. 
24 Informants blame residents from the neighbouring village of Qamnyana for using axes to 
chop down trees for firewood and, in the process, causing much of the deforestation that has occurred 
around Nqwebeba section, which is adjacent to Qamnyana (see Map 4). 
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presumably with a view to relieving the land shortage in Tyefu Location.25 
In the interim period, between these early efforts to reclaim the Outspan and the 
renewed calls for this during the late 1980s, a number of imizi gave up on the idea of 
moving to the Outspan and opted instead to relocate in Nala section. Still others left 
Gwabeni altogether and moved to other villages or to an urban centre. A key complaint 
of those residing at or visiting Nqwebeba section of the village was the distance of this 
area from the Peddie-Committees Drift road, and the steep hill that had to be 
negotiated from Nqwebeba to reach both this road and other sections of the village. 
The renewed attempt to reclaim the Outspan gained momentum in the late 1980s, 
under the leadership of a younger generation of men of the Mabhele and Mbhono 
lineages in the village. These men were all based in Port Elizabeth and wished to 
establish their rural imizi in a more accessible area of the village. Basing their campaign 
on the infrastructural upgrading and development of Gwabeni and, using the phrase 
'the Outspan is for our children and our children's children', they set about selling the 
idea of establishing new imizi on the Outspan sites to other working people based in 
Port Elizabeth. They emphasised the increased probability of services being provided 
by the government for imizi in a clustered settlement, rather than the scattered 
settlement pattern that characterises the villages of Tyefu Location. Adopting a 
discourse that stressed the virtues of arable production and which captured the desire 
of especially older people in the village, to return to the 'good old days' when people 
in Gwabeni enthusiastically ploughed, harvested and shared their plentiful crops, they 
also called for a locally managed process to re-apportion all the arable land in the 
village into equally sized portions, so that every umzi in Gwabeni could be given an 
allocation of arable land26 
The early opponents of their scheme were a few senior men with arable land and 
25 Referred to in Chapter Five (Cory Library, PR3929, Files of the PFFGA). 
26 Without dispelling the notion that they might have regarded arable production as one 
possible livelihood strategy for some Gwabeni imizi in the future , their call for the redistribution of arable 
land probably had more to do with wanting to garner the support of the many younger, landless imizi in 
the village, who wanted to strengthen their claim to membership of the village community. 
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livestock in the village who, given their established imizi in the village, were unlikely to 
be interested in resettling on the Outspan. They regarded the group trying to reclaim 
the Outspan as young upstarts and disparaged their settlement plan as evidence of a 
'township mentality.' They naturally saw the settlement plan as one which would 
impinge upon the already limited grazing resources available to Gwabeni livestock. In 
trying to oppose the development of the Outspan, some of these men adopted a 
'community' discourse of their own. Their 'community' was that of the whole Tyefu 
Location, where grazing had 'always' been available to all livestock owners.27 Their 
claim that people in other Tyefu Location villages were complaining to them about the 
prospect of relatively high quality communal grazing on the Outspan, to which they too 
had rights of use, being lost for good, could not be easily substantiated or refuted. 
They felt that the negative effect of the Outspan settlement on "all the people of Tyefu" 
should be sufficient reason to abandon the plan to resettle on the area. Not 
surprisingly, they rejected with contempt the calls made for the redistribution of arable 
land to landless imizi. 
Undeterred by this opposition, the young men started to lobby the Ciskei government 
in the late 1980s, with the request that the Outspan be transferred to the Gwabeni 
'community' for the purposes of residential settlement. . During 1990, institutional 
dissonance reached new lows in Tyefu Location: in Gwabeni, the residents, who were 
being mobilised by local SANCO activists, forced their African Democratic Movement-
aligned sub-headman to stand down in favour of a non-statutory, SANCO-aligned 
Residents' Association committee. This meant that the village had forfeit its 
representation in the Tyefu Tribal Authority. 
Shortly after the sub-headman had been pressured into standing down, a small group 
of Gwabeni residents from Nqwebeba section visited the headman from the 
neighbouring village of Qamnyana (under whose jurisdiction the village of Gwabeni still 
nominally fell) to enlist his support in reclaiming the Outspan. Opponents of the 
27 As one large livestock owner in Gwabeni told me, "we share all this grazing with the villages 
of Tyefu. Each village doesn't have enough grazing by rtself. People from other villages are complaining 
about the settlement on the Outspan. In the long run , there'll be no grazing land left at all, because of 
such settlements. In five years' time, they will all be coming back [here] with all the resources up there 
[on the Outspan] exhausted." 
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resettlement plan would later submit that neither the enlisting of the headman's help nor 
the subsequent trip to Bisho to press their claim to the Outspan land had been 
sanctioned by al/ the residents of the village. 
The delegation from Gwabeni, which included two Port Elizabeth-based men from 'old' 
Gwabeni lineages (one of them was a Mabhele) as well as Ndlovu - the enthusiastic but 
landless farmer - went to Bisho in 1990 and spoke to Chief D.M. Jongilanga about their 
plan. They claimed that by the time they had finished arguing their case, Jongilanga 
"knew all about the Outspan but was not prepared to act in the matter at all." Instead, 
the Gwabeni delegation was informed that the documents concerning claims and 
transactions in land for the area in question were in Cape Town and that nothing could 
be done to assist them at that. time. 
In 1992, however, word came via the headman in Qamnyana that the persistence of the 
'young men from Port Elizabeth' had paid off: the Ciskei government was prepared to 
look into the claim, but only in respect of that section of the Outspan which fell outside 
the Double Drift Game Reserve. 
Perhaps realising the potential difficulties of getting the support of all the imizi in 
Gwabeni, especially given that several influential imizi in Nala section had expressed 
their oppositon to their project, the 'young men' from Port Elizabeth enlisted the support 
of the Breakfastvlei Hotel owner. The latter no doubt saw the obvious benefits in having 
a new and potentially upwardly mobile village section established directly adjacent to 
his shop. 
A local chapter of the 'Outspan Sites Committee' (OSC) was duly established, 
consisting of 2 residents from Nqwebeba section and the owner of the Breakfastvlei 
Hotel. Both residents from Nqwebeba planned to move to the Outspan sites as soon 
as this became possible. The 'main' OSC comprised three men from Gwabeni lineages 
resident in Port Elizabeth. The local chapter of the committee later co-opted the elderly 
chairperson of SANCO-aligned Residents' Association (RA) in Gwabeni onto their 
(local) committee, even though this man (who lives alone) had recently relocated to 
r 
204 
Nala from Nqwebeba and is not planning to relocate to the Outspan 28 
The reasons for this co-option are not hard to fathom: firstly, the OSC needed to win 
over the support of the (RA) committee to avoid being seen as circumventing the 
established institutions in the village by creating entirely new and parallel structures in 
the new section. Secondly, in the absence of a sub-headman in the village, Gwabeni 
people no longer felt the need to defer to the Tribal Authority Office in Horton when 
allocating residential sites, and the SAN CO-aligned RA committee had taken over 
responsibility for doing this. Having the RA committee chairperson on the new 
committee would thus serve to legitimise the land allocations made by this committee. 
In June 1993, the Ciskei Department of Agriculture brought in bulldozers to clear this 
portion of the Outspan of trees, shrubs and aloe plants. They also laid out roads and 
surveyed and marked off sites. Although the OSC wanted the sites to be 10m x 10m, 
the Department of Agriculture staff convinced them that the available space was limited 
and instead 177 sites of 40m x 50m were measured and demarcated. These sites, the 
OSC decided, would cost R100-00 each and, although people were allowed to choose 
and provisionally register a site in their name, no building on a site was to be permitted 
until the sum was paid to the OSC in full. Significantly, though not surprisingly, some 
of the most ardent supporters of the move to the sites were women who had languished 
in imizi in the furthest reaches of the village, i.e. those from Nqwebeba section. 
Contesting rights of resource ownership and allocation on the Outspan sites 
The lineages that enjoyed most local political control in the past in Gwabeni are 
predominantly those grouped under the Khala clan: Lineages of this group had 
regularly supplied the headmen for the village in the past and the imizi of its members 
still occupy the most centrally situated village-section, called Nata. The village primary 
school and the new creche are also situated in Nala section, and the village meetings 
are held in this section. 
The dominant position of the Khala clan had been both numerically and politically (if 
28 His children are apparently interested in the Outspan sites development. 
205 
not spatially) counter-balanced in the past by members of other lineages, notably those 
who were members of the Nkwayi clan, a number of whose imizi occupied Nqwebeba 
village section, including several Mabhele families. As the wealthier Nqwebeba imizi 
moved away out this remote section from the late 1970s, networks of kinship and 
locality began to suffer: contact between those that had moved and those that remained 
in Nqwebeba became less frequent and the latter began to feel peripheral to the affairs 
of the village. 
The attempt to reclaim the Outspan was thus in part a response to the despair and 
apathy that the imizi that were left behind in Nqwebeba had begun to feel. It was 
particularly their absent members, that felt that something had to be done to counteract 
what they perceived to be the increasingly peripheral role of Nqwebeba residents in the 
affairs of Gwabeni .29 It also represents a rejuvenation of imizi and a renewed 
commitment (not least financial) to a rural way of life and to a village that had witnessed 
a considerable haemorrhage of imizi and individuals out of the area in the past few 
decades. 
By presenting what appeared to be a strong case for well-planned, 'community-driven' 
Betterment Planning,3D the OSC sent a clear signal to the authorities that they were 
awaiting the imminent supply of services like running water and electricity to the 
Outspan sites. Their claim was bolstered, they argued, by the existence of an electrical 
sub-station nearby which could supply the sites with power. Moreover, it was widely 
known that the official Ciskei National Water Plan (which has been adopted practically 
in toto by the Eastern Cape provincial government) shows that the government plans 
to build a water reservoir in the middle of the Outspan from where water will be 
supplied to several nearby villages. The OSC has also made known its plans to collect 
funds and to approach the government to assist them in the construction of a creche 
29 Even attending general village meetings, that are held in Nala section, that rarely start on 
time and that are frequently cancelled, involves considerable physical effort and opportunity costs for 
elderly Nqwebeba residents. The political mobilisation of the early 1990s resulted in a flurry of meetings 
which exacerbated this problem. 
30 The plan to voluntarily resettle in a compact, block-plan settlement on flat, high-lying ground, 
conveniently close to the main thoroughfare and to the hotel/shop, bore a startling resemblance to 
Betterment Planning . 
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and a school on the Outs pan. 
The first note of dissension from the village institutions concerned the legitimacy of the 
party that went to Bisho to claim the Outspan area. The following are some reasons 
given by various informants among the disaffected in the village for rejecting what this 
party did: 
(a) they had acted unilaterally in this matter, without a mandate from the majority of the people 
of the village, who were in fact, not even properly informed of the plan, 
(b) they had acted in cahoots with a neighbouring, ADM-aligned headman who was unpopular 
in Gwabeni and whose authority over the affairs of Gwabeni had been challenged, 
(c) by being satisfied with the grant of only a portion of the Outspan, i.e. that section which lay 
outside the game reserve, they had weakened the chance of claiming and securing the entire 
Outspan for the village, 
(d) that to convert the specified section of the Outs pan into an essentially residential area, would 
be to lose some of the best ploughing soil or, at very least, an area that was providing additional 
grazing and other resources to people in the village, 
(e) that the 'Outspan Sites Committee' had no legitimacy and absolutely no right to allocate and 
offer sites for sale (especially not to people from outside the village), because this represented 
an attempt to alienate the resources on the commons in favour of private ownership, 
(f) that plans to build a creche, school and clinic on the Outs pan would only duplicate and detract 
from the status of these under-resourced facilities in Nala section. In particular the consequences 
of this for the construction of a new creche in Nala section, which had been the subject of on-
going fund-raising and sporadic building efforts, was of concern to Nala section residents and, 
(g) that R100 for a residential site was ridiculously cheap, especially since this was "our 
grandfathers' prime ploughing land", which would now be sold to outsiders and thus be lost to 
"us, the true members of this community." 
Other reasons for opposing the Outspan settlement scheme, which have not been 
voiced publicly, include resentment over the fact that the Port Elizabeth-based Mabhele 
men ignored the SAN CO-aligned village structures and chose to negotiate only with the 
relevant officials in Bisho, and secondly, that the people settling on the Outspan are 
likely to be the first (and, more controversially, possibly the only) people in Gwabeni to 
benefit from provision of water and electricity, even though every umzi in the other 
(dispersed) sections of the village is in dire need of these services. Disgruntled 
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informants claim that people wanting to settle on the Outspan would remain largely 
urban-based, i.e. they are unlikely to live in the rural area on a permanent basis and, 
by implication, are undeserving of being prioritised in respect of the provision of 
services. The Residents' Association committee is adamant that should any 
infrastructural developments in fact take place in Gwabeni, these would have to be 
channelled through itself, since it is the legitimate and democratically elected structure 
for the whole village. The alleged response to this statement (which has since been 
denied vehemently by informants on the Outs pan) is that the people on the Outspan 
sites no longer regard themselves as part of Gwabeni and have named the new 
settlement Phakama (Stand up I). 
Because the key players who initiated the reclaiming of the Outspan are based in Port 
Elizabeth, the local OSC has to negotiate its way around these criticisms. This it does 
by deftly deflecting any difficult questions to the Port Elizabeth-based committee, where 
delays of time and distance rob them of their context, substance and urgency. Since 
the local OSC is not recognised by the Khala-dominated Residents' Association in the 
village, no real dialogue between the parties concerning the objections to the scheme 
is, in fact, possible. 
However, when the Residents' Association committee sent a written request to the OSC 
- which it claims not to recognise - asking that the monies collected through the sale of 
Outspan sites be made available to ensure the completion of the new creche in Khala 
section, no formal response was forthcoming. Apparently, the OSC felt that it cannot 
make such a decision and would have to call a meeting of "Gwabeni people in Port 
Elizabeth" (to be organised by the emigrant section of the OSC) to discuss the request. 
After a long delay, the word came back that the OSC would not hand over any of the 
monies collected through the sale of sites, because this money is needed to develop 
facilities on the sites themselves, not in Nala section. 
For nearly a year (from early 1994), tensions have simmered in the village over the 
proposed move to the Outspan. The 'roads' cleared and sites marked by the bulldozers 
have been in danger of being hidden by the regrowth of weeds and grasses in the area. 
Mr.G (whose one Port Elizabeth-based son was part of the delegation to Bisho) has 
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been a wholehearted supporter of the plan to move to the Outspan and he made the 
first move: to test the extent of local opposition to the scheme, he cleared the site he 
had purchased, erected a shack on it and instructed another one of his sons to live 
there. This young man spent about five anxiety-filled months living alone on the 
Outspan, before other people, realising that he was not going to be forcibly evicted 
from the this area by the opponents of the settlement scheme, worked up the courage 
to begin establishing their imizi there as well. The second umzi which established a 
presence on the Outspan is that of a Mr. Gd, who recently fell foul of the RA committee 
for irregularities that arose during a fencing project around the village and who 
consequently seemed keen to escape from his detractors in New Brighton sectional 
By May 1995, there were three imizi established on the Outspan sites. Mr. G and his 
family moved in a 'corrugated' shack, while he paid to have a three-room house built 
nearby. He is still planning to extend the house to six rooms in time, each with its own 
entrance, so that each of his six unmarried sons can have one room. The three imizi 
have all fenced their sites and planted vegetable gardens. Mr.G has planted peas and 
tomatoes, both of which are doing well. He has constructed a kraal for his livestock and 
is building a chicken run for his wife. Water remains a problem and his wife has to 
collect water from the stagnant pond on the Outspan. 
Slowly, the resistance from the main body of imizi in the remaining three village 
sections was being pared down to a few individuals. Although the sale of sites on the 
Outspan was initially boycotted by Nala section members and their allies, it has 
emerged that some of these people are, in fact, purchasing sites on the Outspan, but 
31 Mr. Gd.'s daughter secured a job as an 'assistant' (some informants sarcastically claimed 
that 'the job came with strings attached') to the fencing contractor/supervisor during a recent fencing 
project which employed Gwabeni people. At the root of the subsequent controversy, was the fact that 
her job did not form part of the formal negotiations that had been entered into between the village and 
the contractor (nor any part of discussions among village residents) concerning which people qualified 
for, and which imiziwere in line to benefit from, the jobs on offer. The project ended prematurely and, 
with the work incomplete, the Gwabeni workteam was paid off. Mr.Gd's daughter, however, continued 
to be employed on the project and to draw a wage. Then the contractor allowed Mr. Gd, an imfiki 
(relative newcomer to the village), to appropriate the redundant fencing that had been replaced along 
the road near Gwabeni. Local people expected him to hand it over to the RA committee in the village, 
but he refused to do so. Mr.Gd remained defiant until at a subsequent village meeting he received a 
comprehensive dressing down from several senior (Khala) men and was informed that unless he 
returned the fencing, he would be ostracised from the village (specifically, that people would no longer 
attend his rituals). At this, he relented and relinquished the fencing. Anger over the informal way in 
which his daughter had been employed, and the fencing material continued to smoulder in the village. 
209 
they claim to be doing so at the behest and in the name of their Port Elizabeth-based 
(adult) children . That they too are purchasing sites might be enough to thwart any 
concerted local opposition towards the scheme, but added to it is the fact that 
unemployed Khala (and other) men taking on 'jobs' clearing and fencing sites 
purchased by other imizi on the Outspan. Some of these men, who were previously 
voicing some of the most vehement opposition to the Outspan settlement, have been 
hired to build houses on the sites. The men from Nala section charge R300 to erect 
fencing around the two Outspan sites which several people have opted to purchase. 
Of course, it is impossible for them to both maintain their opposition to the Outspan 
settlement and to seek employment from those who are establishing their imizi there. 
In late 1995, an attempt was made to quell any remaining dissent by encouraging local 
people to purchase the 'remaining sites', lest they be taken by outsiders. The OSC 
made it known that the residents of Gwabeni had now been given sufficient opportunity 
to acquire prime sites on the Outspan, and it was consequently throwing open the 
purchase of Outspan sites to people from other villages in Tyefu Location. A few 
outsiders have been attracted by the rumours of imminent infrastructural provision in 
the area and have apparently bought sites. This move has been met with indignation 
by some of the RA committee in the village, but seemed to have the desired effect: a 
number of those people who oppose the Outspan settlement scheme have relented and 
bought sites there. By December 1996, over thirty sites had been purchased and ten 
sites were already occupied, all of them by people from Gwabeni imizi.32 Several 
impressive houses had been constructed, indicative of the significant investments 
people are prepared to make in this new area. Meetings of the owners of Outspan sites, 
unlike the meetings held in Nala section, register maximum and enthusiastic 
attendance by the Outspan residents or site owners who are in the village or nearby. 
32 In December 1997, this number stands at 82 snes paid for partially or in full, with only five 
sites purchased by people outside Gwabeni. 
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Instituting operational rules for resource management on the Outspan 
Settlement of the Outspan is open to anyone in Peddie district. Some people from 
Ripplemead village on the Keiskamma River and others from Qamnyana are interested 
in purchasing sites. Meetings of Outspan residents take place at the Breakfastvlei 
Hotel. When someone applies to purchase a site, a meeting is called and the character 
of the applicant assessed by all the people already settled on the Outspan. Those who 
know the applicant personally may be asked to 'testify' in this regard. 
The emigrant section of the OSC has decided that no-one may purchase more than two 
sites, because this would be "unfair and would quickly take up all the available space 
on the Outspan if one person was allowed to buy it all ." It would also rob the younger 
people in the village of the opportunity to buy and develop their imizi on the Outspan 
sites in future. People who are keen to resume arable production are encouraged to 
buy two contiguous sites : one for their house and one for the purpose of ploughing. 
Those who are content to have a garden needed only one plot. Mrs. Mabhele, a local 
OSC member, admitted in an interview that people could easily purchase more than 
two sites, because they are allowed to buy additional sites "in the names of their 
children", but she hopes that the OSC would be able to control any excessive 
concentration of sites by individuals. 
Another rule is that speculative buying of sites will not be tolerated. A site must be 
developed within three years of purchase. This is to prevent an "unfair" situation 
developing in which a person keen to retire to the sites cannot do so because some 
people are "sitting" on empty sites. The OSC would not confiscate such sites, but 
would communicate with the people involved to ascertain what problems they were 
experiencing that prevented them from building. If necessary, the OSC would pay their 
R100 back to them and put up the site up for resale. 
Buyers of sites are issued with a receipt for the money which they have paid to the 
OSC, but no title deeds are available which can be issued to people purchasing sites. 
Recognition of their continued ownership of their site(s) rests on the authority of the 
non-statutory OSC and the endorsement of this authority by other Outspan settlers. 
Mr.G is emphatic about this: 
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"Our committee makes rules for the people on the sites - the government does 
not come into it. There is no higher level of authority concerning residential issues 
here. The [RAJ committee in Gwabeni is not involved in our business here, even 
though we are still under them. When we have service-related problems, maybe 
with our roads or water supply, we send two people to Bisho to ask for help there. 
The government has asked for a map of the Outspan sites and has promised to 
help us." 
I interviewed some of the local OSC members to hear about their longer-term planning 
and what their approach to potential future problems on the Site entails, particularly in 
view of some of the resource management problems that are prevalent in Gwabeni 
itself. They seem vague on the details of several key issues, and there is a tendency 
either to defer to the Port Elizabeth section of the OSC for the making of regulations, 
or to say that "except for the selling of sites, we will do things [i.e. manage our 
resources] as they have always been done in Tyefu Location." Some of the issues that 
are of concern are discussed below. 
Although the ruling that no-one can commence building their new umzi until they have 
paid the R100 purchase price in full is clear, the exact rights that they are paying for 
are not spelt out. It is unclear, for example, whether any conditions of purchase exist 
which govem whether people are allowed to sell their sites, or subdivisions thereof in 
future - and whether they may only sell to buyers who have the approval of the OSC -
or what rules of inheritance and of alienation would apply in the event of a site owner's 
prolonged absence from the area, i.e. is the tenure system applicable to the sites 
essentially one of freehold or a more conditional form of tenure? 
Another area of concern is that no restrictions are placed on the number of livestock 
that site owners may bring into the area. The reasoning is that people have the right 
to own as many livestock as they wish to, and that all livestock will be able to make use 
of all the grazing resources ordinarily available to Gwabeni (and by extension, Tyefu 
Location) residents. This arrangement is fine for existing Gwabeni imizi which are 
unlikely to see a marked increase in their livestock numbers when they move to the 
Outspan sites, but with the outsider imizi that may settle on the Outspan the situation 
is different: if any of these imizi are livestock owners (from outside Tyefu Location), they 
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will be increasing the pressure on the grazing resources around GwabenL Similarly, 
the increased number and concentration of people in the area, is likely to have an 
effect on the availability of other natural resources, such as firewood, water and 
wilderness resources, around the Outspan. 
One of the first resource management issues that the Port Elizabeth-based OSC 
confronted, was the excessive cutting down of trees when people clear their sites. The 
OSC felt that at least some trees should be kept on the Outspan, and a meeting was 
called to address the problem. At this meeting, all the people present readily agreed 
to stop cutting down trees on the Outspan. No mention was made of penalties that 
would be instituted against those who may subsequently be found cutting down trees, 
possibly because this would appear to be too authoritarian, and in any case, no-one 
has been given the responsibility of keeping a check on the number of trees on the 
sites. 
Another problem is that of people's livestock wandering onto the road nearby. The need 
for fencing this section of the sites has been broached, but the OSC does not yet have 
sufficient funds to erect fences, and this project will have to wait until more funds have 
been generated through the sale of sites. 
3. Conclusion 
This chapter documented the nature of rural-urban interdependence as it is 
experienced by Gwabeni residents. I argued that economic necessity has resulted in 
the fragmentation of imizi and the dispersal of dependents, in what has been described 
as the regionalisation of the household (De Wet and Holbrook 1997). With the 
investments in jobs, education and housing that Gwabeni people have made in a 
number of urban centres, notably Port Elizabeth, they have come to see their rural imizi 
in a different light : Gwabeni offers employed and urban-based people a particular 
'bundle' of benefits (and drawbacks) that may be useful to them at different stages of 
the development cycle or may be rejected entirely in favour of an urban-centred 
existence. The dependence of most imizi on both the rural and the urban sectors, and 
the constant movement of people between these sectors, draws people's attention 
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away from the problems which may be considered exclusive to the rural village setting, 
such as the management of natural resources. Very few individuals and imizi can afford 
to be committed to an exclusively rural existence, and consequently the transaction 
costs involved in collectively managing the natural resources of the village are 
disproportionately high in relation to the expected returns. 
The case study of the move to the Outs pan sites is a vivid example of how, what is 
regarded, by many residents of Gwabeni and of Tyefu Location, as part of the 
commons, has been excised from the whole commons under circumstances which 
throw some of the more dysfunctional aspects of natural resource management under 
modified communal tenure into sharp relief. Some of these issues are revisited below. 
The historical circumstances which led to the enclosure of Tyefu Location, and to a 
rapid increase in population, put enormous pressure on the natural resources of 
villages like Gwabeni. As a result, residents were forced to adopt whatever strategies 
they could to ameliorate the localised depletion of natural resources. One 'traditional' 
strategy they sought (and still seek) to emulate was to move their imizi away from areas 
in which the supply of resources had been (temporarily or permanently) exhausted. 
Given the finite area of land available to them, this strategy was really only likely to be 
successful in the short-term. 
When all other suitable areas in the village had been colonised, a generation of young 
men, who were employed in Port Elizabeth, decided to lobby for the return of the 
Breakfastvlei Outspan to the village. That they should even contemplate doing this 
independently and from an urban base, is indicative of a dilemma which continues to 
undermine resource management in Gwabeni and throughout Tyefu Location. This 
dilemma is that a large number of absent people have rights of access to resources -
by virtue of their claims to membership of Gwabeni imizi - and as joint 'owners' of the 
resources on the commons, have to be consulted (in theory, at least) before any 
decisions can be taken which could effect changes to the way these resources are 
allocated and managed. 
Although, in practice, this consultation may not happen, the perceived need to consult 
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them before resource management issues are discussed, has the effect of hamstringing 
the simplest of management regimes, because the body of people resident in the 
village at anyone time do not feel themselves sufficiently competent or authorised to 
take decisions which would affect those who are absent from the village. People in 
positions of leadership in Gwabeni give this as a cause of their inability to get several 
loca l initiatives going, as the following quote from one male informant shows, 
"The [Gwabeni) people living in Port Elizabeth, who voted there [in the 1995 local 
government elections) and will be on the voter's roll there, should have no rights 
in Gwabeni or any rural area. They can't have rights and citizenship everywhere. 
It is these people with jobs and money, who are a problem, because they can 
engineer things in their rural villages to suit them, even if it hurts those left behind 
[in the village]." 
This opinion is clearly not necessarily one that is shared by al l the residents. Another 
man present at the time, who had spent many years working in Port Elizabeth, 
disagreed with my informant, saying that some people who live in Port Elizabeth only 
do so because they work there, and should be able to mainta in all their rights in 
Gwabeni, including their right to be involved in community affairs. This is because 
"everything of theirs is still in Gwabeni" and it is only their jobs that keep them them 
away from the village. Such people, he argued, cannot be expected to give up their 
citizenship in Gwabeni . The problem is, as I have argued, that urban-based people 
have varying levels of commitment and interest in the affairs of the village. To allow the 
possibility of dissent that may emanate from this group to undermine the making of 
important decisions in the village, because they are "part of this community", is to say 
that many of these decisions wil l probably never to be made at village level. 
Even at those times, however, when a large number of absentee res idents are present 
in the village (for example, over the Christmas season), village meetings to discuss 
specific resource management issues are practically unheard of. This is not only 
because "people are too busy to have meetings", as some informants claim, but rather 
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it is because there is resistance from resident elite33 imizi, that appears to prevent the 
any discussion of serious 'community' matters at these times. These elite residents 
fear, perhaps, that the urban-based people will outwit them (as in the case of the 
Outspan sites), undermine their positions of power among the economically weaker, 
resident imizi, or simply misunderstand the local issues and be meddlesome. When I 
asked the first chairperson of the newly established Gwabeni Development Forum how 
and when Gwabeni people in Port Elizabeth would be informed about the Forum, he 
replied, 
"We still don't want them to know. Our reason is that they'll activate their own 
ideas there at Port Elizabeth. They don't qualify to be involved [yet], so when we 
are ready here, we'll delegate people to go to them. It's only then that we'll 
include them. If we let them confer there first before we get there, they'II ..... .. it 
will be a mess. Better we go to them [later]." 
On the other hand, unless they are as confident of their support base in Gwabeni as 
the young men from Nqwebeba who make up the Port Elizabeth section of the OSC 
are, many urban-based people returning to the village during holiday seasons are 
reluctant to be seen to be meddling in local affairs, the exact dynamics of which they 
may little understanding, in ways that could jeopardise their social ties with other imizi 
and people in the village. 
The Outspan case indicates, however, that people connected to Gwabeni imizi, both 
locally resident people and those based in an urban centre, are not all apathetic or 
inactive in the face of poverty and the social dislocation of life in the village (as some 
informants claim). On the contrary, people continue to actively strive to manipulate local 
conditions to their individual, and at times collective, advantage. In the case of the 
Outspan, even the local institutional dissonance has not derailed their project of 
relocation and development. The fact that women are permitted to purchase sites on 
the Outspan in their own right, is a welcome innovation to 'traditional' land rights in this 
area, in that it allows single women to acquire a bigger stake in land and resource 
33 I use the term 'elite' here only to indicate the imizi which, because of their economic 
resources, benefrt most, in terms of both resource use and social status, from the status quo resource 
management regime in the village and the location. 
-' 
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management issues, something that has been somewhat lacking in Gwabeni and in 
Tyefu Location. 34 
The considerable pitfalls in the way of successful natural resource management under 
a modified communal tenure regime in a confined area and in the absence of a effective 
resource management regime, await the Outspan settlers, however, when this new 
settlement almost inevitably reaches a stage when the overcrowding of people and 
livestock start to tell on the sites. As long as the institutions at the level of the village 
and the location remain weak, and the common pool resources around Gwabeni have 
to be shared with the residents of the ten other villages in Tyefu Location, the 
underlying causes of resource degradation are, unfortunately, most unlikely to be 
overcome by encroachments on neighbouring land like the move to the Outspan sites. 
34 As Palmer (1997:97,126) argues, this is evidence of the manner in which traditional gender 
roles in Gwabeni have been modified by decades of migrant labour practices, the payment of pensions 
to women, which affords them an independent income, and, of course, the post-agrarian rural lifestyle 
in Gwabeni , all of which undermine the traditional authority of senior men. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has examined how resource users in Tyefu Location, and in Gwabeni 
village in particular, mediate the effects of the wider political economy in the ways that 
they utilise, and to some extent, participate in the management of, the natural 
resources which are held under a system of modified communal tenure. 
A detailed examination of these issues is particularly pertinent at this time, because the 
most recent official government policy on the issue of (modified) communal tenure 
regimes, includes the explicit recognition and endorsement of the continued existence 
of these systems. In fact, these policies suggest that the interests of 'disadvantaged 
and poor communities' in rural areas may be best served by communal decision-making 
and resource-owning situations (Department of Land Affairs 1997:63-68).1 The data 
presented and the points that have been argued in th is thesis give a clearer idea of 
some of the long-term implications that modified communal tenure regimes, in their 
present form, are likely to have for the management of natural resources in these 
areas. 
In examining the issues of resource management and mismanagement in Tyefu 
Location, I have tried to avoid both the sweeping and sometimes speculative 
generalisations of political economy-type explanations - prevalent in much of the 
literature in the area of debates around agrarian reform - and (what I consider to be) 
the reactionary dismissal of modified communal tenure arrangements and resource use 
practices as being hamstrung by particular, antiquated cultural practices, and as 
inherently destructive of the natural resource base. 
I have not found either of these blanket explanations particularly helpful in advancing 
our understanding of the actual circumstances that prevail in Tyefu Location in respect 
of resource management. Specifically, blanket explanations of the workings of modified 
1 The Minister of Land Affairs, Mr. Derek Hanekom was, however, quoted in Business Day 
(10/12/1997) as saying that "some land reform projects were destined to fail and that government was 
trying to discourage the group purchase of land set aside for transfer." More controversially, the article 
went on to say that "individual ownership [of land] had proved to be the most efficient way of ensuring 
the sustainable transfer of land to black farmers ." 
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communal tenure regimes per se, are of no help in explaining the number and variety 
of ways in which people in these areas negotiate and contest access to natural 
resources. Nor do political economy-type explanations critically unpack the reasons 
why only some of the natural resources, as opposed to others, in this area are 
degraded to the considerable extent that they are at present, except at the expense of 
painting a picture of rural people as passive, weak and unable to exercise any control 
over their lives. 
I have thus made use of aspects of common property theory to analyse the nature of 
resource use and management patterns that are characteristic of the modified 
communal tenure system prevalent in Tyefu Location. In particular, I have found the 
emphasis on the nature and the role of local , resource-user institutions, and their 
relations with other institutions, notably the state, to be analytically useful. I have also 
found useful the theoretical interest in the causes and nature of institutional change 
over time, as well as the way in which the incentives of resource users and local 
institutions to engage in collective action aimed at resource management are constantly 
changing. 
I have, however, been critical of the tendency of common property models to rarify the 
common property systems they analyse, i.e. to make use of 'ideal type' systems, that 
work best 'on paper'. As others (Swallow 1996, Ng'weno 1996) have found in practice, 
property regimes which most resemble 'ideal' common property systems, always 
function in ways that are 'messy' and more flexible than the 'ideal' theoretical construct 
of a common property system. Similarly, I found that features of the modified communal 
tenure system in Tyefu Location do not always match the characteristics of the 'ideal 
type' of common property system which is at the centre of this theoretical model. 
Indeed, empirical studies of cases that resemble common property systems, suggest 
strongly that these systems are, in fact, highly susceptible to disruption from a number 
of quarters. These quarters include socia-economic, demographic, political, institutional 
and ecological change that undermine the individual incentives and abilities of people 
to contribute to collective resource management. In the absence of major institutional 
readjustments that can compensate adequately for these changes, such disruption 
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tends to move common pool resource use in the direction of 'open access.' 
In applying some of these analytical tools and insights to the modified communal tenure 
system of Tyefu Location, I have argued, firstly, that the latter is at least partially 
integrated into the national political economy of South Africa. As such, it does not exist 
as an equilibrial , static system, in which socio-economic homogeneity among imizi and 
a shared value system (or commonly held 'incentives') are the long-term norms that 
underpin strong local institutions, which in turn, co-ordinate natural resource allocation 
and management. On the contrary, the ongoing socio-economic and political change 
experienced in the location, the result of its incorporation into the colonial (and later, 
national) economy over the past 160 years, has resulted in a considerable degree of 
social and economic heterogeneity and has led to a divergence of the interests of local 
residents. 
Secondly, I demonstrate that the strong local institutions that are hypothesised as being 
a critical feature in the making, implementing and enforcing of resource management 
decisions in 'robust' common property systems, are practically absent in Tyefu 
Location. Even Lawry's (1990:406) minimum criterion for what constitutes a common 
property system - namely a situation where rules define (and are actively upheld in 
practice) who has access to resources on the commons, and by extension, who is 
excluded from using these resources (see Chapter One) - is not consistently met by the 
institutions that exist in the villages of Tyefu Location. 
Some of the difficulties of common property management in these circumstances are 
demonstrated by the problems experienced in managing some natural resources 
around Gwabeni , particularly grazing land. The management of grazing resources 
around the village is complicated by the fact that this resource is open for use by all the 
residents of Tyefu Location, most of whom are not in regular contact with each other. 
To manage the commonly-held grazing resources sustainably, i. e. monitor and assess 
rangeland condition, co-ordinate the numbers and movement of livestock around the 
area when required , and ensure that the livestock of outsiders is excluded, would 
require that at least two conditions are met. Firstly, the local institutions in each village 
would need to undertake some of these management tasks and to have the capacity 
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to co-operate closely with similar institutions in other Tyefu villages to fulfil these 
responsibilities. Secondly, all the villagers would need to have recourse to some higher 
authority (at the level of the location) to adjudicate in local disputes over management 
and (at the level of district) to enforce the rules of exclusion of the livestock of outsiders 
from the area. Both these conditions are not met at present in the management of 
grazing resources in Tyefu Location and this does not seem likely to change in the near 
future. 
So, does the current resource management regime in Tyefu Location constitute a 
common property system or not? I would argue that, if we accept that there is an 
'ideal' common property prototype (in which resource allocation and management meet 
with Ostrom's design principles2), with which the property regime in Tyefu Location can 
be compared, then the latter constitutes a weak common property system. This is, I 
argue, because there is a degree of exclusion of outsiders from the use of the natural 
resources, but the rules for the management of resources are practically non-existent. 
Common property theorists would argue that resource degradation is most likely to 
occur when the mechanisms for managing resources in common property systems 
break down. Part of my enquiry has been to develop an critical understanding of the 
possible causes of resource degradation (specifically, the absence and/or 
ineffectiveness of resource management practices) in Tyefu Location. The first area 
of critical interest is the agro-ecological nature of the resource base in the location. To 
summarise, this area is known to have climatic conditions that are adverse to dryland 
arable production and to be highly sensitive to soil erosion. I cited evidence for the 
argument that, if placed under continuous, heavy grazing pressure, the communal 
grazing resources in Tyefu Location are susceptible to deleterious vegetative 
transformation in the long-term. I also provided empirical evidence which unequivocally 
demonstrates that irreversible and deleterious transformation of a range of natural 
resources in this area has, in fact, occurred in the location. 
Clearly, the natural resources in Tyefu Location are susceptible to overuse (i.e 
2 See Chapter One. 
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depletion) and degradation, and all the more so, given the pressures that increased 
human population and livestock numbers have brought to bear on these resources. 
Given this scenario, a 'robust' and adaptable natural resource management regime 
would appear to be a minimum requirement in preventing resource depletion and 
degradation. The key analytical question then becomes why resource use and 
management regimes in the modified communal tenure villages of Tyefu Location are 
grossly inadequate or almost entirely absent. This is the question to which I provided 
some answers in the ethnographic chapters of the thesis. 
Another area of critical relevance in this regard is the historical context of land 
settlement and management that continues not only to exert an impact on people's 
access to land and natural resources, but also to affect their abil ity and inclination to 
participate in the management of these natural resources. I described how Mfengu 
people were resettled in Tyefu Location and then were progressively fenced in by the 
granting of white-owned farms. The resident population of Tyefu Location was 
augmented by natural increase and by people moving into the Location from 
neighbouring areas, with the result that overcrowding, of both people and livestock, and 
thus sustained pressure on natural resources, has been a feature of this area for over 
one hundred years. 
The state responded to the subsequent signs of resource degradation that emerged in 
the villages of Tyefu Location by pushing for the implementation of Betterment 
Planning, despite the fact that settlement rearrangement without the provision of more 
land for an increased population was unlikely to solve the problems of resource 
degradation. Betterment was vigorously resisted by the people of Tyefu Location, and 
in the process, issues of resource management, specifically any restrictions on the 
number of livestock on the communal grazing lands of the Location, became fiercely 
contested - a fact which has acted as a deterrent to people attempting to implement a 
locally endorsed grazing management regime in parts of, or across the whole of Tyefu 
Location. 
The long-standing practice of providing state remuneration for rural people to 
undertake local resource conservation and rehabilitation activities, has had the effect 
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of discouraging people from engaging in voluntary collective action in order to manage 
their resources. It also continues to suggest to the residents of Tyefu Location that the 
state is ultimately responsible for the management of natural resources in their villages, 
rather than they themselves, (and their local institutions) as resource users, accepting 
responsibility for the management of these resources. 
This leads to the question as to why local institutions, primarily the magistrate, the chief, 
the Tribal Authority, the headmen (and sub-headmen) and, since the early 1990s, the 
Residents' Associations at village level, have been unable or unwilling to institute 
resource management practices that are adapted to the particular, changing socio-
economic and political circumstances prevalent in Tyefu Location, and that might result 
in the more judicious use of the natural resources at the disposal of the residents of 
the Location. I showed how the nature of institutional authority in these villages, under 
a system in which the headman was paid by the state but was reliant on the support of 
both the magistrate and the villagers for the execution of his duties and his continued 
employment, was compromised. This gave rise to local interpretations of resource 
management regimes, the mediation of the official directives from the magistrate or 
Tribal Authority with the local, more acceptable and supposedly 'traditional' resource 
management practices. The result has been increased negotiation over, and thus 
flexibility of resource use, at location, village and village section levels. 
I also showed how the nature of rural administration has resulted in the duplication and 
erosion of authority and how the resulting 'dissonance' allowed (and still allows) 
villagers to contest and negotiate, or simply ignore, directives concerning the use and 
control of natural resources in their locality. In a situation where considerable numbers 
of people from neighbouring farms (together with their livestock) were settling in Tyefu 
Location and the interests of established residents were becoming increasingly 
heterogeneous, the lack of institutional regulation over natural resources seemed to 
suit many of the residents. Isolated attempts by various authorities to introduce 
resource conservation measures (such as the prohibition on the use of axes while 
gathering wood, which came from the Tribal Authority), were not only physically difficult 
to 'police', but also unpopular and unlikely to be heeded, given the increasing scarcity 
of certain local resources (i.e. the closest 'dry' wood might be several kilometres away 
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from one's umzl). As a result, these measures were unevenly implemented and 
frequently ignored, suggesting a lack of local institutional capacity and commitment to 
resource management measures. 
In addressing the issue of the apparent lack of local institutional capacity, I have been 
especially critical of the way in which state intervention into natural resource 
management has had the (mostly unintended) effect of undermining village and location 
level institutions concerned with these issues. In Chapter Four, I argued that outside 
intervention has had the effect of increasing the amount of 'institutional dissonance' in 
these villages, distracting the energies and attention of local institutions from the 
management·of the resources upon which many village residents relied. 
But even with this amount of 'dissonance' undermining local resource management 
efforts, the state cannot be accused of actually preventing the institutions and residents 
of Tyefu Location of mobilising around specific esource management problems. 
Clearly, a degree of incoherence in the collective ability or commitment of local people 
to address these problems, is part of the explanation for the inadequacy of resource 
management regimes in these villages. Stated differently, my argument is that the 
existence of 'insitutional dissonance' does not exonerate village residents from the 
collective responsibility - in the face of the visible degradation of the resources which 
many of them use daily - to attempt to mobilise themselves and to initiate local resource 
management and conservation regimes. This is especially so since 1994, when village 
Residents' Associations have enjoyed an institutional legitimacy that has been rare in 
Tyefu Location since the time of Chief Msuthu in the 1940s and 1950s. If collective 
efforts to manage resources at village and Location levels had been latent but stymied 
by the 'institutional dissonance' of the period before 1994, then one might have 
expected a flurry of measures aimed at implementing resource management regimes 
during the past three years. This has, however, not been the case. 
To account for why the present day circumstances in Tyefu Location do not lend 
themselves to collective attempts to manage natural resources, I analysed several 
factors which act as disincentives to collective action. These factors include the social 
structure of imizi in the villages of Tyefu Location (i.e. the predominance of elderly 
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people and children), that has a significant impact on the capacity of those resident in 
the village to actually contribute to collective resource management activities and to 
regulate resource extraction around the village. They also include the socio-economic 
heterogeneity prevalent at the level of the umzi in the village, particularly in respect of 
widely varying degrees of economic security or marginality. I found that access to 
pensions tends to act as an disincentive to participation in collective resource 
management endeavours. Moreover, differential ownership of livestock holdings, and 
of other possessions that decrease reliance on locally available natural resources, 
namely rainwater tanks, paraffin or gas stoves, makes for differentiated transaction 
costs in the organising and maintaining of resource management regimes. 
All these factors are significant, but possibly the primary cause of people's failure to 
engage in the collective management their resource base stems from what must be 
their most adaptive social and e90nomic strategy in the face of the inherent risks in 
both the rural and urban domains: the dispersion of the umzi. It is this factor which 
robs the village of decision-makers and, more importantly, robs those who remain in the 
village of the confidence and will to make and implement decisions. It results in the 
various members of imizi in the village having different (most often, urban-focussed) 
orientations and dissipates the human resources that might be used in managing 
natural resources. The result is that people in Gwabeni do not all have the same 
incentive to participate, as a group, in the collective management of their natural 
resources. 3 
The widespread change away from an agrarian to a post-agrarian rural lifestyle that 
people in these villages have adopted, was also found to have an effect on their 
willingness to co-operate with each other around issues of natural resource 
management. 
3 Peters (1994:7), in her analysis of common property grazing systems in Botswana, puts it very 
succintly : "Studies show that the reasons for the demise of [a] commons ....... lie ..... .. in historically 
specific conditions that include the effect of the state's claiming authority over locally managed 
resources, the role of new technologies in changing patterns of use and assessments of value for 
different categories of users, and the increased disparity in wealth and infiuence within a community of 
users or between categories of users, which makes it more difficult to regulate use and to enforce 
rules ...... .Tragedy in a commons is produced not by the inevitable confrontation between a self-
interested, asocial individual and an impersonal group, but by the inability of members of social groups 
to find (partial) solutions to competition and conflict." 
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Despite these many weaknesses of the resource management system in Tyefu 
Location, I would argue that, to the extent that the natural resource base still makes a 
significant contribution to the subsistence needs of many rural imizi, and particularly to 
those of the poorest imizi, it does so precisely because of the flexibility of the system, 
itself made possible by the advanced degree of institutional collapse. This systemic 
flexibility allows individuals and groups of resource users the space to negotiate and 
manipulate the use and management of natural resources to their own best advantage 
-as in the case of the move to the Outspan sites - even in the resource-poor 
environments that have come to characterise the villages of Tyefu Location. 
In the absence of an effective resource management regime and institutional framework 
- problems that are compounded by the modified communal tenure regime in the area, 
but not necessarily caused by it - the livelihoods of large numbers of people can be 
supplemented by essentially unregulated and indeed, predatory, resource extraction. 
This means that the natural resources that are available to people, by virtue of their 
membership of these villages, constitute an important social safety net to poorer 
people, but the price is, in Tyefu Location at least, resource degradation and potential 
conflict over resources' 
Finally, I want to problematise the notion of communal tenure itself. I have argued in 
this thesis that the communal tenure system in Tyefu Location is 'modified' in the sense 
that a central feature of the 'traditional' tenure regimes, on which colonial models of 
communal tenure were apparently based, was the ability of rural people to expand into 
new areas when the resources in their immediate locality become exhausted. This 
ability to expand and resettle in well-resourced areas, while it does still occur (such as 
in the case of the Outspan sites), has been severely curtailed by the fact that the land 
is state-owned and that previously independent 'indigenous' institutions, such as the 
chieftaincy, have all but ceased to administer the affairs of people here, that the 
location is enclosed by fences and that large numbers of people have moved into the 
area, so that overcrowding has undermined many of the norms that are said to have 
4 But it is certainly not alone in exhibiting these features - for striking similarities to the situation 
in Tyefu Location see studies conducted in oBivane, KwaZulu/Natal, (Huggins 1993), and in Mhezi 
Ward, in the Communal Lands of Zimbabwe, (Moyo 1995). 
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characterised pre-colonial communal tenure systems (see Peters 1994:9-10). 
My first point in this regard is that it is important to stress that the 'communal tenure' 
system in Tyefu Location cannot be equated with 'traditional' tenure patterns in these 
areas, because the way in which people access and manage their resources has been 
transformed into something different. Just what this 'something different' actually 
entails, is the second point I want to address. The notion that within modified communal 
tenure areas like Tyefu Location, despite the overcrowding and degraded state of 
resources, there exist latent or actual 'systems' (including viable or potentially viable 
institutions) of natural resource management, which are premised on notions of 
collective decision-making and collective action (and which can 'empowered' to function 
democratically and equitably), is deeply problematicS If I have tried to demonstrate 
anything in this thesis, it is that, certainly in Tyefu Location, the management of natural 
resources is highly contested, individualised, subject to the attentions of weak rural 
institutions that do not share a clear set of resource management objectives, and thus 
extremely difficult to co-ordinate and to sustain. 
As the Outspan case-study demonstrates, two areas in particular will remain highly 
contested . Firstly, individuals and groups of people linked to Gwabeni imizi, will 
continue to make attempts to excise parts of what many residents view as the common 
pool resources of the village and of Tyefu Location, for their own purposes. How 
successful these attempts will be over the long-term, and what mechanisms (if any) 
they will put in place to manage the natural resources they excise in this way, remains 
to be seen. 
Secondly, the definition of the 'community' of people that have rights to use natural 
resources at village and location levels, will be a rich source of contestation. As long 
as the dispersion of the umzi does not undermine the rights of those umzi members 
who reside elsewhere from having a stake in the management of natural resources in 
the village, any definitions of a specific 'community' responsible for such management 
wi ll be contentious. As Li (1996:509) argues, 'images of community are central to 
5 See Department of Land Affairs (1997:66-68) . 
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questions of resource access ... .... not because of guaranteed rights provided by rules 
and traditions, nor because of any self-evident qualities of moral economy, but as 
culturally available points of leverage in ongoing processes of negotiation." 
Whether the causes that give rise to the resource management situation in Tyefu 
Location are widespread and prevalent in other areas that are subjected to modified 
communal tenure, is one area that would require empirical investigation. Another area 
of empirical interest is to understand more clearly the factors that underpin the ongoing 
social transformation of rural existence in places like Tyefu Location, from an agrarian 
lifestyle, to one in which (what appear to be) essentially post-agrarian concerns of 
accessibility and service provision are priorities for rural and urban-based people 
(Peters 1994:227). Conducting research into the feasibility of 'building' village level 
institutions that are able to take on the thorny task of moving natural resource 
management practices in areas like Tyefu Location, towards more sustainability, 
without undermining or threatening the flexibility that a foothold in these areas offers 
many people, would also be time well spent. 
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